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 Abstract  
Judges and courts play a vital role in the development of law and politics in the 
countries of the Arab Middle East. But, despite their importance, there is a gap 
in legal scholarship about the significance and function of judges across the 
region. The small amount of previous research on Arab judiciaries has focused 
primarily on formal descriptions of the judicial role, particularly from a 
comparative perspective with Western judiciaries. This research aims to 
address this gap in scholarship by: 
 
(1) Developing a new typology of judicial systems in the Arab Middle East, 
reflected in the judicial systems Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and 
Jordan; 
(2) Surveying Arab judges across the region about their role perceptions, 
attitudes to law and politics and their personal experiences as judges. 
(3) Profiling Arab judges, based on information on LinkedIn, to assess their 
educational background and professional experiences prior to 
appointment. 
 
The thesis encompasses three inter-related studies. The first study draws on 
primary and secondary material to map and create a typology of representative 
judicial systems in the region. This draws on existing typologies of judicial 
systems in Western democracies but develops this further by identifying 
whether there are unique elements to judicial systems in the region. The 
second study is an online survey of 65 judges from six Arab countries exploring 
their judicial role. This is believed to be the first-ever survey of Arab judges to 
explore these issues. The third study profiles the educational and professional 
experiences of 112 judges based on their profiles obtained from the online 
professional platform, LinkedIN.  
 
The three studies provide for an initial insight into the significance of an 
important group in the Arab region that has traditionally not been the subject 
of empirical research. The thesis explores Arab judicial systems and judicial 
roles through an interdisciplinary prism, drawing on methods found in political 
 science, sociology, social psychology and law. The thesis also explores how 
the role and significance of Arab courts and judges fit within the wider 
scholarship on judicial behaviour and role perceptions.  
  
 Impact Statement  
Despite their essential societal role in imparting justice, little is known about 
judges in the Arab Middle East, in particular, how judges perceive their role 
and how this perception might affect their decision-making. What little previous 
research there is on judges in the region has not focused on judicial role 
conceptions, and there has been little to no work that takes a comparative and 
interdisciplinary perspective on this topic. Exploring the judicial role therefore 
provides for a broader understanding in an otherwise under-developed area of 
judicial studies and Arab Middle Eastern law.  
 
This research is an inter-disciplinary and empirical work on judges in the Arab 
Middle East and the findings offer a first insight into the role of Arab judges. It 
is believed that the knowledge, analysis, discovery and insight provided in this 
thesis could be put to a beneficial use within academia and beyond. This study 
is able to: 
• Describe the interactions between judges, including their interactions 
with other parts of the political system; 
• Explore possible behavioural regularities within the community of 
judges, as well as the formal and informal requirements of behaviour. 
• Provide an understanding of the differences and similarities that judges 
have in the perception of their role; 
• Provide an understanding of Arab judges’ role outside the legal system; 
• Shed light on the similarities and differences of judicial role perceptions 
within the Arab region and between judges in the Arab region, in civil 
law jurisdictions and common law jurisdictions. 
 
Academic impact  
The insights provided in this research highlight the need to promote, deepen 
and widen academic scholarship on the judiciary in the Arab region that is 
empirically grounded. This research significantly advances academic 
knowledge of Middle Eastern law and society from an inter-disciplinary 
approach. The research begins to build the necessary evidence-based 
 knowledge to further judicial studies in the Arab region and beyond. 
Specifically, this research will help to enhance academic links between the 
Arab Middle East and the West on judicial research.  
 
Wider impact 
Generally, this research will help to further intercultural dialogue and increase 
understanding of the justice sector in the Arab region. This research also has 
the potential for impact, regionally and internationally. From a policy 
perspective, the research will enable those interested in the region to 
understand the values, attitudes and significance of the judges in the region. 
 
This research will also equip policy-makers, third sector organisations and 
practitioners with solid and evidence-based knowledge about judges and 
courts that can guide future policy making and activities in the region. The 
findings from this research will be disseminated beyond academia through 
policy-papers, briefing reports and articles in the mainstream media.
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 Glossary  
 
Arabic Term 
 
English translation 
 
Maḥakem al-ta’dibīah Disciplinary Courts 
Maḥakem al-‘amaliah Labour courts  
Maḥakem al-‘amma General courts 
Al-Majlis al-‘adli Lebanese Supreme Judicial Council 
Maḥakem al-aḥwal al Shakhsīa Courts of personal status 
Al Qaḍā’ al-‘adi The ordinary judicial branch  
Al-khilāfa al-Rāshidah,  
“Al-Rāshidun” 
 
(lit. “The rightly guided caliphs”). The first of 
the four major caliphates established after 
the death of Prophet Muḥammad. 
Maḥakem al-‘askariyah Military Courts 
Banū ʾUmayya 
 
Clan of the Quraysh tribe descended from 
Umayya ibn Abd Shams  
Maḥakem al-Beaeyah Environmental Courts 
Dawa’er 
(lit. “circuits”). such as the appeal circuits in 
Saudi Arabia 
Maḥakem al-dinīah Religious courts 
Dīwān al-mazalem 
 
(lit. the “Board of Grievances”). Refers here 
to the Saudi administrative judicial branch  
Maḥkmah al-dostoriah al-‘ulīah The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court  
Maḥakem al-ebtidaīah Courts of first instance  
Maḥakem al-eqtisadīah Economic Courts 
Ghoraf al-ibtidaīah Primary court chambers in Lebanon  
Ḥadīth 
Prophetic traditions; reports of what the 
Prophet had said, done and or tacitly 
approved. Constitutes the second source of 
Islamic law and after the authority of the 
Qurʾān, the holy book of Islam. 
Haīya al-qaḍā’īa al-dawla The State Lawsuit Authority (as in Egypt) 
Ḥakam  
(pl. Ḥukkam) 
(lit. “arbiter”, “umpire”, “judge”). Also 
referred to the pre-Islamic tribal arbiter 
 whose decision, was usually accepted by 
the two parties to a conflict. 
Ḥanafī 
One of the four Islamic Sunni Islamic 
schools of jurisprudence named after the 
scholar Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān (699 – 767) 
Ḥanbalī 
One of the four Islamic Sunni Islamic 
schools of jurisprudence named after the 
scholar Aḥmad bin Muḥammad bin Ḥanbal 
(780–855)  
Hatt-ı hümâyûn  
(Turkish) 
An official document or note composed by 
an Ottoman Sultan 
Ḥukum ‘ashaīrī Bedouin tribal law  
Maḥkamat al-idarīah al-‘Ulīah 
The High Administrative Court in Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt 
Maḥakem al-idarīah Administrative courts  
Ijtihād 
Islamic legal term referring to the process of 
legal reasoning and hermeneutics through 
which the jurist (mujtahid) derives or 
rationalises law on the basis of the Qurʾān 
and the Sunnah.  
Maḥakem al-Isti’naf al-Idarīah Administrative Courts of Appeal 
Maḥakem- al-isti’nafīah Ordinary Courts of  Appeal 
Maḥakem isti’naf al-jamarek 
Jordanian courts of appeal dealing with 
custom and income tax disputes. 
Istiḥsān 
(lit. “to approve”, “to deem preferable” 
Relates to the juristic preference of 
exercising personal opinion in order to avoid 
rigidity and unfairness that may result from 
literal enforcement of the existing law 
Maḥkamat al-Jenaīat Criminal courts   
Maḥakem al-khassa Special courts 
Madhhab 
Referred here as a doctrinal school of Sunni 
Islamic Law  
Majlis al-dostori The Constitutional Council (as in Lebanon) 
Majlis al-shura The Advisory Council (as in Lebanon) 
 Majlis al-qādā 
A court or place where judicial activity is 
performed.  
Mālikī 
One of the four Islamic Sunni Islamic 
schools of jurisprudence named after the 
scholar Mālik ibn Anas 
711–795 CE 
Mecelle-ʾi Aḥkām-ı ʿAdlīye, 
“Mejelle” 
(Turkish) 
Civil code of the Ottoman Empire entered 
into force in 1877. The Mejelle was the first 
attempt to codify a part of the Sharī’ʿa -
based law  
Moḥafazat Lit. Districts 
Maḥākim al-mukhṭaliṭah 
 
Egyptian Mixed courts 1875-1949 in which 
international judges and heard disputes by 
Egyptians and foreigners. The Mixed Court 
Codes were mainly based on civil law.  
Nāʾib Lit. “Representative,” “delegate”, “deputy”  
Maḥkamat al-naqth Egyptian Court of Cassation 
Maḥakem al-Nizamyieh Ordinary (“secular”) courts (as in Jordan)  
Nizamyieh Courts 
The secular court system introduced within 
the Ottoman Empire in 1864 as part of the 
Ottoman reforms, the Tanẓīmāt.  
Qaḍā’ 
Judgeship, encompassing  the entire range 
of a judge’s judicial activities. 
Qāḍī 
 
Arabic word for a judge  
Qāḍī al-Quḍāt Chief justice  
Qiyās 
A fourth source of Islamic law often referred 
to be the process of deductive analogy in 
Islamic jurisprudence.  
 
Maḥkamat al-quthaa al-idari 
The Egyptian Court of Administrative 
Justice  
Ra’y 
(lit. “opinion”). In Islamic law, refers to a 
discretionary opinion or reasoning based on 
precedent  
 Shafi’ī 
One of the four schools of Sunni Islamic law 
and jurisprudence named by Muḥammad 
ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (767-820) 
Maḥakim al-sharī’ʿa Sharī’ʿa Courts (as in Saudi Arabia)  
Sharī’ʿa Islamic law  
Sunnah 
Second most important source of authority 
for Muslims and which the bulk of Islamic 
law derives from. Sunnah refers to the 
practices, customs and traditions of the 
Prophet Muḥammad See also Ḥadīth 
Maḥakem al-sulḥ Jordanian Magistrate Courts 
Maḥkamat al-tamwīz 
Supreme Courts (as in Lebanon, Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia)  
Tanẓīmāt-i Hayriye,  
“Tanẓīmāt” 
(Turkish) 
(lit. “the auspicious reorganisation”). A 
series of reforms promulgated in the 
Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876. 
The reforms were influenced by European 
ideas and intended to fundamentally 
modernise the Empire from an old 
theocratic system to a modern state.  
Maḥakem al-tejareeya Commercial courts 
Al-Maḥkama al-‘uliyah The High Court (as in Saudi Arabia)  
Maḥakem al-usra The Family Courts (as in Egypt)  
Uṣūl al-fiqh 
(lit. “roots of legal philosophy, law”). The 
body of principles and investigative 
methodologies through which practical legal 
rules are developed from the foundational 
sources of Islamic law (the Qurʾān , the 
Sunnah (Ḥadīth), Ijmāʿ(scholarly 
consensus), and Qiyās (analogy). 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Judges in the Arab region (like any judges) are not mechanical appliers of the 
law.1 By virtue of the social roles they occupy, they are inextricably linked with 
their societies. This is especially true for states with complex social and 
political histories; judges cannot be regarded as de-historicised figures of 
authority “when the rule of law is infused with rival visions of social relations”.2 
It is against this backdrop that this thesis examines the nature of the judicial 
role in Arab countries, and the extent to which “judicialisation” is occurring in 
the Arab Middle East. This thesis presents an inter-disciplinary inquiry into the 
roles Arab judges occupy, their background and experiences, their own views 
and perceptions of the power and significance of judges in the Arab Middle 
East. 
Judges as political actors  
The fundamental objective of this thesis is to embark on an agenda of empirical 
research that is oriented towards a better understanding of Arab judges. 
Specifically, the aim is to unite well-established theories of judicial politics and 
empirical data in order to explore Arab judicial roles and their political 
significance. This study relies primarily on judicialisation of politics from which 
hypotheses can be deduced and empirical data against which to test the 
validity of these hypotheses. A central purpose of this research is to take a 
phenomenological approach where subjective perceptions, in addition to 
formal descriptions, of judicial roles are considered. With this approach, the 
thesis aims to arrive at a more systematic and realistic understanding of the 
judicial functions in the Arab region.  
 
Judicial politics3 is concerned with the study of courts and judges as political 
actors. Early 20th scholars, most notably in the US, began to argue that since 
                                               
1  Ibid. p.150. 
2  Ibid. p.152 
3 Judicial Politics is one of several labels that refers to the role and political significance of 
judges See Whittington KE, Kelemen RD and Caldeira GA, Overview of Law and Politics the 
Study of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2011)  
 3  
courts and judges are part of the government, they are naturally part of the 
country’s political process: “the court is part of politics even if it is a court of 
law, because all law is part of politics”.4 The basic premise of judicial politics 
adopts the Aristotelian definition of politics, i.e. politics is understood as the 
affairs of the community in which citizens participate. Along these terms, 
politics does not refer to ideologies or rationalisations of the will of the 
majority.5 Rather, politics is understood as involving the creation and the 
pursuit of a moral community where law becomes an instrument and a product 
of this pursuit6:  
“The political jurist begins with what any fool could plainly see if his eyes 
were not beclouded by centuries of legal writing, that judges and courts 
are an integral part of government and politics [...] and are, therefore, 
first and foremost political actors and agencies”.7 
 
From this premise, law and legal institutions are understood as cogs of the 
political apparatus; and its actors - judges - are conceived of as political actors. 
Judges’ functions’ and outputs, therefore, are of importance as they directly or 
indirectly participate in the political sphere, because “law is a product of politics 
and judges are governors”.8 This participation is magnified at the highest 
courts since supreme (or apex) courts are the “titular head of the legal-political 
apparatus of the government”.9 It would therefore be erroneous to understand 
judges as mere mouthpieces of the law since they are part and parcel of the 
political process. Even if we were to perceive judges as law-interpreters, the 
judge will nonetheless participate in creating it. As Kelsen writes: “judicial 
decisions are not and can never be purely declaratory of the law”.10  
 
                                               
4 Martin Shapiro, (1988)  Morality and the Politics of Judging, 63 Tul. L. Rev. p.1556 
5 Ibid.See also Dyevre A, (2010) ‘Unifying the Field of Comparative Judicial Politics: Towards 
a General Theory of Judicial Behaviour’, 2 European Political Science Review 297 
6 Brian Z. Tamanaha, (2012) ‘The Several Meanings Of “Politics” In Judicial Politics Studies: 
Why “Ideological Influence” Is Not “Partisanship”’, 61 Emory L.J. 759, 4 See also Martin 
Shapiro, (1988)  Morality and the Politics of Judging, 63 Tul. L. Rev. p. 1558 
7 Shapiro MM and Stone Sweet A, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization (Oxford University 
Press 2002), p.22  
8 Martin Shapiro, (1988)  Morality and the Politics of Judging, 63 Tul. L. Rev. p. 1559 
9 Brian Z. Tamanaha, (2012) ‘The Several Meanings Of “Politics” In Judicial Politics Studies: 
Why “Ideological Influence” Is Not “Partisanship”’, 61 Emory L.J. 759, 4, p.773 
10 Kelsen, H. (1926), Grundriβ einer allgemeinen Theone des Staates. Wien: R. M. Rohmer. 
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Studies of courts and judges have grown rapidly in recent years and have 
begun to acquire international dimensions. According to Whittington et al., 
questions similar to those previously asked in the American judicial context are 
now being asked in democratic and non-democratic regimes alike: how do law 
and courts fit into the political and social environment?11 Although researchers 
have traditionally focused on explaining variation in judicial decision-making, 
contemporary judicial research is increasingly taking a broader approach to 
understand the political character of courts. Judicial politics research now 
involves analysing macro, meso and micro factors (both legal and extra-legal) 
that may have an impact on judicial activities (political significance). This thesis 
fits with this research trend in order to explore judicial functions and their 
political significance (in Aristotelian terms).  It seeks to explore Arab judicial 
functions by utilising the theoretical framework of judicialisation of politics.  
“Judicialisation of Politics” 
“Judicialisation” of politics (or the politicisation of the judiciary) refers in general 
to the involvement of judges in regulating, influencing and creating political 
decisions. According to Vallinder, judicialisation has two core meanings. The 
first sees judicialisation as the process by which the powers of courts and 
judges expand and increasingly begin to dominate the making of public 
policies (that have previously been made by other branches of government).12 
The second meaning refers to the process by which non-judicial decision-
making forums become dominated by legal/judicial terminology, rules and 
procedures.13  Both meanings are a type of judicialisation that is “inextricable 
from law’s capture of social relationships and popular culture, and its 
expropriation of social conflicts”.14 As a consequence, courts and associated 
legal processes become a preferred venue for and are relied upon to offer 
solutions to the public. When the right circumstances exist, courts will have the 
                                               
11 Whittington KE, Kelemen RD and Caldeira GA, Overview of Law and Politics the Study of 
Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 6 
12  C Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder (eds), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. (NYU 
Press 1995) p.13. 
13  Ibid. p.13. 
14  Ran Hirschl, ‘The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide’ 
(2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 721, p.723. 
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upper hand when the legislature is too fragmented to react.15 According to the 
“rights hypothesis”16, courts can protect a wide range of values against political 
abuse mainly through “ordinary” constitutional rights jurisprudence.17  
 
While judicialisation may have first been explored in the American context, the 
social and political significance of the judiciary has now used to analyse the 
role of courts in contemporary modern democracies.18 Similarly, judicialisation 
appears to be a phenomenon in states with a transitional democracy. For 
instance, several high courts in Latin American states have in recent years 
cast themselves as defenders of rights and chosen to intervene in significant 
political controversies.19 As for non-democratic states, the prevailing view 
seems to suggest that judicialisation is difficult to imagine. While recognising 
that the expansion of judicial power is on the rise around the world, Tate and 
Vallinder hold steadfast to the idea that a democracy is a prerequisite: 
“Perhaps the most important of these conditions is the presence of liberal 
democracy.”20 The belief is that in authoritarian regimes, it would be highly 
unlikely to even nominally allow independent judges to increase their 
participation in the making of major public policies or to tolerate judicial 
decision-making processes which place emphasis on legalistic procedural 
rules.  
 
                                               
15  John Ferejohn, “Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law” (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 41, p.55. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. 
18  For instance Guarnieri and Pederzoli write that “a democracy with strong judicial power is 
unquestionably a stronger democracy, since it is a polity where the rights of citizens are better 
protected[…] while it is not a new phenomenon in the United States, in recent years it has 
taken on increasing significance in European democracies, such as Britain and Germany, and 
especially in Latin European Countries such as France, Portugal, Spain, and Italy see Carlo 
Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and 
Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.78. 
19  Although judicialisation unfolds in a context that is in important ways different from that of 
developed countries with longer histories of centralization of power, resort to courts has been 
increasingly used by activists throughout the region as a “portal through which to import 
favorable international norms” see Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden and Alan Angell (eds), The 
Judicialization of Politics in Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan 2005). p.5 
20  Torbjörn Vallinder “When the Courts Go Marching in” C Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder 
(eds), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press 1995), p.526.   
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The presence of democratic government therefore appears to be a necessary 
condition for the judicialisation of politics.21 The existence of written 
constitutional provisions for example, would facilitate judicialisation in terms of 
judicial protection of rights and liberties. This is because the effectiveness of 
rights provisions in contributing to social change in any given polity is largely 
contingent upon the existence of a support structure for legal mobilisation, and 
more generally, socio-cultural conditions that are hospitable to  judicialisation. 
These are usually understood to prevail only alongside democratic 
governments.  
Judicialisation beyond Western liberal democracies  
Recent literature suggests that judicialisation may in fact be regarded as a 
worldwide phenomenon and may exist despite the authoritarian character of 
some states.22 According to Hirschl, there is an increasing reliance on judges 
and courts to deal with core political controversies, including in non-democratic 
states.23 He terms this the “judicialisation of mega-politics”, where he 
distinguishes between judicial involvement relating to procedural justice issues 
(basic “judicialisation”) and judicial involvement in substantive moral dilemmas 
affecting the whole nation (“mega-politics”).24 “Judicialisation of mega-politics” 
is a type of judicialisation that takes on an extreme shape that “exceeds any 
previous limit”.25 Hirschl calls this a “juristocracy” in which courts decide on 
watershed political questions that face a nation. Hirschl’s concepts arguably 
describes a form of judicialisation that is un-democratic in character. Hirschl’s 
concept of “juristocracy” or “mega-politics” may capture some cases of 
judicialisation in the Arab Middle-East, particularly the role played by Egyptian 
                                               
21  See generally Martin M Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization 
(Oxford University Press 2002); C Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder (eds), The Global 
Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press 1995). 
22  Peter H Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes” (2007) 60 World Politics, 
p.122 
23  Hirschl lists subcategories of this type some of which relates to a judicialization of electoral 
processes; judicial scrutiny of executive branch prerogatives; Judicialization of formative 
collective identity, Hirschl argues that this is the most problematic type of judicialisation from 
a constitutional theory standpoint.  See Ran Hirschl, “The New Constitutionalism and the 
Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide” (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 721, 
24  Ibid. p.723      
25  Ibid.  
 7  
courts during the so-called Arab Spring. Brown for example describes the 
Egyptian judiciary along the lines of Hirschl’s juristocracy where:  
“the judiciary went beyond resisting partisan oversight and tried to make 
itself self-perpetuating to a degree that undermined democratic 
mechanisms. Judges had the means not merely to defend against 
encroachments on judicial turf by parliament and the presidency, but to 
undermine these institutions by striking at their legal basis.” 26    
 
 
The recent political and social conflicts in many Arab states did not arise in a 
vacuum, nor were they the first instances of protest in the region. Historical 
experiences of occupation and colonialism, followed by varying efforts of 
independence, have made a lasting impact on the political and legal orders of 
a number of Arab states. Although the political character of courts may have 
been exacerbated during the Arab Spring, their political role and significance 
was not a phenomenon arising out of it.27 The impression that the Arab Spring 
constituted a judicial rupture fails to capture the complexity of judicial roles in 
the region. 
 
A critical question examined in this study is whether there are other less 
controversial examples of judicialisation that can be seen in Arab states. 
Specifically, the aim is to explore whether or not judges and courts in the Arab 
Middle East have “political” dimensions attached to them as a result of the 
historical, religious, social and cultural developments of the region. In doing so 
the thesis explores the following questions about judicialisation in the Arab 
Middle East:  
 
• Is the judicial role in Arab jurisdictions different from Western judges?   
• Have courts in the Arab region always been a preferred venue for and 
relied upon to offer solutions to the public?   
                                               
26 Nathan Brown, ‘Tracking the Arab Spring: Egypt’s Failed Transition’ (2013) 24 
Journal of Democracy 45, p.53. 
27Sultany for example, argues that there was no qualitative change in terms of judicial tasks 
before and during the Arab Spring, and that the difference has been one of “degree rather 
than kind” Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the 
Arab Spring (First edition, Oxford University Press 2017, p.150 
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• Is it possible that the socio-cultural conditions in Arab states have 
always been hospitable to judicialisation, despite the lack of a liberal 
democratic government?  
• If so, does this suggest that judicialisation is not exclusively a trait of 
contemporary democracies or is it a new phenomenon arising out of the 
“rights hypothesis”? 
 
This thesis sets out to examine the various strands of judicialisation that may 
operate within the Arab region, the sources of such powers for courts and 
judges in the region and whether the way Arab judges view their role provides 
further evidence of judicialisation in the Arab Middle East. 
Research questions  
As mentioned above, this thesis is intended to contribute to our understanding 
of Arab judicial roles as political actors. It draws on established research 
procedures found in judicial studies that has sought to study courts as part of 
the political system and to investigate individual behaviour of judges. In other 
words, the thesis sets out to explore judges and courts in the Arab region by 
using three modes of analysis found in judicialisation of politics: institutional, 
functional and behavioural. The foundational research questions of this 
research are as follows:  
 
1. Does the composition and organisation of courts in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon and Jordan indicate a judicialisation of politics?  
2. Does judicial selection, training, career, and discipline in the Egyptian, 
Saudi Arabian, Lebanese and Jordanian judiciaries promote or impede 
judicial activism?   
3. What are judges prior (and concurrent) career experiences and sources of 
individualisation? 
4. How may these affect judicial role perceptions of Arab judges?  
5. What norms and expectations might Arab judges have about their jobs as 
judges? 
6. To what extend does individual judges identify themselves as part of a 
judicial collective?  
 9  
7. What norms and expectations might Arab judges have towards their peers 
within the judicial community and towards non-judicial actors?  
Assessing the political significance of judges 
It has been argued that three key elements affect the political significance of 
the courts: (1) the structure of the judicial system in which judges operate28, 
(2) judicial career structures29 and (3) judicial role conceptions.30 This thesis 
provides the first detailed examination of each of these three elements in 
relation to the Arab Middle East. 
Judicial system  
The aim of this thesis does not seek to explore judicial roles in isolation, but 
rather, Arab judicial roles in context. In order to do so, the context in which 
judges are found, the judicial system must also be considered. In particular, 
how the institutions are arranged and the limits placed on judicial activities:  
 
“Institutions typically have formal and relatively explicit informal 
expectations that are reinforced through incentive and sanctioning 
mechanisms. Institutional expectations always serve to limit choice and 
discretion on the part of the members of the institution”.31  
 
According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, a political system can use two different 
sets of instruments to exert influence on courts.32 One mechanism is an 
indirect strategy aimed at reducing the impact of judicial decisions by limiting 
court jurisdiction, and thereby restricting judges’ role in the resolution of 
political disputes.33 The second element that affects judges’ scope for political 
participation is the actual organisation of the judicial system.34 For instance, 
the greater power supreme (or apex) courts have in promoting greater 
                                               
28  See Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) 
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid. 
31 James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p.17 
32  Ibid. p.79 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
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coherence in the judicial system, the greater the likelihood is of that court being 
politically significant.  
 
Generally, jurisdiction over cases can be described as either concentrated into 
a unitary system of courts or fragmented into a plurality of different courts 
with their own separate hierarchical structures.35 Rather than a unified system 
of courts with far-reaching jurisdictional scope, fragmented systems have 
exceptional courts running alongside the regular courts in which politically 
sensitive cases are channelled.36 As Guarnieri and Pederzoli explain, this type 
of fragmentation strategy usually limits the sphere of judicial action and is often 
adopted by authoritarian regimes to prevent ordinary judiciaries from direct 
involvement in political cases.37 In these types of situations, judicial autonomy 
only exists alongside a lack of political significance. The fragmentation of the 
judicial system can therefore be seen as a means of politically neutralising 
ordinary courts while preserving their institutional independence. As Toharia 
notes, here judges become “independent, because they are powerless”.38  
 
A second element affecting judges’ scope of political participation relates to 
the actual organisation of the judicial system, including the existence (or non-
existence) of judicial review of legislation.39 Conventionally, there are two 
models for the organisation of courts: (1) co-ordinate systems where lower 
and intermediate courts make the majority of decisions, and (2) hierarchical 
systems, where a substantial proportion of lower court decisions are re-
examined by a final appellate court.40 The two models highlight the role of 
supreme (or apex) courts and the institutional mechanisms in place to reinforce 
                                               
35  Ibid. 
36  Shapiro, Martin. "Appeal". Law & Society Review 14.3 (1980), p.629. 
37 Toharia, José J., "Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of 
Contemporary Spain". Law & Society Review 9.3 (1975), p.475.  
38  Ibid. 
39  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.81. 
40  Damaška, Mirjan. "Structures Of Authority And Comparative Criminal Procedure". The Yale 
Law Journal 84.3 (1975), p.480. 
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their authority.41 A strong decision-making court at the top that is centripetal 
in nature will be better equipped to ensure the consistency of judicial decisions, 
and therefore the final court is more likely to be politically significant.42 By 
contrast, a court of final appeal with a centrifugal dynamic tends to reduce 
internal consistency by promoting autonomy of lower and intermediate courts 
– but resulting in lower political significance for the apex court itself.43  
 
This thesis maps the approaches to the jurisdiction and organisation of courts 
in four Arab Middle Eastern countries as a first step in exploring whether the 
actual structure of the judiciary may indicate a form of judicialisation.   
Judicial selection and career 
A second element that may affect the growth of judicial power relates to 
individual judges themselves, including the actors that may influence their 
guarantees of judicial independence. These are known in Western 
democracies to have a direct bearing on the interactions between the judiciary 
and its political environment.44 The institutional position of those in charge of 
selecting, training, and promoting judges will also have a bearing on the 
guarantees of judicial independence and thus the extent to which courts have 
political significance. Judicial selection and career patterns have an impact on 
judicial growth in at least two ways. First, the way judges are recruited affects 
the social and professional composition of the bench. Second, the structure of 
judicial recruitment can indicate as to what relationships the judiciary has with 
actors outside the judiciary.45 Here, emphasis is placed on the institutional 
mechanisms governing elements important for the independence of judges.  
                                               
41  As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the relationship between courts and the relative 
strength of the highest courts in each of the four countries explored reflect different, but 
equally important, forms of political significance. A prime example of this in the Western 
context is the UK and France. Although the organization of courts and the interrelationship 
between courts in each country is structured differently, they reflect , albeit different, forms of 
judicialisation.     
42  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.81. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. Chapter 2 “Legal System”. 
45 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.18 
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In the Western context, a distinction is generally made between two patterns 
of judicial recruitment: the bureaucratic model and the professional model 
of recruitment.46 The two patterns are said to reflect the continental European 
(civil law) and Anglo-American (common law) approaches, respectively.47 The 
bureaucratic model tends to recruit young candidates into the judiciary with 
little or no prior professional experience.48 In the bureaucratic model, 
socialisation is described as achieved almost exclusively from within. Upon 
entry into the judiciary candidates will learn the required norms and approved 
organisational behaviours in order to effectively participate in the judiciary.49 
Career advancement under the bureaucratic model is competitive and granted 
according to formal criteria of seniority and merit where hierarchical superiors 
have a wide discretion.50 By contrast, in the professional model, entry into the 
judiciary is usually confined to individuals with extensive professional practice 
and experience in the law. Under the professional model, candidates have 
been socialised outside the judiciary and, although a degree of 
“resocialisation” can occur within the judiciary, candidates are more likely to 
bring values and experiences from outside the judiciary into their working life 
as judges. Candidates are also likely to maintain ties with their former 
colleagues in the legal profession.51 Under the professional model, there are 
no formal criteria for advancement and they occur less frequently compared to 
career advancement under the bureaucratic model. In addition, higher-ranking 
judges tend to exert influence in the promotion of judges from lower ranks.52  
 
                                               
46  Ibid. p.81 
47  See generally Mirjan R Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative 
Approach to the Legal Process (Yale Univ Press 1986). 
48  C Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder (eds), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New 
York University Press 1995), p.158. 
49  Giuseppe Di Federico, “The Italian Judicial Profession and Its Bureaucratic Setting” (1976) 
Part 1, Law Journal of Scottish Universities, pp. 40, p.47. 
50  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002)  p.20. 
51  Ibid.  
52  Ibid. p.66. 
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Guarnieri and Pederzoli argue that in both models courts are not insulated from 
the political environment.53 For a professional judiciary, “influence of the 
political system is channelled primarily through the appointment process”54, 
whereas in a bureaucratic judiciary, the “political influence is filtered through 
the hierarchical structure and procedures for career advancements”.55 To gain 
a fuller understanding of judicial selection and career patterns, this thesis sets 
out, for the first time, the variety of approaches used in four Arab Middle 
Eastern judiciaries. The two traditional models of recruitment are compared 
and contrasted with those in the region in order to assess whether they can be 
accurately used in the region.  
Judicial role conceptions  
Judges’ willingness to take on a politically significant role is also a key factor 
in the political significance of courts. This third element falls under the 
framework of role theory, and it relates to individual judges themselves and 
how they conceive of their roles as judges. It includes individual judges’ beliefs 
about the qualities, behaviours and characteristics suitable for a judicial role.56 
Within this framework, judges’ role perceptions relate to the subjective aspect 
found in the mind of the individual judge.  
 
In this study, how Arab judges subjectively understand and conceive of their 
roles is explored in three ways. The first element examines judges’ own 
personalities and capacities, which relates to the processes through which 
attitudes, values and role conceptions are acquired.57 The second element 
involves an examination of the possible objectives judges perceive as 
important in the performance of their judicial roles. Included in these objectives 
                                               
53  Ibid. p.64. 
54  Ibid. p.66. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Central to role theory is the idea of role expectations which is understood to be the beliefs 
concerning the qualities, behaviours, and characteristics suitable to a specific social role. See 
generally Bruce J Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic 
Press 1979) 
57  James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p.26 
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are norms that guide their behaviour. By extension, they also include the 
individual judge’s internalised impressions of societal norms and expectations 
of what constitutes the role of a judge.58 The third element relates to individual 
judges’ expectations of what constitutes proper judicial behaviour in relation 
to other judges (judicial peers) and other politically significant people outside 
judiciary (non-judicial actors). In this thesis all three elements are examined 
for the first time from the individual Arab judge’s viewpoint as a further step in 
seeking insight into the political significance of judges and courts in the region. 
Are judges human? The development of judicial behaviouralism 
This thesis fits within the body of judicial scholarship that sees judges not as 
mechanical appliers of the law but as human beings. During the first half of the 
20th century, American legal and political scholars increasingly began to 
challenge the traditional understanding of judges as “value-free technicians 
who do no more than discover the law”.59 Early works viewed the judicial 
process as “situated in a political context and saw judicial decision-making as 
influenced by overtly political factors”.60 This view was based on the premise 
that the unique features of the American common law tradition rendered 
judges and courts susceptible to political pressure.61  
 
                                               
58  “Generalised other” is George Herbert Mead’s term for the collection of roles and attitudes 
that people use as a reference point for figuring out how to behave in a given situation. See 
generally George Herbert Mead, Charles W Morris and George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and 
Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Univ of Chicago Press 2000). 
59  Walter F Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Study of Public Law (1st ed, Random House 
1972) p.13. 
60  Nancy Maveety (ed), The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (University of Michigan Press 2003), 
p.2. 
61  For Haines who was a legal realist, judicial decisions were political acts by virtue of the law 
itself which was a ‘process for constructing political values and legal interpretation was always 
influenced by dee political forces that shaped judicial attitudes at the affective and cognitive 
level’ Because elected institutions ‘believe they may be able to achieve their aims through 
judicial decisions, often on much better terms than via other branches’. See Cornell W Clayton 
and Howard Gillman (eds), Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 
(University of Chicago Press 1999), p. 21.  
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Early empirical studies, such as those of Haines and Pritchett62 drew 
inspiration from psychological and sociological theories on human behaviour 
in order to challenge the mechanistic model of judging espoused by legal 
formalism.63 As Haines wrote:  
“And a complex thing like a judicial decision involves factors, 
personal and legal, which carry us to the very roots of human 
nature and human conduct. Political prejudices, the influences of 
narrow and limited legal training with antiquated legal principles 
and traditions, or class bias having little or no relation to wealth 
or property interests, are more likely to affect the decisions of 
judges than so-called ‘economic interests’.”64 
 
The “behavioural revolution” of the 20th century generated numerous studies 
of judicial and court behaviour in the U.S, exploring whether policy preferences 
and partisan influences were related to judicial voting behaviour”.65 In 
analysing U.S Supreme Court decisions, scholars began to recognise that 
“decisions made by judges appeared to be correlated to extra-legal attributes 
such as background, training and personality”.66 Maveety argues that this 
behavioural revolution of the 1940s and 1950s was the most important point 
in the development of the discipline of political science.67 This new movement 
endeavoured to understand judges as political actors and centred around 
“judges’ concern with the content of their decisions” aimed at discovering 
                                               
62  See for example Pritchett’s “the Roosevelt Court”, his seminal work on U.S judicial politics. 
C Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947 
(2014). 
63  Nancy Maveety (ed), The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (University of Michigan Press 2003), 
p.2. 
64  Haines, Charles Grove, ‘“General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and 
Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges,”’ (1922) 17 Illinois Law Review 96, p.116. 
65  American judges have been affected by the evolution of the American political system. The 
unique features of the American common law judicial system, and in particular the political 
nature the judiciary, have made the judiciary susceptible to political pressure because elected 
institutions “believe they may be able to achieve their aims through judicial decisions, often on 
much better terms than via other branches. Nancy Maveety (ed), The Pioneers of Judicial 
Behavior (University of Michigan Press 2003), p.9. 
66  Ibid. p.3. 
67  The “behavioural political science” movement was directed towards a more scientific and 
positivist practice of political inquiry. It marked a break from the traditional doctrinal school of 
thought that sought to emphasise theory and method and was, in Dahl’s words, “a protest 
movement against traditional political science”. See  Robert A Dahl, “The Behavioral Approach 
in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest” (1961) 55 American 
Political Science Review, p.763. 
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“political values that underlie judicial decisions”.68 Scholars have taken 
different approaches and used different methods in seeking to explore what 
judges do and why they do it. Although this has contributed towards scholarly 
understanding of judicial decision-making, no single approach or 
comprehensive theory has emerged as definitive in explaining the role and 
significance of judges. 
Understanding the role of judges in the Arab Middle East 
Social constraints and the types of expectations society will have on judges 
are partly determined by the particular attributes of the society in which the 
judge works. In other words, the judge’s role is determined by his/her society’s 
reality.69 Understanding the social context in which Arab judges operate is a 
complex endeavour. Behind the impression of a seemingly homogenous 
region, Arabic-speaking countries are both diverse and similar. The region is 
usually characterised by two common attributes: the dominant use of the 
Arabic language and the predominant adherence to the Islamic religion. 
However, on closer inspection, these attributes are themselves diverse. Islam 
varies widely across the region in several respects, such as practice, legal and 
theological orientation.70 Moreover, the religion’s role and significance in 
government and society differs from one Arab society to the next.71 The Arabic 
language spoken by 250 million people across the world is also dialectically 
different in its everyday usage.72 Modern “Arab countries” are divided along 
ethnicities, religious beliefs and culture. They are a result of a mixture of 
African, Hellenic, Roman, Ottoman and European influences.73 And the legal 
environment in the region reveals a similar complexity. Arab legal systems 
have never remained static: they have been subject to constant transformation 
                                               
68  Nancy Maveety (ed), The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (University of Michigan Press 2003), 
p.8. 
69  Peter L Berger, The Social Reality of Religion (Penguin 1973) p.20. 
70  See generally Farhad Daftary, “Varieties of Islam” in Robert Irwin (ed), The New Cambridge 
History of Islam (Cambridge University Press 2010).  
71  Ibid. 
72  James Lane, “The 10 Most Spoken Languages In The World” [2016] Babbel Magazine.  
73   Leila Rezk, “Monde Arabe et Diversité Culturelle -Les Enjeux de La Diversité Culturelle Au 
Nord et Au Sud” p.4  
 17  
and re-development.74  To explore the political significance of Arab judges and 
courts requires an understanding of this diversity of legal approaches and 
histories in the region.   
Western conceptions of the Arab judge 
The Arabic word for a judge is Qāḍī,75 and for over 1400 years the Qāḍī has 
occupied an important social role in Arab societies76. But Western conceptions 
of the Arab judge have often been clouded by a false perception of the Muslim 
Qāḍī. In 1906 American legal scholar Roscoe Pound77, warning of the 
implications of widening judicial discretion, wrote: 
“The judge, bound hand and foot by a code and the maxim that 
law is best which leaves least to the discretion of the judge, is 
our natural goal, not the oriental cadi administering justice at the 
city gate by the light tempered by the state of his digestion for 
the time being.”78 
 
In 1949, US Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter invoked a clearly 
pejorative view of the Qāḍī to argue that the Supreme Court was a court of 
review and not a tribunal unbounded by rules: “We do not sit like a kadi under 
a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual 
expediency”.79  
 
This image of the Muslim Qāḍī dispensing “oriental justice” as whimsical and 
unbound by rules is not uncommon. Throughout the 19th century and well into 
the present century, the Qāḍī has served as a yardstick for assessing the 
nature of judicial discretion. When Western jurisprudence shifted away from 
concern with natural law to emphasise procedure, code, and appellate 
                                               
74  This transformation and re-development of Arab legal systems is discussed in detail in 
Chapters 3 and 5. 
75  There are different Latin spellings of Qāḍī such as “cadi”, “kadi”, “kazi”. The study however 
will use Qāḍī throughout.  
76  The history and significance of the Islamic Qāḍī is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
77  Roscoe Pound (1870 –1964) was one of the leading figures of 20th century American legal 
and jurisprudential thought. 
78  Roscoe Pound, “The Decadence of Equity” (1905) 5 Columbia Law Review 20, p.21.  
79  337 U.S. 1 (69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131) Terminiello v. City of Chicago. No. 272. (1949).  
Here Frankfurter was echoing Lord Justice Goodard of the English Court of Appeal. 
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hierarchy, so too did the idea of natural justice.80 Perhaps the most famous 
usage of “Qāḍī-Justice” was attributed to Max Weber.81 Surveying other forms 
of law and legal thought, Weber found in Islamic law a failure to generate a 
system of general rules and, in Qāḍīs, a lack of resort to an established body 
of legal doctrine. Qāḍī-justice, in other words, had no rational rules of decision, 
and predictability was at a minimum.82 
 
The term “Qāḍī-Justice” still appears in use today in legal scholarship. 
Klabbers writes that the use of the term “Kadi justice” usually carries a 
pejorative meaning. It is thought of as the “impoverished cousin of true 
justice”83, whereas true justice has something to do with the rule of law: 
“whatever its contents, [true justice] has to be rule-based. The Kantian 
legacy exercises a strong hold on legal and philosophical minds alike. 
Kadi justice, by contrast, is explicitly not rule-based, and therewith 
considered somehow less useful in our day and age.”84 
 
The colouring of the Qāḍī in a negative hue is an unfortunate description of 
judges’ work in the Arab region, and it results in the role of Qāḍī being 
erroneously portrayed. It ignores more than five centuries of judicial practice 
that is characterised by diversity in opinion as well as practice. Not all Western 
jurists have ignored this rich history. In “Are Judges Human?” Jerome Frank 
noted that the use of “Kadi-justice” has become something of a curse. He 
admitted that while he knew little about the administration of justice by Qāḍīs, 
he knew that:  
“[R]ules and the like play much the same part in the theory of 
Mohammedan justice as in our own; that no more than in France, 
Germany, England or the United States, is the judge in Mohammedan 
countries supposed to decide cases arbitrarily.”85  
                                               
80 Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society 
(Cambridge University Press 1989)., p.58 
81 See Weber, M., Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (2013). Economy and society. Berkeley: Univ. of 
California Press 
82 Ibid, p.823 
83  Jan Klabbers, “Kadi Justice at the Security Council?” (2008) 4 International Organizations 
Law Review 293, p.7.  
84  Ibid. p.7. 
85  Frank continues “…and if someone happens to say in his presence that of course judges 
are incurably human and that their background and personality affect all their thinking and 
therefore their decisions, the Dicksonian will pronounce with Pound and Dickinson, the fatal 
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“Rules and the like” have been, and continue to be, equally important in 
dispensing justice in the Arab Middle East, including for Qāḍīs, whether they 
are religious or state judges. On this basis, this thesis aims seeks to offer a 
more nuanced view of judicial roles in the region, including how they perceive 
their functions.  
Thesis aims and organisation  
The main aim of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the political 
significance of judges and courts in the Arab Middle East. In order to do so it 
has three more specific objectives:  
• To develop a typology of judicial systems in the Arab Middle East that 
highlights the political significance of courts and judges, and explore the 
extent to which this typology differs from existing typologies of judicial 
systems in Western democracies; 
• To understand how the selection, training and careers of Arab judges may 
affect their political significance, drawing not just on formal explanations of 
these processes but also on the actual experiences of Arab judges based 
on new empirical research; and 
• To develop an understanding of Arab judicial role conceptions (including 
their political role) through the first survey undertaken of judges across the 
Arab Middle East on this topic. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, considers literature on judicial role conceptions 
and how judicial role conceptions can be important for the political significance 
of judges. The chapter also explores “ideal” qualities and attributes of Arab 
judges found in the region’s cultural, religious and legal principles. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a historical overview of the development of the judicial role 
and function in different countries of the Arab Middle East. The chapter 
                                               
words: ‘you are seeking a reversion to Cadi or oriental justice!’”. Jerome M. Frank, “Are Judges 
Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption That Judges Behave Like 
Human Beings” (1931) 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17,p. 24.  
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explores distinct long-term historical processes of judicial development that 
eventually resulted in the adoption and accommodation of two main judicial 
role conceptions: a religious-based conception of the judge and a “secular” 
based conception.86 With varying degrees, both role conceptions have 
contributed to the present judicial function in the region. Two formative phases 
in the evolution of the judicial role in the region are covered. The first phase 
traces the historical development of Islamic-based conceptions of the judicial 
role. The second phase explores the evolution of the Arab judicial role during 
the Ottomans and the colonial and post-colonial periods. The two phases are 
important historical factors for understanding the origins of the concept of a 
judge in the region, and they set the stage for the following chapters which 
explore current Arab judicial roles. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the different elements of the mixed methods approach 
adopted in this thesis. First, it sets out how the unique mapping and 
characterisation of Arab judicial systems was developed in this thesis. The 
chapter then sets out the empirical methods used in profiling the background 
of judges in the region, and it then explains the conceptual basis for and the 
empirical methods used in the survey of judicial attitudes on role conceptions 
in the Arab Middle East.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 all present results of the research. Chapter 5 sets out 
a new typology of Arab judicial systems. It focuses primarily on the judiciary in 
four Arab states: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan. The chapter 
argues that these four judicial systems reflect the range of different judicial 
models in the region that affect the political significance of judges and courts.  
 
Focusing on the four Arab states identified in Chapter 5 as judicial system 
“models”, Chapter 6 examines judicial selection, career and discipline in Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan as a means of exploring socialisation 
                                               
86  A “secular” judicial role is in itself a problematic concept, particularly in the Arab region 
where secularism is often associated with Western legal thought. However, in this study, a 
secular based conception of the judge encompasses several concepts that originate within the 
Arab region as well as those influenced from the West. 
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patterns that occur within these judiciaries. To understand the nature of judicial 
selection and career for Arab judges, the chapter draws on primary source 
documents from the region. But given the limited nature of official information 
sources on this topic, the chapter also draws on additional  information 
gathered specifically for this thesis through an analysis of over one hundred 
Arab judges’ professional profiles obtained from the online professional social 
network, LinkedIN.  
 
Chapter 7 explores the personal background of Arab judges; in particular, their 
prior education and professional experience before entering the judiciary. The 
chapter uses primary data from the analysis of Arab judges’ professional 
profiles on LinkedIN. The results in this chapter are meant to provide an initial 
insight into the educational and professional background of Arab judges in the 
absence of any other sources of information on this issue.  
 
Chapters 8 and 9 examine Arab judicial role perceptions, predominantly of 
judges from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon, based on findings from an 
online survey of Arab judges (the Arab Judges Survey) conducted for this 
thesis. Chapter 8 focuses on how Arab judges perceive their role in relation to 
the law and public policy, exploring the extent to which these judges appear to 
adopt positions of judicial activism or judicial restraint. This chapter also 
compares these findings from the Arab Judges Survey with similar studies of 
judicial role perceptions in common and civil law jurisdictions. 
 
Chapter 9 further explores Arab judicial role conceptions by examining Arab 
judges’ views of what constitutes the “proper” behaviour of a judge towards 
two key groups in their respective countries: (1) their judicial peers and (2) 
important non-judicial actors such as the executive, religious authorities and 
the public. The findings in this chapter are from the Arab Judges Survey 
conducted for this research. 
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The final chapter (Chapter 10) attempts to synthesise all the research findings 
to address the central question in this thesis: how can we begin to understand 
the role and significance of judges in the Arab Middle East?
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Chapter 2. Judicial role conceptions and the political 
significance of judges 
Judges have a social function that is interdependent with their society.87 This 
manifests itself in complex arrangements such as judicial systems, judicial 
roles and judicial identities.88 Therefore, any understanding of the judge and 
the judicial function (in the Arab Middle East and elsewhere) ought to consider 
the assumptions widely held within a particular society about judges.89 This 
chapter explores how and why the way judges’ see their role (judicial role 
conceptions) are important for the political significance of judges. 
Judicial roles 
Like any jurisdiction, there are social norms, rules and demands that prescribe 
the role of judges in the Arab Middle East. The judicial systems across the 
region exercise a degree of institutional control over judges.90 Despite this 
control, roles are occupied by individuals who play an active part in the 
innovation and creation of their own judicial roles.91 An individual judge’s own 
                                               
87  According to the sociologist, Berger, society is understood as a product of human activity 
that has eventually attained the status of objective reality. See Peter L Berger, The Social 
Reality of Religion (Penguin 1973) p.21.  
88  Berger writes that, by extension, social roles and institutions are representations of these 
objectivised meanings. They are also manifested in the roles that the individual is expected to 
play because “the objective description of the role so dictates”. Peter L Berger, The Social 
Reality of Religion (Penguin 1973) Ibid. 
89  According to anthropologist Ruth Benedict, this is because “human behaviour will take the 
forms those institutions suggest, even to extremes of which the observer, deep-dyed in the 
culture of which he is a part, can have no intimation.” See Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture 
(1st Mariner Books ed, Houghton Mifflin 2005) 207. See also Bruce J Biddle, Role Theory: 
Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic Press 1979) p.98 
90  These can relate to institutionally set procedures, norms and cultures, which effectively 
allow for judicial systems to shape individuals’ attitudes and behaviours in the performance of 
their judicial roles. See Jennifer H Waldeck and Karen K Myers, “Organizational Assimilation 
Theory, Research, and Implications for Multiple Areas of the Discipline: A State of the Art 
Review” (2007) 31 Annals of the International Communication Association 322, p.324. 
91  The term “socialisation” is often understood as referring to the ongoing process by which 
individuals learn “the values, norms, and required behaviours that allow them to participate as 
members of organizations”. However, this definition is narrow in scope and fails to account for 
individuals who actively innovate and create roles for themselves within the organisation. See 
Porter et al., for instance, coin the term “individualization” where socialisation experiences 
“result in creativity, innovation, and contributions to the organization (as opposed to passive 
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personal attributes and experiences may therefore help to shape his/her 
judicial role. For instance, the values and knowledge judges acquire from 
educational and professional experiences before entry to the judiciary may 
affect the extent to which an individual judge actually shapes his/her judicial 
role. 
 
Part of the judicial role conception includes those objectives individual judges 
perceive as important for the judicial office. Included in these objectives are all 
the norms that guide individual judges’ behaviour. By extension, they also 
include judges’ internalised impressions of societal norms and expectations of 
what constitutes the role of a judge. These impressions are the individual 
judge’s own understanding of the kind of behaviour they should exhibit in the 
performance of their duties. In other words, they relate to a judge’s subjectively 
held beliefs of what he/she “ought to do” as a judge.92  
 
These judicial objectives and role conceptions are important to explore 
because of the insight they may provide into the inner workings of a court. For 
instance, judges often work in groups where they must agree on basic norms 
in order to carry out their judicial functions. At the minimum, there must be a 
“singularity of purpose” among judges in a court, which would be disrupted 
without the existence of some acceptance of rules regulating an individual 
judge’s treatment of his/her judicial colleagues.93 Judicial role conceptions may 
also influence judges’ interactions with other people external to the judicial 
system. As Glick points out: “believing that one of his purposes as a judge is 
to be active in community affairs, for example, may predispose a judge to 
develop a close relationship with certain non-court personnel”.94  
 
                                               
acceptance of existing organizational norms)”, See Lyman W Porter, Edward E Lawler and J 
Richard Hackman, Behavior in Organizations (McGraw-Hill 1974). 
92  James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p.9.  
93  Henry Robert Glick, Judicial Role Perceptions and Behavior: A Study of American State 
Judges (PhD Tulane University 1967), p.114.  
94  Ibid. p.47. 
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Individual judges’ objectives may also provide insight into what methods they 
deem appropriate in the realisation of those objectives. This goes back to what 
is assumed to constitute the core element of any judicial function: adjudication 
and case-disposition. Judges’ decisions through adjudication are the activities 
that have the greatest tangible effect outside the legal system.95 And it is, 
therefore, crucial to identify what the main criteria are for a judge in reaching 
his/her decision in court: 
“Judges invariably feel constrained by previous decisions taken 
by other judicial decisionmakers. Some judges, however, feel 
more constrained than others. Some believe that adequate 
precedents exist for all potential problems that may be brought 
to them. Others feel that they must use additional considerations 
in order to make their rulings, including such factors as the needs 
of society as well as their own sense of justice.”96 
 
Judges’ value preferences during decision-making are assumed to be 
inextricably linked with their overall objectives, and the factors they consider 
as important during the decision-making process may have tangible effects 
outside the justice sector. Glick, for instance, argues that judicial decisions are 
vital channels through which the court interacts with actors in the political 
process.97 This means it is important to identify what values direct and 
influence judges’ decision-making for two reasons. First, they may uncover 
what objectives they have as judges and, second, because they set the tone 
for judicial interaction in the political process. 
 
One prevalent approach to studying the judicial role has been to measure 
judges’ role orientations on the basis of specific role perception categories. 
The underlying purpose behind the role orientation categories is to identify the 
degree of judicial creativity judges may afford themselves in the performance 
of their roles. The orientations are distributed along a continuum (see Figure 
                                               
95  John C. Wahlke , Heins Eulau , William Buchanan , LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative 
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (John Wiley & Sons 1962) p.12.  
96   Victor Eugene Flango, Lettie McSpadden Wenner and Manfred W Wenner, “The Concept 
of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note” (1975) 19 American Journal of Political Science 277, 
p. 277. 
97  Henry Robert Glick, Judicial Role Perceptions and Behavior: A Study of American State 
Judges. (PhD Tulane University 1967), p.99. 
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1) that ranges from judicial restraint at one end of the spectrum (following 
precedent, strict construction of constitutions and deference to legislative 
intent) to judicial activism at the other end of the spectrum (insubordination of 
precedents, statutes, and deference to personal attitudes, values, and 
goals).98 
 
Figure 1.  Judicial role orientations by elements of judicial creativity 
 
 
 
Three key studies  
The study of Arab judges’ role conceptions in this thesis draws on three earlier 
studies of judicial roles: Ungs and Baas;99 Flango et al.;100 and Guarnieri and 
Pederzoli.101 What these studies have in common is that they disregard the 
traditional distinction between civil and common law judges. In particular, the 
results of empirical studies by Ungs and Baas and Flango shows that different 
role orientations are found in judges in both civil and common law jurisdictions. 
This challenges the view that some role orientations are particular to the civil 
tradition and others are particular to the common law tradition.  
 
In a 1975 study, Ungs and Baas examined judicial role perceptions among 
lower court judges in the American state of Ohio. The authors assessed 
judges’ role orientations based on four distinct categories they derived from 
analysing literature and judicial opinions. These were: “Law interpreter”, 
                                               
98  J. Woodford Howard Jr., Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S. Courts of Appeals 
(1977) 39 University of Chicago Press, p. 916. 
99  Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, “Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges” (1972) 6 Law & Society Review.  
100  Victor Eugene Flango, Lettie McSpadden Wenner and Manfred W Wenner, "The Concept 
of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note" (1975) 19 American Journal of Political Science 277. 
Herein referred to in the main text as "Flango". 
101  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) 
 27  
“Administrator”, “Adjudicator” and “Law maker”. They found all four orientations 
among their sample of American state judges, but they found that the “law-
interpreter” role was the dominant orientation.102  
 
With the aim to widen the field of judicial behaviour beyond the common law 
traditions, Flango et al. conducted a (postal) survey of 97 German-speaking 
mid–level appellate judges in Austria (48 judges) and Switzerland (49 judges). 
In the survey the authors repeated questions from a number of previous role 
theory studies of American judges. In their analysis of the survey findings, the 
authors identified two clearly distinguishable orientations for judges: (1) toward 
precedent and (2) toward the public judges serve.103  The Flango study found 
that both dimensions appeared to be present among the Swiss and Austrian 
judges that took part in the survey. The authors also combined these two 
dimensions to create four distinct role orientations among their sample of 
European civil law judges: “Law-applier”, “Law-extender”, “Mediator” and 
“Policy maker”. Austrian and Swiss judges demonstrated both similar and 
different role orientations to American common law judges, and the findings 
called into question “the traditional assertion that civil and common law judges 
regard their functions differently”.104  
 
A more recent study by Guarnieri and Pederzoli on the power of judges in 
Western liberal democracies argues that the trend towards expanding the 
political significance of courts (judicialisation) has helped to weaken traditional 
judicial role conceptions.105 In their view, the trend towards judicialisation has 
                                               
102  Through their analysis, the authors "discovered" two other orientations not included in the 
original typology: the "trial judge" and the "peacekeeper", which according to Scheb 
is a hybrid containing features of several of the originally posited types. See John M Scheb, 
“Merit Selection, Role Orientations and Legal Rationalization: Q- Technique Study of the 
Florida State District Courts”. p.93 
103  Victor Eugene Flango, Lettie McSpadden Wenner and Manfred W Wenner, "The Concept 
of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note" (1975) 19 American Journal of Political Science 277, 
p. 277. 
104  Manfred W Wenner, Lettie M Wenner and V Eugene Flango, “Austrian and Swiss Judges: 
A Comparative Study” (1978) 10 Comparative Politics 499, p.511 
105  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.76. 
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made it more difficult to disregard the growing freedom judges enjoy in relation 
to the law and the legal system. With the aim to examine the relationship 
between courts and the broader political system, the authors set out a typology 
of four judicial role orientations based on two distinct dimensions. The first 
dimension, “judicial creativity”, relates to the extent to which judicial decisions 
are taken “on the basis of pre-existing substantive laws”.106 The second 
dimension relates to the degree of judicial autonomy from political 
institutions.107 From these two dimensions, Guarnieri and Pederzoli identify 
four distinct judicial role orientations, which they argue are useful for identifying 
the range of roles found inside any Western judiciary: the “Executor”, 
“Delegate”, “Guardian” and “Political” judge.  
Judicial role categories used in this study  
Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s terminology is adopted in this study of Arab judges’ 
role orientations. Although the judicial role orientations are labelled differently 
by the three key studies, they remain conceptually similar. This section 
describes the conceptual basis of the distinct judicial role orientations used by 
Ungs and Baas, Flango, and Guarnieri and Pederzoli, and Table 1 below 
shows how the different role terminologies compare. 
 
Table 1. Judicial role orientations and terminology used in three studies 
 Role Orientation Guarnieri & 
Pederzoli 
(and this 
thesis) 
Flango et.al Ungs & Baas 
 
Judicial 
Roles 
Restraint 
 
 
 
Activism 
Precedent 
 
 
 
Public 
 
“Executor” 
 
“Law applier” 
 
“Law interpreter” 
“Delegate” “Law extender” “Administrator” 
“Guardian” “Mediator” “Adjudicator” 
“Political” “Policy maker” “Law maker” 
 
 
                                               
106  Ibid. p.69. 
107  Ibid. 
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Executor judge 
The first role orientation is considered as an ideal conception of the judge. 
Flango describes this judge as a “Law applier” and defines it as someone who 
does not consider the societal needs or the social consequences of judicial 
decision-making.108 For this judge, the judicial task “is expected to be focused 
on the legal prerequisites and skills of a judge”.109 Flango’s orientation is 
conceptually similar to Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s “Executor” judge. The 
“Executor” judge is described best according to Montesquieu’s definition of a 
judge: a passive executor of the legislative will or a mouthpiece of the law 
(bouche de la loi).110 This orientation is traditionally associated with judges in 
civil law traditions.111  
 
According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, this judicial role was historically 
developed in conjunction with the institutional transformations of the French 
revolution and Napoleonic legal reforms 112 But the “Executor” role has also 
been found in common law jurisdictions. In their study of US state judges, Ungs 
and Baas label this role “Law interpreter”, meaning a judge who characterises 
the judicial function as “involving only the interpretation of the law”.113 
Moreover, the “Law interpreter” takes the view that legal precedent is the major 
criteria in decision-making and therefore “advocates judicial self-restraint as a 
necessary control over reading personal predilections into law”.114  
                                               
108  Victor Eugene Flango, Lettie McSpadden Wenner and Manfred W Wenner, "The Concept 
of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note" (1975) 19 American Journal of Political Science 277, 
p.282. 
109   Ibid. p.282. 
110  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.69. 
111  Scheb M John, (1982), Merit Selection, Role Orientations and Legal Rationalization: A Q-
Technique Study of The Florida State District Courts (PhD, University of Florida) p.9. 
112  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002)  p.79. 
113  Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, "Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges" (1972) 6 Law & Society Review, p. 345. 
114   Ibid. p. 346. 
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Delegate judge 
Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s “Delegate” judge recognises the existence of judicial 
creativity, but this is only exercised “within the space left open by the political 
branches”.115 They describe this judicial role as a more realistic version of the 
“executor” judge; arguing that while a “mechanistic” judicial role might be 
desirable, it does not reflect an accurate nature of present judicial roles: 
“[L]egal norms are not independent from the process of 
interpretation: they do not pre-date interpretation but assume 
meaning through the very process of interpretation, a process in 
which the judge obviously plays a strategic role.”116 
 
The “Delegate” judge is similar to Flango’s “Law extender”. This type of judge, 
like the “Law applier”, “believes that nearly all cases can be decided using clear 
and relevant precedents as guides.”117 However, the “Law extender” is also 
conscious of the societal consequences of his/her judicial decisions. Seen in 
this way, the “law extender” is both "public regarding" and "law regarding."118  
The “Delegate” and “Law extender” judge are also closely aligned with Ungs 
and Baas’ “Administrator” judge. This type of judge pays close attention to 
judicial procedures, since they are as important as the decisions 
themselves.119  Ungs and Baas describe the “Administrator” judge as someone 
who “disclaims reliance on abstract ideas of right and justice”.120 And while the 
“Administrator” judge recognises that precedent is significant: “its importance 
is measured less as the required criteria for decision than as a means to assure 
reliability and certainty in decisions so that litigants can have faith in the 
continuity of the law”.121  
                                               
115  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.71. 
116  Ibid.  
117  Victor Eugene Flango, Lettie McSpadden Wenner and Manfred W Wenner, "The Concept 
of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note" (1975) 19 American Journal of Political Science 277, 
p. 282. 
118  Ibid. p. 282. 
119  Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, "Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges" (1972) 6 Law & Society Review, p. 347. 
120  Ibid. 
121  Ibid. 
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Guardian judge 
The “Guardian” judge is closer to the “judicial activism” end of the spectrum 
than the “judicial restraint” end. This orientation describes the role of a judge 
as a “moral force in the community”.122 For Guarnieri and Pederzoli, this 
orientation exists where courts have powers of judicial review, and “where the 
main task of the judge is to defend individual or minority rights from abuses by 
the political branches and the majorities in control of them.123 Flango calls this 
role a “Mediator”, and describes it as someone who places less confidence in 
the possibility of finding a clear and relevant precedent for every case 
encountered.124 The “Guardian” judge is also similar to Ungs and Baas’ 
“Adjudicator” judge, where the “prototype goals” of the judge are to balance 
contending principles, evaluate the conditions in society, and act as a decision 
maker to achieve the welfare of society.125 In achieving these goals, the 
“Adjudicator” judge seeks to understand and appreciate the changing social 
forces and environments that guide the judge in his/her decisions.126 
Political judge 
The “Political” judge is clearly positioned at the judicial activism end of the 
spectrum. Guarnieri and Pederzoli describe the “Political” judge, as someone 
who is independent from both the political and legal system, and this 
strengthens his/her capacity for political intervention.127 Judges belonging to 
                                               
122  This role conceives the judge as someone who protects the people from external threats 
or unwise values. According to Glick, the judge will at times even protect the people from 
themselves. The general justification for this orientation is that social peace and constitutional 
government require a judicial orientation in which the judge performs a function as a protector 
of social norms and, where necessary, is a creator of them by using the procedural 
mechanisms available. See Henry Robert Glick, Judicial Role Perceptions and Behavior: A 
Study of American State Judges. (PhD Tulane University 1967), p. 60. 
123  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002)  p.72. 
124  Victor Eugene Flango, Lettie McSpadden Wenner and Manfred W Wenner, "The Concept 
of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note" (1975) 19 American Journal of Political Science 277, 
p.284. 
125  Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, "Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges" (1972) 6 Law & Society Review, p. 346. 
126   Ibid. p. 347.  
127  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p. 74. 
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this role “act as true policy-makers developing rules based on judgments of 
social benefit”.128 The qualitative distinction between the “Guardian” judge and 
the “Political” judge is that the “Guardian” relies on available procedural 
mechanisms in deciding cases, whereas the decision-making of the “Political” 
judge often involves the judge’s personal views. Flango labels this orientation 
as a “Policy-maker”, where the judge is unfettered by deference to precedent: 
“Because precedents are often available to support both sides of 
any controversy, this type of judge may believe that he cannot 
help ‘making law’, and in doing so must necessarily be guided, 
in part, by a personal conception of justice.”129  
 
Ungs and Baas label this judicial role orientation the “Law-maker”, where 
attitudes and experiences of the individual judge form part of the judge’s 
primary function (judicial decision-making and case-disposition).130 Ungs and 
Baas describe this judge’s goals as usually defined “in terms of the pursuit of 
his own conception of justice as applied to particular cases”.131 
The ideal Arab judge  
An important part of official laws associated with the judicial role is the basis 
they create for an “ideal judge”. According to Glick, they form an important part 
of consensual norms because they “establish fundamental personal 
characteristics which are the bases of more specialized interactions on the 
court”.132 The four Arab countries examined in detail in this thesis have laws 
and official provisions that regulate judicial conduct within and outside the legal 
system. Formal enactments provide for skeletal definitions for judges in the 
Arab region, and there are also informal “but no less important rules” of judicial 
                                               
128  Ibid. 
129  Victor Eugene Flango, Lettie McSpadden Wenner and Manfred W Wenner, "The Concept 
of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note" (1975) 19 American Journal of Political Science 277, 
p.  284. 
130  Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, "Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges" (1972) 6 Law & Society Review, p. 346. 
131  Ibid. 
132  Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University p.115. 
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conduct.133 While little empirical information exists about Arab judges’ views of 
their appropriate relationships with each other or with important political non-
judicial actors, there are numerous sources that set out the principles of ideal 
judicial behaviour.  
 
Cultural and religious principles provide an important source of information 
about qualities and ideal attributes of Arab judges. One principle which is still 
in use and is quoted by judges and judiciaries extensively relates to the 
message of the Second Caliph of Islam, ʻUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, conveyed to his 
governor, Abū Musā al-Ashʿarī, on the conduct of a judge.134 The letters were 
written around 17-29 years after the Prophet Muḥammad’s death and remain 
a template for judges in the Arab region:  
“Act impartially between the people in your audience-room and 
before you, so that the man of noble status be not greedy for 
your partiality and the man of inferior status despair of justice 
from you; 
 
Let not a judgment which you judged yesterday, but over which 
you re-consulted yourself and were guided to your rectitude, 
prevent you from retracting to justice, for nothing can invalidate 
justice. You must realise that retraction to justice is better than 
long persistence in a thing invalid; 
 
Have care to avoid [anger] [concern] and annoyance with the 
litigants in the battlefields of justice in which God confers reward 
and makes goodly store […]”135 
 
These are only some of ‘Umar’s instructions, which today are still highly 
esteemed and often quoted and adhered to by judges across the Arab region 
and in the wider Muslim communities.136  In this way, principles of equality, 
                                               
133  John C. Wahlke, Heins Eulau , William Buchanan , LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative 
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (John Wiley & Sons 1962), p.141 
134  According to Serjeant, ʻUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (581– 644 AD) wrote the letters sometime 
between 17-29 years after the Prophet’s death. See by Serjeant, R. (1984) “The Caliph 
‘Umar’s Letters to Abu Musa Al-Ash’ari and Mu’awiya”, Journal of Semitic Studies, XXIX(1), 
pp.65-79. 
135  Translation by Serjeant, R. (1984) “The Caliph ‘Umar’s Letters to Abu Musa Al-Ash’ari and 
Mu’awiya”, Journal of Semitic Studies, XXIX(1), pp.65-79. p.66  
136  The authenticity of ʻUmar’s letters is a source of contention among historians. Regardless 
of their origin, they are often referred to and used as a basis for judicial conduct in the Arab 
region. For example, the letters form part of the preamble to the 2007 Sharjah Convention. In 
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impartiality and justice can be said to be deeply entrenched in the Muslim and 
Arab legal history that regulates judicial conduct.137  
 
In addition to the national codes that regulate judicial ethics, the 2007 Sharjah 
Convention is a regional document intended to be a morally guiding document 
for judges.138 The Convention was drafted by a five-member committee 
composed of Heads of Judicial Inspectorates in Jordan, the United Arab 
Emirates, Algeria, Lebanon and Egypt. Part of the preamble translates as 
follows: 
“Society has accorded the judiciary with dignity and a certain 
degree of sanctity. Judges are given important and serious 
powers where they issue binding decisions that impact the social 
order, the lives of individuals and their freedoms, dignity, 
property, money, obligations and duties. […] “139 
 
According to the Convention, with the evolution of the judiciary’s competences 
and powers, “norms, values, customs and traditions have been developed and 
broadened in order to strengthen their independence from other branches in 
the State.”140 The Convention also draws inspiration from international 
instruments on judicial conduct, pre-dominantly from the 2002 Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct.141 Intended to establish standards for the ethical 
conduct of judges, the Bangalore Principles include six core values: 
                                               
addition, ʻUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb’s message was often quoted in Arabic by Arab judges and 
lawyers that were consulted for this research.  
137  Similarly, “Letter 53” of the fourth Caliph, Imam ‘Ali Bin Abi Talib (601 – 661 CE) contains 
specific advice on the selection of judges to Egypt’s governor, Malik al-Ashtar: “Beware! The 
utmost carefulness is to be exercised in its selection: for it is this high office which adventurous 
self-seekers aspire to secure and exploit in their selfish interests. After the selection of your 
chief judge, give careful consideration to the selection of other officers. Confirm them in their 
appointments after approved apprenticeship and probation. Never select men for responsible 
posts either out of any regard for personal connections or under any influence, for that might 
lead to injustice and corruption.” See generally Ali Paya and Hamid Tehrani, “Imam “Ali”s 
Theory of Justice Revisited” (2013) 6 Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 5. 
138  “Sharjah Convention on the ethics and behaviour of the judge” [wathiqat ash-shārja: ḥawl 
“akhlaqiat wasolok al-Qāḍ”ī al-mu“tamar al-ḥadi ”ashr li-ruasa’ ’ajhizat al-taftish al- Qaḍā“ī fi 
al-dowal al-”arabiah]’ 11th Conference of Heads of Judicial Inspection Bodies in Arab States, 
Sharjah (2007). Hereinafter “Sharjah Convention 2007”.  
139  Preamble, Sharjah Convention 2007. 
140  Ibid. 
141 ‘The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct’ E/CN.4/2003/65  (2002). 
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Independence, Impartiality, Integrity, Propriety, Equality, Competence and 
Diligence. The Sharjah Convention list all of these values with the exception 
of “Equality”. In addition to the Bangalore Principles, the Sharjah Convention 
include four more principles: Courage, Humility, Honesty and Honour.142  In 
the Sharjah Convention, each of the 8 values consist of several subcategories 
and descriptions. These are set out in Table 2.143  
                                               
142 The values in the Sharjah Convention are further reflected in some of the national codes of 
ethics, particularly for Jordan and Lebanon. The Jordanian Code of Judicial Ethics was issued 
by the Judicial Council in 2017 and replaced the 2014 Code of Judicial Ethics. The Code forms 
part of the Judicial Independence Law No. 29 of 2014. Lebanon’s Code of Judicial Ethics was 
adopted by the Ministry of Justice in 2005 as part of Resolution No 77/1.  
143 An additional source of judicial ethics and behavior that is relevant in the region is in 
Chapter 1, Book 16 of the Ottoman Mejellet al Ahkam al Adilyia (1876) 
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Table 2. Sharjah Convention on Judicial Ethics 2007 (unofficial translation) 144 
Principle Definition 
Principle 1: 
Independence 
• Strengthen the laws of the judiciary;  
• Strengthen the confidence in the judiciary;  
• Exercise the judicial functions in a way that promotes confidence; 
• Refrain from, and confront external pressures and influences; 
• Knowledge and application of the law; 
• Have personal freedom 
Principle 2: 
Impartiality 
and Neutrality 
• Impartial and neutral treatment of litigants, lawyers, fellow judicial 
colleagues;  
• Endeavour to enhance confidence in the judicial role; 
• Recusal when there are serious grounds to believe that 
impartiality and fairness is compromised;  
• Respect the principles of fair trial and the right to defence;  
• Refrain from engaging in financial and commercial activities that 
may impair impartiality and integrity; 
• Do not step down during the course of a trial or seek to withdraw 
judicial colleagues sitting in the same court; 
• Monitor personal behaviour and practice strict self-control, in 
court and in public. 
Principle 3: 
Integrity 
• Possess integrity; 
• Take every effort to ensure that behaviour is free from suspicion;  
• Strive to be a role model for fellow colleagues; 
• Always stay alert and cautious for anyone seeking to benefit from 
the judge because of the judicial tasks exercised.  
Principle 4: 
Propriety 
• Respect the prestigious nature of the judicial role and make sure 
that behaviour will not undermine trust in the judicial institution; 
• Refrain from expressing personal, religious and political views; 
• Refrain from publicly commenting on judicial decisions issued that 
would undermine the court's judgment; 
• Preservation of personal reputation and personality; 
• Refrain from complaining about the nature of the judicial work;  
• Keeping court deliberations secret. 
Principle 5: 
Courage 
• Be self-confident in declaring the law;  
• Possess conscience and wisdom; 
• Look to senior judges and jurists as models for behaviour;  
• Confront difficult and complex cases courageously.  
Principle 6: 
Humility 
• Distancing oneself from vanity, arrogance and hypocrisy; 
• Avoid strong emotions such as anger, rage, and enthusiasm; 
• Continuously strive to acquire more knowledge;  
• Refrain from boasting about the judicial office.  
Principle 7: 
Honesty and 
Honour 
• Stay committed to the content of the judicial oath;  
• Be honest towards colleagues, (particularly senior judges) and the 
parties to a dispute; 
• Avoid misinformation and exaggeration  
Principle 8: 
Competence 
and Diligence 
• Qualified to perform his duties;  
• Development of general knowledge beyond the law; 
• Continually engage in legal research; 
• Ensure that all judicial tasks are completed in the best possible 
manner; 
• Be active in judicial role 
                                               
144  The Sharjah Convention is translated from Arabic. To view the document in its original 
language: <https://carjj.org/sites/default/files/sharjah_document.doc>/> accessed 30 August 
2018. 
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Relationships with other judges 
One theme that arises from the Sharjah Convention concerns judges’ 
appropriate relationships with other judges. According to the Convention, 
judges must strive to be role models for their colleagues. Judges have a duty 
to encourage integrity among their peers and confront them when their integrity 
falters.145 A judge must be honest towards his/her judicial colleagues, 
particularly senior judges.146 Similarly, the Jordanian Judicial Code states that 
a judge must interact with superiors, colleagues and subordinates with respect 
and cooperation “that reflects the prestige of the judiciary and its reputation.”147  
 
In addition to integrity, according to the Convention, Arab judges must self-
monitor their behaviour in their professional and private lives. They must 
practice strict self-control within the court as well as in public in order to gain 
the confidence and respect of litigants, their agents (lawyers) and the public.148 
Because judges are representatives of the judiciary, they must make sure that 
the judiciary is not distrusted or questioned. Judges should be careful not to 
place themselves in precarious situations and engage in behaviour that harms 
the judge’s and the judiciary’s reputation. This includes the judge expressing 
opinions on political, religious and ideological matters. Judges must also 
refrain from publicly commenting on judicial decisions.149 Judges are expected 
to be purely objective in the decision-making process at all times. The duty to 
maintain objectivity extends beyond the court, and judges are expected to 
isolate themselves from influences that might affect the image of justice and 
the dignity of the judicial profession. 
 
These principles are not confined to the Arab region only; they form part of 
internationally accepted norms on judicial ethics. For instance, the Bangalore 
Principles endorses strong statements of impartiality and unbiased judging 
                                               
145  “Principle 3: Integrity”, Sharjah Convention 2007 
146  “Principle 7: Honesty and Honour”, Ibid. 
147   Art. 30, “Code of Judicial Conduct” 2017 (Jordan) 
148  “Principle 2: Impartiality and Neutrality”, Ibid. 
149  “Principle 4: Propriety”, Ibid. 
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inside the courtroom and in the wider public. A judge "shall ensure that his or 
her conduct maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal 
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary."150  
 
Although the national, regional and international codes of judicial conduct are 
laudable aspirations, there is a fundamental problem with them. They promote 
an unrealistic vision of judicial activity, and this is a vision that fits the 
conceptual role of the “Executor” judge as mere mouthpieces of the law.151 As 
discussed earlier, the “Executor” is an ideal conception of the judicial role. It 
espouses a well-defined and acceptable role conception of what a judge ought 
to be, that is: someone who does not consider the societal needs or the social 
consequences of judicial decision-making.152 The “Executor” judge “advocates 
judicial self-restraint as a necessary control over reading personal 
predilections into law”.153 This role is, however, widely recognised as 
unrealistic. This thesis attempts to empirically assess the extent to which Arab 
judges can in reality be categorised as “Executor”, “Delegate”, “Guardian” or 
“Political” judges.  
Speaking with one tongue 
Because judges often work in groups where members share the same role, 
there must be some minimal level of “working consensus”.154 Such working 
consensus may be based on two norms. The first set of norms relate to written 
prescriptions such as laws and rules of procedure that direct judges about how 
they are expected to act in certain situations. The second norm relates to 
unwritten but informally understood rules, which Wahlke et al. call “rules-of-
the-game”.155 Taken together, these two norms indicate what the expected 
                                               
150  “Principle 2: Impartiality and Neutrality”, Ibid. 
151  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.69 
152  Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975) “The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science, 19(2), p.282 
153  Baas and Ungs “Judicial Role perceptions: A Q-Technique”, p.345 
154  John C. Wahlke, Heins Eulau , William Buchanan , LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative 
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (John Wiley & Sons 1962) p.145 
155  Ibid. p.144 
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relationship with the individual judge vis-à-vis her/his colleagues should be 
according to the judicial collective.  
 
Judges’ working in a group such as collegial court must agree on basic norms 
in order to carry out their judicial functions. According to Glick: 
 
“The actual internal workings of the court could be disrupted, though, 
without the existence of some acceptance of rules regulating an 
individual's treatment of his fellow court members. With disagreement 
here, it might be very difficult for judges to move to the more specific 
area of agreeing on the way decisions should be reached.”156 
 
Although the true internal workings of collegiate courts may be hidden from 
view by an artificial image of court unity (often promoted by the judiciary as a 
whole), judges sitting in the same court must agree on basic norms of conduct. 
“[Group norms] serve as points of reference or anchors from which [judges] 
can evaluate events”.157 
Actors beyond the legal community 
Other types of actors can play an important part in how judges think about their 
own role. In order to fully explore the judicial roles (and their significance) in 
the region, how judges perceive of those actors they are in frequent interaction 
with is also important. In role-theory, the relationship between role-holders 
(judges) and those holding counter-positions (“non-judges”) is taken into 
account. Just as judges may have expectations of their judicial colleagues and 
these help form their own role orientations, judges may also have expectations 
of other (non-judicial) actors and these also form part of judges’ role 
orientations.158  
 
                                               
156  Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University p.114  
157  Ibid. p.113 
158 A full exploration of judicial roles in the region would also seek to understand the 
expectations non-judicial actors have of judges’ role and function. This however is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
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An important characteristic of role theory is that it assumes the existence of 
interpersonal relations.159 While the overwhelming bulk of a judge’s work is 
within the confines of court and with his/her judicial colleagues, no judge is 
isolated from the outside world. Judges’ relationships with actors in the legal 
community is supposed to be conducted according to strict legal standards. 
According to Glick, judges are expected to decide the case in purely objective 
terms.160 Furthermore, judicial objectivity is also supposed to operate when 
judges are not sitting on the bench and judges are expected to “isolate 
themselves from influences which might affect their image of justice incarnate 
or which might skew their determination of a case”.161 As seen in the Sharjah 
Convention, judges are considered representatives of the judiciary and must 
therefore make sure that the dignity of the judiciary is not compromised when 
interacting outside court.162 However, contrary to the myth of absolute judicial 
isolation, judges do interact with actors beyond the legal community, through 
their decision-making and other activities. This is particularly true for judges in 
Arab states that have witnessed social and political upheavals in recent years. 
In Sultany’s view: 
“The judiciary that upholds the rule of law is not an impartial 
arbiter because it is divided along political and professional lines 
that relate to political disputes and competing visions of the 
social order and the revolution. Thus although the judiciary 
provides a form of institutional continuity, given the lack of judicial 
reform, the law is intertwined with politics, and the judicial 
resolution of political disputes is contestable and not merely 
contested … [emphasis added].”163  
 
For Sultany, judges in states with revolutionary upheavals cannot be neutral 
because they form part of the social and political struggles they are supposed 
to regulate. While the type of external non-judicial actors may vary from 
                                               
159  John C. Wahlke, Heins Eulau , William Buchanan , LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative 
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (John Wiley & Sons 1962), p.10 
160  Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.233  
161  Ibid. p.233 
162  Under the third principle of integrity, integrity is described as the judge’s effort to strive to 
strengthen people’s confidence of the judiciary which is a top priority. “Principle 3: Integrity”, 
Sharjah Convention 2007. 
163  Sultany N, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017) p.199.  
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country to country and the importance judges place on their relationships with 
external actors may also vary, three types of non-judicial actors are in 
particular considered and explored in this study: the wider public, religious 
authorities and the executive branch.  
Judges and the public  
An important relationship for judges that forms part of their core duties is their 
interaction with the public. In principle, judges are required to keep a distance 
from the community. For instance, under the fourth principle of the Sharjah 
Convention, judges are instructed to maintain a balance between their judicial 
duties and their engagement in society.164 According to Guarnieri, a judge 
cannot "deny justice”, and in principle every citizen has the possibility to go to 
court with the legitimate expectation of receiving a judgment.165 Theoretically, 
this makes the judiciary a more accessible institution than the political 
branches. A recent study by the World Justice Project in 2018 found that 49% 
of 1000 Lebanese  and 46% of 1001 Tunisians had experienced a legal 
problem in the past two years.166 
 
How non-judicial individuals and groups perceive judges and the utility of 
courts can be an important factor in regulating interactions between the two.167 
For instance, social and economic costs of litigation, delays in processing 
complaints and the existence of quasi-judicial institutions that can effectively 
process conflicts may foster court avoidance and thus promote a negative view 
of judges and courts. Although not true of all the Middle East, this may be 
particularly relevant where, in addition to the state courts, tribal mediators are 
                                               
164  “Principle 4: Propriety”, Sharjah Convention 2007 
165  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.98.   
166  Global Insights on Access to Justice Findings from the World Justice Project General 
Population Poll in 45 Countries’ (World Justice Project 2018) 
<https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_Access-
Justice_April_2018_Online.pdf>. p. 31 and p.50 
167  Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.29. See also Friedmann, W. (1961), “Legal Philosophy and Judicial 
Law-making”. Columbia Law Review, 61: 821–45. 
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used for dispute resolution. In some countries, they also complement the civil 
legal system in several countries.168  
 
A 2017 study conducted by the Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) 
surveyed the public about its confidence in judges and courts in three countries 
in the Arab Middle East. Data included responses from approximately 6000 
participants in each of three studies in Tunisia169, Jordan170 and Lebanon.171 
Table 3 below presents HiiL’s findings on the overall level of trust in courts 
across the three countries.172 In Jordan and Lebanon, respondents had similar 
levels of trust in informal justice mechanisms. In Jordan, trust in informal justice 
mechanisms such as tribal justice scored 3.9 out of 5 among the respondents  
and courts scored 3.8 out of 5. In Lebanon, trust in informal justice 
mechanisms scored  2.82 out of 5, and trust in courts scored 2.85 out of 5. In 
Tunisia there were higher levels of trust in courts (3.27 out of 5) than in informal 
justice mechanisms (2.84 out of 5).  
                                               
168  For instance, tribal principles and processes of dispute resolution are used across Jordan, 
both in rural and urban areas. Among 6000 Jordanians surveyed for the HiiL report in 2017, 
the majority indicated that their solutions were achieved via a mediator/ conciliator or a 
decision of an adjudication authority. 
168 For instance, the Bedouin populations in Syria, Palestine, and Jordan tribal dispute 
resolution is still practiced upon. For a discussion on how tribal dispute resolution is still used 
see Jessica Watkins, “Seeking Justice: Tribal Dispute Resolution And Societal Transformation 
In Jordan” (2014) 46 International Journal of Middle East Studies 31; Dawn Chatty, “The 
Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control”, 64 Middle 
East Journal, 1 
169  Rodrigo Núñez, Martin Gramatikov, Sam Muller, Kavita Heijstek Ziemann, Martijn Kind, 
Nadja Kernchen, Roger El Khoury, Nicoleta Balau, “Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Tunisia” 
(The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) 2017) Data and Impact 
170  Rodrigo Núñez, Martin Gramatikov, Sam Muller, Kavita Heijstek Ziemann, Martijn Kind, 
Nadja Kernchen, Roger El Khoury, Nicoleta Balau, “Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Jordan” 
(The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) 2017) Data and Impact.  
171  Martijn Kind, Martin Gramatikov, Rodrigo Núñez, Roger El Khoury, Nadja Kernchen, 
“Justice Needs in Lebanon: Legal Problems in Daily Life” (The Hague Institute for Innovation 
of Law (HiiL) 2017) Data and Impact  
172 In the three studies by HiiL, respondents were asked to rate five institutions by indicating 
to what extent they agreed with the following statement: “I trust [INSTITUTION] in 
[COUNTRY]”. The score range was from 1 (“Disagree strongly”) to 5 (“Agree strongly”). 
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Table 3. Average trust in informal justice and Courts on a score range of 1-5 (HiiL) 
 Jordan173 Tunisia174 Lebanon175 
Informal Justice Mechanisms 3.9 2.84 2.82 
Courts      3.8 3.27 2.85 
 (n=6001) (n=6770) (n=6000) 
 
The same study also explored perceptions of courts across the three countries. 
Findings from Jordan and Lebanon are illustrated in Table 4 below where 
answers of “Agree strongly” and “Agree” are combined.  
 
Table 4. Perceptions of courts in Jordan and Lebanon (HiiL) 176 
 Jordan Lebanon 
Courts generally protect the 
interests of the rich and 
powerful 
48% 33% 
Courts generally treat the 
people with respect 
67% 50% 
Courts make fair, impartial 
decisions based on the 
evidence 
before them 
59% 47% 
Courts generally explain their 
decisions and actions when 
asked 
54% 49% 
 (n=6001) (n=6000) 
 
The public perception of courts in Jordan was more positive than in Lebanon, 
with two-thirds of respondents (67%) agreeing the courts generally treat the 
people with respect, over half (59%) agreeing courts are fair and impartial and 
explain their decisions (54%) and just under a majority (48%) agreeing that 
courts protect the interests of the rich and powerful above those of ordinary 
people.177 In Lebanon, perceptions of courts were less positive with only a 
                                               
173  (n 160) p.146 
174  (n 159) p.178 
175  (n 161) p.96 
176  HiiL’s study in Tunisia did not explicitly indicate whether these three statements were part 
of the survey as in Jordan and Lebanon. Tunisia is therefore not included in Table 4.  
177  Rodrigo Núñez, Martin Gramatikov, Sam Muller, Kavita Heijstek Ziemann, Martijn Kind, 
Nadja Kernchen, Roger El Khoury, Nicoleta Balau, “Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Jordan” 
(The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) 2017) Data and Impact. p.148 
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minority saying that courts treat people with respect, make fair decision and 
explain decisions.178  
 
This thesis provides an additional perspective on the relationship between the 
public and judges in the Arab Middle East, by exploring the role of the public 
in judicial decision-making from the perspective of Arab judges themselves.  
Judges and the media 
Another (perhaps more controversial) relationship judges may have is with the 
media. Maintaining the dignity of the judiciary is a cornerstone in several Arab 
states. For example, a central theme in the Sharjah Convention focuses on the 
preservation of the dignity of the judicial community vis-à-vis the public and 
other branches of government.179 Under the third principle of integrity, judges 
must not “be drawn into futile arguments that are ill-suited to the honour of the 
judiciary”.180  Some national judicial codes of conduct in the region include 
similar principles. The Jordanian Code of Judicial Conduct allows judges to 
exercise freedoms, provided that such activities do not compromise the 
reputation of his/her fellow judges and the dignity of the profession of the 
judiciary and its independence.181 In Egypt, judges must avoid any behavior 
(even if it is legal) that contradicts the dignity of the judiciary, privately and in 
his/her official capacity.182  
 
Several high judicial councils in the region have taken a strict approach to 
judges and the media, often under the guise of upholding the dignity of the 
judicial office. In Lebanon, the High Judicial Council has assumed the 
responsibility for scrutinising media outlets and issuing instructions in relation 
                                               
178  Martijn Kind, Martin Gramatikov, Rodrigo Núñez, Roger El Khoury, Nadja Kernchen, 
“Justice Needs in Lebanon: Legal Problems in Daily Life” (The Hague Institute for Innovation 
of Law (HiiL) 2017) Data and Impact. p.97 
179  “Principle 3: Integrity”, Sharjah Convention 2007. 
180  “Principle 7: Honesty and Dignity”;  Resolution No 77/1 “Code of Judicial Ethics”, 2005 
(Lebanon) and; Chapter 1, Book 16 of the Ottoman Mejellet al Ahkam al Adilyia (1876) 
181   Art 27, “Code of Judicial Conduct” 2017 (Jordan) 
182  Art. 72 Law No 35/1984 (which amended Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), 
Egypt 
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to the coverage of the judiciary. For instance, the Council issued a statement 
calling for “necessary action” to be taken by the Public Prosecutor's Office in 
response to comments made by a satirical television show that, according to 
the statement, offended the Public Prosecutor and the judiciary.183 The Council 
stated that the show’s remarks were “an insult” to the judiciary and had the 
greatest repercussions on the reputation and prestige of the judiciary. The 
Council added that the protection of the dignity, reputation and prestige of the 
judiciary is paramount.184 According to Saghieh, this will “pave the way for 
broad interpretations based on impeding freedom and transparency in the 
name of dignity, and for turning the [Judicial Council] into the guardian of 
judges’ reputations”.185 
 
The Egyptian Constitution states that interference in judicial affairs or in its 
proceedings is a crime to which no statute of limitations may be applied.186 The 
provision has been applied on several occasions particularly in relation to 
negative media coverage of the judiciary. In 2017, the Egyptian Judicial 
Council ordered a restriction on the publication of news related to judges and 
the judiciary in media outlets. Violating this decision, the Council stated, would 
lead to “disciplinary measures” and possible referral to other government 
entities. The Council has so far referred three violations to the prosecutor for 
alleged judicial misrepresentation.187 Senior Egyptian judges have also on 
occasion adopted a confrontational attitude towards media outlets. One 
notable example is the statement made by the chairman of the Egyptian 
                                               
183  “LBCI Host’s Song Leads Judiciary to Call for Further Prosecution” The Daily Star Lebanon 
(2 February 2018) <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Feb-02/436555-
lbci-hosts-song-leads-judiciary-to-call-for-further-prosecution.ashx>. Accessed 8 July 2018. 
184   Ibid. 
185  Nizar Saghieh, “Intra-Judicial Interference: The Case of Lebanon’s Supreme Judicial 
Council Secretariat” The Legal Agenda (Beirut, 7 August 2014) <http://legal-
agenda.com/en/article.php?id=3016#> accessed 30 August 2018. 
186 Article 184, Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (2014). See also David Risley, 
“Egypt’s Judiciary: Obstructing or Assisting Reform?’” (2016) 
<https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Risley_Egyptjudiciary.pdf> accessed 1 
August 2018. 
187  Daily News Egypt (2017) “Supreme Judicial Council imposes gag order on news related 
to judges and judiciary” [online] Available at: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2017/01/09/609368/ 
[Accessed 7 Apr. 2018]. 
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Judges’ Club, Ahmed el-Zind, in 2015. When asked in a television interview 
about a protest in which images of judges were burned, el-Zind commented: 
"We [judges], on the soil of this nation, are masters, while others are slaves. 
We will burn the heart of anyone who burns a judge's photograph."188  
Judicial links to the government  
The final actor that has generated considerable scholarly interest in the Arab 
region is judges’ relationship with the executive branch. Particularly, judicial 
reform projects that seek to modernise the administration of justice have often 
been of the view as having strong relationships with the executive. For 
instance, in its report on Arab judiciaries following the Arab Spring, the Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network summarises the nature of eight Arab 
judiciaries as follows:  
“The hegemony of the executive authority over judicial authority: in spite 
of the fact that the constitutions of all the countries of the region have 
stipulated an article or more on the independence of judiciary […] The 
legal mechanisms of this hegemony take place via the prerogatives 
given to the Ministry of Justice over the role of judicial councils in most 
of the countries (notably Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and 
Morocco)”.189  
 
Despite the existence of formal statements of judicial independence from the 
political branches in the Arab region, there appears to be a general 
understanding that Arab judges, in comparison with Western judiciaries, enjoy 
less independence.  
                                               
188  El-Zind later became the Minister of Justice but was discharged from the ministry within a 
year following a controversial remark that drew public outrage. Asked about a case involving 
journalists accused of defaming him and whether he would jail journalists that defamed him, 
he said he would imprison anyone, including the Prophet Muḥammad himself. Hendawi, H. 
(2015). ‘Anti-Brotherhood judge named justice minister in Egypt’. San Diego Union Tribune 
Available at: http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-anti-brotherhood-judge-named-
justice-minister-in-2015may20-story.html [Accessed 7 Apr. 2018]. 
189 The report continues: “In this relationship, we find the executive authorities, mostly through 
the role of Minister of Justice, controls appointment, disciplinary actions against judges, judicial 
inspection, salaries, promotion, retirement, transfer or permission to work abroad (especially 
that the rich Gulf area countries ‘borrow’ judges from Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan in particular) 
or permission to be seconded to work as legal advisors with other government bodies; this 
situation gives the executive authorities a huge leverage on the judges’ economic and 
professional situation.” Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), “The Reform 
of Judiciaries in the Wake of Arab Spring” (2012), p.8  
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For Guarnieri and Pederzoli, judges often play a significant role in Western 
democracies by virtue of how the judicial system is organised, how judges’ 
conceive of their role and the increasingly political role assigned to judges by 
virtue of the structural set up of the judiciaries.190 In civil law judiciaries, the 
Higher Judicial Councils are intended to be self-governing bodies, but they 
have provided a conduit through which the judiciary's representatives may 
develop new relationships with the political system.191 When this happens, 
according to Guarnieri and Pedezoli: “the connections between judges and the 
political system do influence judges' reference groups, their conception of their 
judicial role, and therefore their decisions”.192 
 
This thesis explores the relationships between Arab judges and the political 
system through an assessment of court powers (Chapter 5) and socialisation 
processes, such as selection, training, evaluation and disciplinary proceedings 
(Chapter 6), educational and professional experiences obtained before joining 
the judiciary (Chapter 7), and Arab judges’ views of the importance of and 
appropriate role of government in judicial decision-making (Chapter 9). 
Summary 
Little is currently known about judicial roles in the Arab Middle East or about 
inter-judicial and extra-judicial relationships. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
Western perceptions of “Qāḍī justice” have long implied that Arab judges have 
little concern for precedent or legal rules in their decision-making, and that their 
decision-making is arbitrary, personal and expedient. This thesis sets out to 
understand the reality of the judicial role in the Arab Middle East, and this 
chapter has set out the conceptual background to understanding judicial role 
conceptions. Chapter 4 sets out the methodology this thesis adopts in 
attempting to understand judicial role conceptions in the Arab Middle East, and 
how these compare with what is already known about judicial roles in civil and 
                                               
190 See generally Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative 
Study of Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) 
191  Ibid.p.52 
192  Ibid.p.68 
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common law judiciaries. It also sets out the methodology used in this study to 
examine the expectations Arab judges have about the appropriate nature of 
their relationships with other judges and important non-judicial actors in their 
countries. Before discussing the methodology used to analyse the Arab judicial 
role, the next chapter provides important historical background information 
about the evolution of the role of the judge in the Arab region.
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Chapter 3. Judiciaries in the Arab Middle East: A complex 
history  
This chapter examines the historical evolution of the judicial role in the Arab 
Middle East in order to highlight the possible influences that exist today on 
judicial roles in the region. Drawing on secondary source materials, two 
phases in the evolution of the judicial role are covered in this chapter. The first 
phase traces the historical development of Islamic-based conceptions of the 
judicial role. The second phase explores the evolution of the Arab judicial role 
under the Ottomans, and the period following the independence of Arab states 
from primarily British and French colonial rule.  
 
The chapter situates present judicial roles within an historical context and sets 
the stage for the following chapters in this thesis. 193 In this chapter, focus is 
placed on the Arab Sunni legal tradition and its contribution to the judicial role 
in the Arab Middle East. The thesis is concerned with developments that are 
directly concerned with the origins of law and judicial practice in four countries 
whose judiciaries are examined in greatest detail in this thesis: Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. The chapter’s focus on the Sunni legal tradition 
also means there is less attention paid to the contribution of the Shi’a (and 
other) schools of Islamic law to judicial roles during the course of legal history 
in the Middle East. 
 
The legal history of the Arab region spans over a millennium and any attempt 
to cover this in one chapter cannot capture all the historical complexities and 
will necessarily be limited and to a large degree, superficial. Islamic (and other) 
legal developments have been vast and have extended beyond the Arabic-
speaking region. There were also equally important non-Arab developments 
and periods (such as  the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo between 1261 – 1517) 
                                               
193 The literature in this area is vast with diverging opinions on the historical development of 
law and judicial function in the Arab region. The aim of this chapter is limited to introduce 
and situate present Arab judicial roles within a historical context. It does so by focusing on 
overarching regional trends that, are considered by most scholars in this field to have had an 
impact on present law and judicial practice arising from internal developments as well as 
those factors stemming from outside the region (with particular focus on the West).  
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that made their own marks on the Islamic conceptions of the judicial office 
(e.g., the Safavids and Mughals amongst others) that are not covered in this 
chapter. In addition, the chapter only briefly covers the historical role of tribal 
judges (particularly in relation to early pre-Islamic arbitration). In many parts of 
the Middle East Ḥukum ‘ashaīrī, tribal laws and customs (albeit Islamized194), 
continue to operate and coexist alongside the state’s judiciary. As Watkins 
rightly points out, the lack of scholarly attention paid to the contemporary 
application of tribal laws in the Middle East encourages the impression that it 
is archaic.195 However, this is far from the truth. But tribal law and adjudication 
is a complex topic which deserves full exploration on its own and is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.196  
Law and legal systems in the Arab Middle East: beyond binary terms of 
traditionalism and modernity  
 
In light of the above, a core purpose of this chapter is to provide for a more 
nuanced insight into the historical development of judicial culture in the Arab 
region:  
 
“A large number of societies view law with indifference and 
many, particularly those we term primitive, consider the birth and 
development of law as a misadventure. In these societies, which 
set themselves against law, law appears with difficulty, evolves 
but little, and if one attempts to transfer law born and nourished 
elsewhere, the result is usually failure”197 
 
                                               
194 See for instance, Layish A, 2002. “The Qāḍī’s Role in the Islamization of Sedentary Tribal 
Society.” In ThePublic Sphere in Muslim Societies. Ed. Miriam Hoexter, Shmuel N. 
Eisenstadt, and Nehemia Levtzion. New York: SUNY, 83-107. 
195 See for instance, Layish A, ‘Islamic Law in the Modern World: Nationalization, 
Islamization, Reinstatement’ (2014) 21 Islamic Law and Society 276 
196  This omission should not be regarded as the author’s failure to acknowledge that tribal 
justice continues to operate in the region today, sometimes alongside state judges and courts. 
The role and use of tribal justice and their adjudicator deserves a full exploration, as it is part 
of a rich legal heritage, but this is not within the scope of this study. See generally Jessica 
Watkins, “Seeking Justice: Tribal Dispute Resolution And Societal Transformation In Jordan” 
(2014) 46 International Journal of Middle East Studies 31; Frank H Stewart, “Tribal Law in the 
Arab World: A Review of the Literature” (1987) 19 International Journal of Middle East Studies 
473; “The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control”, 
64 Middle East Journal, 1  
197  Norbert Rouland, Legal Anthropology (Athlone Press 1994) p.293  
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Descriptions of the evolution of law and legal systems in the Arab region tend 
to be described in binary terms of “modernity” and “tradition”.198 On the one 
hand, modernisation efforts are often the focus of scholarship which is 
concerned with the desire to move towards a more Westernised legal 
conception based on “contractual relationship between free individual wills”.199 
On the other hand, a focus on “tradition” in Arab law is concerned to highlight 
legal systems based on kinship where the community “defines the 
individual”.200 Alliot for instance considered that “man is a servant of the past 
in traditional societies, and forges the future in Western societies”.201 But to 
describe the evolution of law and judiciaries in the Arab region using binary 
terms is factually misleading.202 Efforts at modernising judicial practice in line 
with Western legal influences form only one historical aspect of the region’s 
legal history. Similarly, looking at the role of tradition in law and judicial practice 
will only provide for a partial picture, in part because there is no uniform 
understanding of tradition across the region. What constitutes as “traditional” 
is contested and there are several competing values which have been 
established as legitimate traditional values within each Arab country as well as 
in the region. The present role of the Arab judge is complex and cannot be 
understood simply through the narrow lens of modernisation and 
traditionalism.  
 
                                               
198  Usually underlying this distinction is Max Weber’s binary distinction between two concepts, 
“traditional authority” and “rational-legal authority”. These are refuted in this thesis because 
they are simplistic and generalising.  
199  Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017) p.293. 
200  Norbert Rouland, Legal Anthropology (Athlone Press 1994) p. 301.  
201  For Rouland, the reconciliation between these binary concepts can only be achieved with 
difficulty: “The transfers of law from modern to traditional societies are unlikely to be fully 
accomplished without serious repercussions. When they take place willy-nilly, imposed by 
colonialism and taken up by newly independent states, it is at the price of an acculturation in 
which the state may ultimately be the loser”. Norbert Rouland, Legal Anthropology (Athlone 
Press 1994) p.295.  
202  The tendency to view history as an “opposition between the European contractual state 
and Oriental despotism is no more than a scholarly fiction’. See Sultany, Law and Revolution: 
Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring (First edition, Oxford University Press 
2017) p.20.  
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This chapter is set out in two parts. Part one traces the historical development 
of conceptions of the Islamic judicial role by briefly discussing three historical 
periods:  
 
1. Pre-Islamic judicial practice of arbitration among the Arab Bedouins (-622 
AD) from which the institutionalised, Islamic judge would emerge; 
2. Umayyad Caliphate (661-750 AD) and the formal creation of the Islamic 
judicial office;  
3. Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 AD), which allowed the Islamic judicial 
function to mature.  
 
These three periods are important for understanding the origins of the concept 
of a judge from the perspective of early Islamic legal developments and 
transformations of the judicial role.203  
 
Part two explores the judicial role in the region from the 19th century, focusing 
on the impact of the Western law to the region with emphasis on the Ottoman 
legal reforms in the Arab region between 1839 – 1876 and the period following 
the Ottoman decline in the 20th century. The chapter then explores how these 
two historical phases have contributed to current understandings of the judicial 
role in the four main Arab countries analysed in this thesis (Egypt, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and Lebanon).  
Part 1: Origins of the Arab judge: tribal, Islamic and non-Islamic 
influences 
The term Qāḍī is used primarily in two contexts in Arabic. First, it refers to the 
generic function of any judge anywhere (within and outside the region). A Qāḍī 
is concerned with Qaḍā’, encompassing the entire range of a judge’s judicial 
activities including the engagement with “the art of adjudication”. The second 
                                               
203 As explained above, the legal history of the Arab region spans over a millennium which 
cannot be captured in one single chapter. The purpose of this chapter is simply to shed 
some light on the complexity of law and judicial practice in the region through the broad 
historical lenses of western and islamic developments in two periods. This does not suggest 
that other periods such 1258-19th did not make important contributions or influences.  
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use specifically refers to a judge in the Islamic religion. A Qāḍī in the religious 
sense is a revered religious figure whose office is a symbol of divine justice 
(Sharī’ʿa), pre-dominantly occupied by men.204 
 
But the origins of the Qāḍī predates Islam. The context from which Islam 
emerged was deeply rooted in the traditions of the Bedouins in the Arabian 
Peninsula (which today corresponds to the whole Gulf region, Yemen and 
parts of Jordan and Iraq). The Arab Bedouins were in possession of two sets 
of laws: one set served sedentary, agricultural and commercial needs, and the 
other set supported nomadic tribal conditions.205 Both sets of laws were heavily 
dependent on normative legal custom, which was reinforced and legitimised 
by public opinion.206 The intercessor (both female and male) between parties 
to a dispute was called Ḥakam (lit. “arbiter”, “umpire”, “judge”).207  Although not 
binding in the strict legal sense, the Ḥakam’s verdict (Ḥukm) was normally 
considered to be authoritative and final. The role and function of the Ḥakam 
was not only confined to issuing verdicts; the Ḥakam was also a lawmaker. 
With no centralised judicial system, the Ḥakam applied and developed legal 
custom.  
 
                                               
204  When the role of Qāḍī became institutionalised, opinions differed on whether women could 
act as judges. Although women did act as tribal adjudicators in pre-Islamic Arabia, the issue 
has been a point of contestation. The majority of Islamic legal scholars have held the view that 
women cannot be judges. However, a strong minority of famous jurists such as Imam Abu 
Ḥanifa (the “founder” of the Ḥanafīte school of law), Ibn Ḥazm, and Imam al-Tabari are of the 
opinion that women can be judges. Despite this, there have been a few notable female Qāḍīs. 
One historical example was the mother of the Abbassid Caliph Muqtadar Billah who acted as 
an appeal judge. See Nadia Sonneveld and Monika Lindbekk (eds), Women Judges in the 
Muslim World: A Comparative Study of Discourse and Practice (Brill 2017); Noriani Nik Badli 
Shah and Yasmin Masidi, Women as Judges (Rev ed, Sisters in Islam 2009). Recent 
developments in Saudi Arabia suggests that this may change See (n516). 
205  Wael B Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 
2004) p.18.  
206  Ibid.p.18. See also Nathalie Najjar, Arbitration and International Trade in the Arab 
Countries (Brill Nijhoff 2018) p.31. 
207  Ḥakam comes from the root Ḥa - kaf- mem م ک ح which refers to the attribute of judging, 
being wise, passing a verdict and preventing or restraining people from wrongdoing. (pl. 
Ḥukkam). 
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The Islamic Prophet, Muḥammad, was very much part of this society and was 
a Ḥakam himself.208 In later years, Muḥammad’s actions as a Ḥakam became 
an ideal model for the Islamic judge,209 and the Ḥakam’s function continued 
throughout the Prophet’s lifetime.210 Instead the aim was to remind and teach 
men and women the moral obligations required to pass the reckoning of 
judgment day.211  By the time of Muḥammad’s death in the year 632, Islam had 
a large following, but concepts of law and judicial practice in accordance with 
the newly established religion remained undeveloped.212  
Age of the Arab-Muslim Caliphates 
Substantial developments in the judicial role occurred during the next 500 
years, which is generally referred to as the age of the Arab-Muslim Caliphates 
and is illustrated in Figure 2 below.  
 
                                               
208  In the year 622, Muḥammad was invited to be an impartial arbiter, Ḥakam, between 
Medina’s warring factions that had lasted for around a century. He was to settle their disputes 
on the basis of tribal custom. See PM Holt and others, The Cambridge History of Islam (2008) 
p.39  
209  Muḥammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters and David Stephan Powers (eds), Dispensing 
Justice in Islam: Qāḍīs and Their Judgements (Brill 2006) p.7 
210  Wael B Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 
2004) p.36-36 
211  Khadduri, M. and Liebesny, H. (2008). Origin and development of Islamic law. Clark, NJ: 
Lawbook Exchange, p.31  
212  Ibid.  
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Figure 2. Timeline of Muslim Caliphates213 
 
 
 
During the greater part of the first century, technical aspects of law were a 
matter of indifference to the early Muslims. The pre-Islamic system of 
arbitration and custom continued under the first successors of Prophet 
Muḥammad, the Caliphs of Medina (“Al-Rāshidun” in 632–661). Judicial 
appointments were made mostly of men deemed to be in in possession of 
experience in arbitration, wisdom and charisma to whom tribesmen could 
resort to adjudicate their disputes.214 With the ensuing military (and later 
cultural and religious) expansion of Islam, the monotheistic religion found in 
the Arabian Peninsula eventually transitioned into a politico-religious Islamic 
                                               
213  Following the Siege of Baghdad by the Mongol Empire in 1258, the Abbāsids’ power was 
drastically reduced. The Abbāsids would later rule, albeit superficially, under the Mamluk 
Sultanate of Cairo between 1261 – 1517 until they were finally overthrown by the Ottomans in 
1517 
214  According to Hallaq, qāḍīs under the first Caliphs were recruited from ranks of pre-Islamic 
arbitrators. Wael B Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2004), p.35-37.  
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Empire.215 In order to adapt to Islam’s new political reality, the Ḥakam’s role 
would have to be redefined in order to accommodate this new reality.  
The Umayyads (661 – 750 AD) 
The Banū ʾUmayya, (“Umayyads”), were a prominent Meccan clan of the 
Quraysh tribe to which the Prophet Muḥammad also belonged.216 Before 
Muḥammad’s death, the clan converted to Islam and several members of the 
clan would hold leadership roles: ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan became the third Caliph 
of Medina between 644-656 AD, and Muʿawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan; (602 – 680 
AD) became the second Caliph from the Umayyad clan.  
 
At its height, the Umayyad Caliphate claimed dominion over North Africa, 
Central and South Asia, the Middle East, Iberian Peninsula and Sicily. The 
centralisation of Umayyad legal administration appears to have begun during 
the last years of the first century, and this marked a change in the nature of 
judicial appointments.217 Although the Umayyad legal system was a patchwork 
of legal sources, law had begun to acquire its own independent character 
separate from tribal arbitration. The Arab Ḥakam was supplanted by an 
institutionalised Islamic judge who was a deputy of the governor. In addition to 
rendering judgments, Umayyad judges performed a multitude of functions 
such as collecting taxes and acting as police chiefs, and this led to subsequent 
descriptions of them as “proto-Qāḍīs”.218 Tyan, for example, describes the 
                                               
215  Immediately after Muḥammad’s death, Islam experienced significant splits in its polity over 
the issue of political authority. The majority Sunnis believed that sovereignty passed to those 
caliphs who were companions of the Prophet and elected from the leadership of the Quraysh, 
the Prophet’s tribe. But others, those who became the Shi’a Muslims, insisted that ’Ali, 
Muḥammad’s nephew and son-in-law, was the rightful caliph and that rulership should pass 
after ’Ali to the children born of his wife Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter. See generally PM Holt 
and others, The Cambridge History of Islam (2008).  
216  The Prophet Muḥammad belonged to the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe.   
217  Wael B Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 
2004), p.57 
218  Lena Salaymeh, The Beginnings of Islamic Law: Late Antique Islamicate Legal Traditions 
(Cambridge University Press 2016) p.150.  
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Islamic judge under the Umayyads as a delegate and representative (Nāʾib) 
rather than a judge in his own right.219 
 
According to Tyan, under the Umayyads, there was no distinction between 
judicial activity in litigation and activities outside litigation.220 The court (Majlis 
al-qādā) was not confined to a physical space. Rather, it was a manifestation 
of the judge himself (or herself) and an extension of the judicial personality. 
Hallaq contrasts this with civil and common law systems in Western countries, 
where the court tends to be less dependent on the judge and more on the 
purpose of the law. In the West, the court is a building occupied and 
appropriated according to the law for the holding of trials. Whereas Hallaq 
explains that the Islamic judge was not obliged to conduct his sessions in a 
specific place. Hearings were frequently held in the mosque, but they could 
also be held in the judge’s private residence, in the market place and even in 
the public streets.221   
Introduction of foreign legal concepts and maxims into Islamic society  
The Umayyad’s were influenced by conquered territories and legal knowledge 
from non-Arab converts to Islam. Hallaq describes this as a “process of 
infiltration” 222, where the introduction of non-Islamic and non-Arab legal 
concepts and maxims into Islamic society was made possible through non-
Arab converts to Islam. In addition, the Umayyads adopted concepts and 
principles from Byzantine (Roman), Sassanian (Persian) and Hellenic (Greco-
Macedonian) laws, and they also drew inspiration from religious legal practices 
found in Canonical and Rabbinical laws.223 Islamic judges favoured local 
custom in their judicial interpretations by reinforcing and preserving local 
                                               
219 Émile Tyan, Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam, 2nd edition (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill,1960) p.101 
220  Ibid.p.236 
221  Wael B Hallaq, “The Qāญī’s Dīwān (Sijill) before the Ottomans” (1998) 61 Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 415, p.418.  
222  Wael B Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge University Press 
2009) p.37  
223  Jokisch B, Islamic Imperial Law: Harun-Al-Rashid’s Codification Project (de Gruyter 
2007) p. 3 
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traditions.224 More specifically, they were expected to give judgment according 
to sound opinion (ra’y). Judges based their decision-making on the customary 
practice of the community under their jurisdiction, as well as combining it with 
the letter and spirit of the Qurʾān.225 Through this judicial practice, Byzantine 
and Sassanian laws (amongst others) came to be integrated into Islamic legal 
practice, introducing considerable legal diversity within which religion was 
“secondary”.226  
 
The variety of functions attached to the Umayyad Qāḍī had drawbacks that 
were further aggravated by the judge’s subordination, not only to the central 
executive authority, but also to various regional authorities. Judgeship was 
considered an extension of caliphal authority, where a judge was only a 
delegate of the person who had appointed him.227 Suspicion of political power 
and those associated with the judicial function grew particularly strong during 
the late Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyads were blamed for the loss of 
religious ethos in Islamic jurisprudence by focusing on worldly ends. For 
Islamic jurists, judicial appointment entailed a moral risk and a calamity for 
anyone who received it because the role was an inherently political, “worldly” 
and “secular” in function. Asserting the truth, God’s truth, was in direct 
eschatological opposition with the judicial functions prescribed by the 
Umayyads. The judicial role involved determining right and wrong, and taking 
rights from some and granting it to others, involved a delicate and sacrosanct 
activity. Failure to judge by God’s command and instead relying on temporal 
laws amounted to unbelief and oppression.228  
                                               
224  Layish for example writes that the early Umayyad qāḍīs “filled local practices and customs 
with Islamic religious and ethical norms” Layish A, ‘Islamic Law in the Modern World: 
Nationalization, Islamization, Reinstatement’ (2014) 21 Islamic Law and Society p. 283. See 
also Schacht, Joseph. 1964. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 
225  Émile Tyan, Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam, 2nd edition (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill,1960) pp. 49-50 
226  Jokisch B, Islamic Imperial Law: Harun-Al-Rashid’s Codification Project (de Gruyter 2007) 
p. 54  
227  Hallaq, W. (2011). The origins and evolution of Islamic law. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, p.79 
228  Jurists were reported to have avoided judicial appointment even at the cost of punishment 
by the authorities. See Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System Studies of Saudi Arabia 
(Harvard University 1993) p.139.  
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Following unrest and several rebellions, the Umayyads were overthrown in the 
year 750 by the ‘Abbāsids, a rival clan to the Umayyads. The ‘Abbāsids shared 
the same clan of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Banu Hashim clan, and claimed 
caliphal authority by virtue of the closer bloodline than of the Umayyads.229 In 
addition, the ‘Abbāsids distinguished themselves from the Umayyad’s who 
were criticised as an “Arab Kingdom” because of the secular nature of the 
Umayyad state:230  
“The ideology of a restoration of primitive Islam, with variants 
reflecting different trends, had conquered the masses, and, with 
the support of a majority of the learned men, became part of the 
programme of all, or nearly all, the leaders of parties. It triumphed 
when the 'Abbāsids adopted it as their slogan.”231 
 
The ‘Abbāsids (750- 1258) 
Despite the new rulers’ promise to inaugurate a new era of justice and piety, 
the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs, like their predecessors, had to administer and rule a 
complex, multi-cultural realm. Two important legal developments took place 
under the ‘Abbāsids which would make a lasting mark on the Arab judicial role. 
The first development was the creation of jurisprudential schools of Islamic law 
(Madahib). The second development was the creation of the Islamic judicial 
office, which in part was due to the new jurisprudential schools and in part to 
the increasing power of Islamic jurists granted by the new caliphs.  
Doctrinal schools of law 
By the early Abbāsid period, law had become more comprehensive in 
coverage and jurists began to develop their own legal assumptions and legal 
methodology. Unlike the Umayyad’s who had given leeway to local customs, 
under the Abbāsids laws became the exclusive domain of jurists to interpret 
and formulate. The emergence of Islamic jurisprudence influenced by the 8th 
                                               
229  The Abbāsids descended from their founder, Al-Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (566–653 CE), 
who was one of Muḥammad’s uncles. The Banu Hashim clan, the Hashemites now rule Jordan 
under King Abdallah II.  
230Asma Afsaruddin, ‘Umayyad Dynasty’ (Encyclopædia Britannica 2018) 
<www.britannica.com/topic/Umayyad-dynasty-Islamic-history> accessed 12 August 2018. 
231  PM Holt and others, The Cambridge History of Islam (2008), p.103 
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century jurist, Shafi’ī’’s, principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-fiqh).232 
Shafi’ī formulated the fundamental paradigm for Islamic law between the years 
815 and 820. Of the several juristic schools that existed, only four from the 
Sunni branch were raised to the level of doctrinal schools during the ‘Abbāsid 
era. The schools were named after their respective “founders”: Shafi’ī, Abū 
Ḥanīfa, Mālikī and bin- Ḥanbal.233 According to Vogel, the survival of these 
doctrinal schools was “influenced by communal and regional conformities, as 
well as official endorsement through financial and political support.”234 Table 5 
below summarises the key characteristics of each of the schools.  
 
Table 5. Doctrinal schools in Sunni Islamic law 
Doctrinal 
school 
Characteristics Period235 Present reach 
Ḥanbalī 
 
The most source-oriented of the four 
schools with the least room for 
analogical reasoning. 
780–855  AD 
to Present 
 
 
The Gulf, pre-
dominantly in Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar 
 
Mālikī 
Places special emphasis on the 
actions of the people of Madinah 
shortly after the Prophet's death as a 
source of law (thinks of the residents 
of Madinah as "living Ḥadīth". 
 
711–795 AD to 
Present 
Popular in North 
and West Africa 
Shafi’ī 
Slightly less emphasis on analogical 
and reasoning; more focused on 
evidences and methodological 
approaches. Traditionalist inspired. 
“Prefers a weak tradition to a strong 
analogy” 
 
767-820 AD– 
to present 
 
Popular in Egypt, 
and Malaysia. 
 
Ḥanafī 
Use of Analogy (Qiyās) and Taqlid 
(lit. imitation) is central to the Ḥanafī 
school. It is the method in conforming 
to legal precedent, traditional 
behaviour and doctrines often set or 
used by mujtahids. 
699 – 767 AD 
to present 
 
The most 
widespread school 
in Islamic law, 
followed by roughly 
one-third of the 
world’s Muslims. 
                                               
232  Shafi’ī was born around 767 and died in 820 AD. 
233  Other “schools” eventually died out or were subsumed by the four surviving ones. The 
survival of the four Sunni schools was, in addition to popularity, influenced by communal and 
regional conformities as well as official endorsement through financial and political support. 
See Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000); Abd-
Allah, U. (2013). Mālik and Medina. Leiden: Brill, p.510 
234  See Frank Vogel, Islamic law and legal system studies of Saudi Arabia Ph.D. Harvard 
University, 1993, p.126 
235 Because these schools were tied to their respective founders, the years indicated relate to 
the lives of each of the four founders.  
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The three other schools found ways to accommodate Shafi’ī’s dogma, 
combining interpretation and application of legal principles they claimed could 
override the authority of the Ḥadīth. For the Ḥanafī school, this was the 
strength of “juristic preference” (Istiḥsān). According to Kamali, this is a 
rationalist doctrine that consists of giving preference to one over many possible 
solutions to a particular problem, and “the choice of one or the other of these 
solutions is mainly determined by the jurist in the light of considerations of 
equity and fairness”236  The Mālikī school’s benchmark was the credibility of 
“the consensus of the Medina scholars”237 because the city of Medina was the 
centre of Islamic teaching and where the Prophet Muḥammad’s companions 
resided. The Mālikī school would, therefore, come to be characterised by its 
reliance on the customary practice of Medina as a source of law.238 The 
adherents of the Ḥanbalī school remained strictly traditionalist, but would later 
accept the jurisprudential necessity of analogy.  
Development of the Islamic judge 
The second important development under the ‘Abbāsid rule was the evolution 
of the judicial role. Unlike the Umayyad period, judges increasingly 
distinguished themselves from political power.239 During the ‘Abbāsids, the 
office of a chief justice was established (Qāḍī al-Qudat).240  His role was to act 
primarily as an adviser to the Caliph in the appointment and dismissal of 
judges. Through the increasing institutionalisation of the judicial office during 
this period, a clear role for judges had begun to emerge: 
“Judges established themselves as the intercessors between the 
populace and the rulers. Even outside the courtroom, jurists and 
judges felt responsibility toward the common man, and on their 
own often initiated action without any petition being made.”241 
                                               
236  Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (3rd rev and enl ed, 
Islamic Texts Society 2003)., p.4 
237  Ibid. 
238  Ibid. p.372 
239  Majid Khadduri and Herbert J Liebesny (eds), Origin and Development of Islamic Law 
(Lawbook Exchange 2008) p.260  
240  Hallaq, W. (2011), The origins and evolution of Islamic law. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, p.79-80 
241  Ibid. p.183 
 62  
 
While the responsibility of the Islamic judge was primarily judicial, he was also 
charged with certain quasi and non-judicial responsibilities.  
Significance of the Arab-Muslim Caliphates on the role of the Arab 
judge 
Prior to the Arab expansion in the name of Islam, disputes in the Arabian 
Peninsula were largely settled with arbitration based on legal custom.242 The 
role of the Ḥakam made important contributions to the development of the 
Islamic judge. With Islam’s territorial expansion and the establishment of an 
Islamic polity, the Islamic judicial office began to take shape. Its development, 
however, was not confined within the framework of Arab formulated Islamic 
principles. It would have been difficult if not impossible for the Arab caliphs to 
administer a complex, multicultural realm without the advantages offered by 
conquered territories. For the Umayyads, the advantages included assistance 
in establishing and laying the groundwork for the judicial office, drawing 
inspiration from neighbouring judicial systems as well as monotheistic religious 
laws. Their contribution, however, did not escape criticism and suspicion. 
Islamic jurists disapproved of the Umayyad rule in several respects, 
particularly in relation to the Umayyad tendency towards executive 
interference. They also disapproved of the infusion of secular laws with the 
early developments of Islamic law. Under the ‘Abbāsids, this changed 
substantially, and the judicial function became more autonomous and distinct 
from the ruling class. Judges began to rely on established bodies of law 
formulated by jurists in accordance with the newly established schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence.  
Part 2: Western influences on the development of the Arab judge 
The end of the Arab Muslim Caliphates marked a new beginning for the 
development of the judicial role. Earlier developments had refined and 
developed a judicial role that was religiously legitimised, only to undergo 
                                               
242 See Hallaq, W. (2011), The origins and evolution of Islamic law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press 
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further refinements throughout the later centuries. This time, its development 
would be overseen and authorised by neither ethnically nor linguistically Arab 
Muslim rulers: 
“In the seventh century the Arabs created a new world into which 
other peoples were drawn. In the nineteenth and twentieth, they 
were themselves drawn into a new world created in Western 
Europe.”243  
 
Secular notions of law and justice from predominantly civil legal traditions 
made their mark on the Islamic judge. Two important periods are associated 
with the introduction and eventual synthesis of Islamic laws with ideas from 
different Western legal cultures.  All of this would have a marked effect on the 
judicial office. The first period relates to the final years of the Ottoman rule 
(1839-1922), and the second, to the establishment of Arab independence 
following the British and French mandates (mid-20th century). For Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt, these two periods of regional legal trends 
set the course for the development of their present-day legal systems, 
including the role of judges in their respective countries. 
The Ottoman judicial reforms (1839 -1876) 
The Ottoman dynasty was founded in the late 13th century in north-western 
Anatolia. Under Selim I (1470 –1520), the Empire rapidly expanded into the 
Middle East. Following the seizure of the holy Islamic cities of Mecca and 
Medina, Ottoman claim of caliphal authority was solidified. The Ottoman 
stronghold would remain, at least officially, until the Caliphate’s defeat and loss 
of its territories in the Middle East to the Allied Powers in the aftermath of the 
first World War.244  
 
By the late 19th century, the Ottoman empire officially controlled all of the 
Levant region (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine) and Iraq. The Ottomans 
also claimed dominion over most of North Africa, Egypt and the Arabian 
                                               
243  Hourani, A. (1992), A history of the Arab peoples. London: Faber and Faber, p. 249.  
244  The conquered Middle Eastern territories were divided between the United Kingdom and 
France under the “Asia minor Agreement” in 1916, also referred to as the Sykes – Picot 
Agreement.  
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Peninsula. In practice, however, the regions enjoyed varying degrees of self-
rule. The territory that now corresponds to Saudi Arabia was under the direct 
rule of Arab tribal leaders. Despite Ottoman claims to the entire Peninsula, 
central rule was limited to strategic areas such as Hijaz, the two Islamic 
sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina. In the 19th century, Egypt was technically 
an Ottoman province but in practice enjoyed a degree of autonomy.245 Modern 
day Lebanon dates back to the Ottoman Mount Lebanon Principality.246 In 
1860, Mount Lebanon became part of the Ottoman province, with political 
institutions based on power sharing among its various religious groups under 
an Ottoman-European consortium protectorate.247  
 
The Ottomans began an unprecedented period of reforms between 1839 – 
1876.248 The empire sought to reform and modernise its institutions and 
society in line with the prevailing cultural, legal and political dominance of 
Europe. Libertarian ideas of the French Revolution found a favourable milieu 
among educated urban Ottomans, and the empire was called on to give way 
to the new philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment. Between 1839 and 1876, 
a series of reforms were promulgated in the Ottoman empire. These reforms, 
called the Tanẓīmāt, were intended to modernise the empire from an old 
theocratic system into a modern state similar to European states.249  
 
The Tanẓīmāt reforms would require universality and a direct contact with the 
Ottoman citizen without regard to religion or ethnicity. As Hanioğlu describes, 
                                               
245  Jasmine Moussa, Competing Fundamentalisms and Egyptian Women’s Family Rights: 
International Law and the Reform of Sharī’ʿa-Derived Legislation (Brill 2011), p.120 
246  Zahar writes: “The principality’s autonomy was premised on subservience to its Ottoman 
masters; the Emir (prince) was required to maintain social order and deliver required taxes 
and other obligations to the Sultan in Constantinople”. See Roeder PG and Rothchild, DS 
(eds), Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Cornell University Press 
2005) p.219 
247  Ibid. p.219 
248  ‘Tanzimat’ (Encyclopædia Britannica 2016) <https://www.britannica.com/event/Tanzimat> 
Last accessed 9 September 2016 
249  Ibid. Ahron Layish writes that “The “Young Ottoman” constitutional movement and the 
ideological struggle between the Westernist, Islamist and Turkish schools of thought of the 
“Young Turk” movement in the 19th century – both under the impact of the West – 
preparedthe ground for the complete abolition of sharīʿa.” Layish A, ‘Islamic Law in the 
Modern World: Nationalization, Islamization, Reinstatement’ (2014) 21 Islamic Law and 
Society p. 278. 
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the vision “was a significant first step toward the transformation of hitherto 
Muslim, Christian, and Jewish subjects into Ottoman”.250 To achieve this, law 
and legal administration required substantial reforms, especially the Sharī’ʿa 
dominated courts which were run by Islamic judges. Mirroring Western legal 
developments, Ottoman Islamic law and practice would have to move away 
from natural justice and to emphasise procedure, code and appellate 
hierarchy. The dominant judicial paradigm was legal formalism, and the 
Ottomans wished to introduce this to their own empire. This required replacing 
doctrinal interpretation, custom and, more importantly, judicial discretion with 
a rigid and mechanical application of a comprehensive set of laws.251 To 
achieve this, a series of centralised reforms were inaugurated, including the 
introduction of the Nizamyieh courts chiefly modelled on Napoleonic laws and 
judicial structures.  
 
The Nizamyieh courts were three tiered and covered civil, criminal and 
commercial disputes. The civil corpus juris, the Mejelle, was a comprehensive 
compendium of Islamic law and was also codified in with western structures in 
mind. The Mejelle was to be administered in the new civil courts and applied 
by judges trained in secular legal methodologies.252 Penal law, traditionally 
based on Islamic law (and codified in early 19th century), gave way to an 
adaptation of the French penal code of 1858, also applied by the new criminal 
courts. Sharī’ʿah courts continued to operate alongside the Nizamyieh courts, 
but their jurisdiction was reduced to adjudicating on endowments and personal 
status laws for Muslims only.  
Influence of Ottoman Tanẓīmāt in the Arab region  
Despite these centralising reforms, Ottoman suzerainty in the Arab region was 
implemented in a piecemeal fashion. By the start of the 19th century, Ottoman 
hegemony ranged from existent to non-existent in the jurisdictions covered in 
                                               
250  M. Şükrü Hanioğlu., A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton University Press 
(2008) p.74 
251  Avi Rubin, “Legal Borrowing and Its Impact on Ottoman Legal Culture in the Late 
Nineteenth Century” (2007) 22 Continuity and Change 279, p.284. See also Rubin A, 
Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 
252  The “Mejellet al Ahkam al Adilyia”  was issued in 1876  
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this research. The Tanẓīmāt influenced some places profoundly, and others 
only superficially. For instance, Egypt, technically an Ottoman province, 
managed to acquire a degree of autonomy in the law throughout the 19th 
century. Even if the country generally followed Ottoman legal developments, 
such as the Mejelle, the pace and content of the Tanẓīmāt were largely 
informed by the country’s own juridical developments.253 The establishment of 
the Egyptian Mixed Courts in the 19th century had an international dimension 
that went beyond the modelling of the Nizamyieh courts. Dictated by foreign 
powers, the Mixed Courts were a hybrid series of courts, particularly 
established to deal with disputes between foreigners and Egyptians. Judges 
sitting in the Egyptian Mixed courts had considerable experience and came 
from a variety of nations, including France, England, Italy, Scandinavia and the 
USA, as well as Egypt. The increasing number of British and American judges 
serving in the Egyptian courts, especially after the British Occupation in 1882, 
resulted in the, albeit limited, introduction of Anglo-American common law 
elements which came to be a source of influence on Egyptian judicial decision-
making in later years.254 Central Arabia (present day Saudi Arabia and Yemen) 
and rural areas inhabited by Bedouin tribes also saw little of Ottoman legal 
influence. Instead, Shari’a,  tribal law and custom remained in full practice, and 
an Islamic version of Ḥakam remained the intercessor in disputes.  
 
Despite the varying degrees of influence of the Tanẓīmāt, the Ottoman reforms 
had – directly or indirectly – made an influence in the Arab region in one 
important respect: the Mejelle. The Ḥanafī-based Islamic law had been the 
official school of law throughout the centuries-long Ottoman rule, and by the 
late 19th century this school acquired a new status once it became codified. 
Legal norms were no longer valid merely because eminent Muslim jurists had 
developed them. In the new context, the validity of Islamic jurisprudential 
                                               
253  Nathan J. Brown, “Reining in the Executive,” in Judges and Political Reform in Egypt, ed. 
Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008) p.27-32 
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norms “came to depend on the fact that they were state law, legalized by state 
legislation.”255  
 
Some regions however, managed to evade this development completely. It 
was wholly rejected in parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Prior to the conquest of 
Hijaz in 1926, the judicial systems of the various Saudi regimes in the Arabian 
Peninsula were simple and largely based on the Ḥanbalī school of Islamic law 
and tribal custom. On the verge of extinction, the Ḥanbalī school was revived 
in the 18th century with the help of a religious and political movement brought 
together by a tribal alliance headed by a judge, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Sa’ud (this alliance eventually led to the creation 
of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom).  
Significance of the Ottoman period on the role of the Arab judge 
In the pre-modern period, Islamic judges had jurisdiction over an entire gamut 
of legal norms.256 Following the Ottoman caliphal claim, Islamic judicial 
practice would be conceptualised according to the Ottoman favoured Ḥanafī 
school of Islamic law for centuries. With the diminishing of Islamic law in favour 
of secular laws in the 19th and 20th century, the Islamic judge’s jurisdiction were 
reduced and replaced by those of secular Ottoman judges. The Ottoman 
embrace of modernism, inspired by European thought, envisioned that law and 
the judiciary would eventually move away from the “old” and make way for the 
“new”. Instead, a certain duality of legal culture ended up characterising the 
legal system across the region. The western civil courts in many areas of the 
region came to coexist uneasily side-by-side with the traditional Islamic law 
courts, a phenomenon that would later imbed itself in many Arab 
jurisdictions.257 The dual character of religious judges and secular judges also 
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continued to serve as a framework for, and inform the development of the 
judicial role in several Arab states following independence.  
Influence of British and French hegemony and post-colonial legal 
reforms  
In the late 19th and early 20th century, following the fall of the Ottoman empire, 
the Arab Middle East underwent critical changes that affected the region’s 
legal systems. Ottoman rulers were replaced by European rule. Territories 
taken from the Ottomans were divided between the United Kingdom and 
France as per the “Asia Minor Agreement” in 1916 (also referred to as the 
Sykes – Picot Agreement).  
 
Although the extent of European colonial hegemony in Arab legal systems 
varied across the region. The imposition, adoption and imitation of European 
models of legislation varied across the region. For instance, the British applied 
a diverse body of laws during their mandate in Iraq (1920 -1932), which Lowry 
writes was “culled from Ottoman, French, and Anglo-Indian colonial laws, while 
tribal customary law was applied in the countryside”.258 In Transjordan and 
Iraq, Ottoman legislation remained partly in effect.  In Palestine (1922-1948), 
English judges applied the Mejelle as well as British law.259  
 
Following the French and British mandates, newly established Arab nation-
states renewed their efforts at modernising their respective laws and 
judiciaries.260 Egypt was at the forefront of this process through the work of the 
French-educated Egyptian jurist, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī. Al-Sanhūrī was a 
member of all three legislative committees charged with the revision of the 
Egyptian Code in 1930s.261 Sanhūrī developed a deliberate reformist agenda 
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by conceptualising Egypt’s law in a more progressive and egalitarian way. He 
modernised Islamic law by “applying the insights of sociological critiques of 
classical legal thought.”262 His scholarship was motivated by a desire to 
harmonise and develop the Ottoman codifications of Islamic law with modern 
positivist conceptions of law inspired from the West (primarily from Swiss, 
French, English and American laws). Islamic law and Western laws, Sanhūrī 
believed, were not antithetical.263 Rather, Islamic law had a “contemporary 
relevance in other than a fundamentalist or recidivistic sense.”264 Sanhūrī 
incorporated both Islamic and Western legal values in the1949 Egyptian Civil 
Code which “became the basis of a new standard of legal justice”.265 The new 
Code devised a unique, empowered role for Egyptian judges. According to 
Bechor, Sanhūrī’s code expanded judicial discretion beyond the limits of 
classic French law.266 In his explanatory notes to the proposed Egyptian Code, 
Sanhūrī wrote: 
“Let no one imagine that a judge who rules in accordance with a 
frozen basis and whose hands are shackled by a narrow text can 
adapt the legal provisions for just application in changing 
circumstances. For he will then either bring justice, but break the 
shackles of the law, or remain committed to the limits of the law, 
and bring only partial justice.”267  
 
                                               
for discussion in 1942. Eventually, the proposed became the blueprint for Egypt's new Civil 
Code of 1949. al-Qanun al-Madani: Majmutat al-A'mal al-Tahhdriyya (Cairo: Ministry of 
Justice, n.d-). 
262  Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017)., p.22 
263  According to Sanhūrī: “As regards the application of the principles of Islamic law, we have 
seen that this great legal system has fallen into a state of stagnation because it has not 
undergone the necessary changes. It therefore seems indispensable to us, before we can 
think of putting the principles into practice, to bring about a revival of Islamic law, distinguishing 
between its religious part and its temporal part. The current state of civilization demands a 
continuous relaxation of the last of these two parts so that all the citizens, Muslim or not, are 
in presence of rules of law which can also be applied to them.”, ‘Abd al-Razzaq al Sanhuri 
(Sanhoury), Le Califat (Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner 1926).p.571 
264  Hill, E. (1988). “Sanhūrī and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the 
Life and Work of 'Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad Sanhūrī, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar”, 1895-
1971. Arab Law Quarterly, 3(1) p.38 
265  Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (Johns Hopkins University Press) p.207 
266  Ibid. p.296. 
267  Guy Bechor, The Sanhuri Code, and the Emergence of Modern Arab Civil Law (1932 to 
1949) (Brill 2007).p.209; 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī ‘Al-Wasīt fi Sharḥ al-qānūn al-Madanī’ 
(Cairo: Dār al-Nahda  al- ʿArabiyya, 1988), volume 1, p. 104. 
 70  
For Sanhūrī, the Code required flexible criteria that could anticipate future 
developments and change. Developing this idea, Sanhūrī wrote that the 
provisions of the Code became tools in the hands of the judge “so that he can 
develop the Code on an ongoing basis, and, with the help of these tools, meet 
changing circumstances and conditions.”268 For this reason, Bechor argues, 
the Egyptian code brought about a dual loyalty for the Egyptian judge.269 The 
first loyalty was owed to society that granted the judge power and authority. 
The second loyalty was to the Code itself, which granted the judge discretion 
within the designed limits.270 Where tensions between the code and society 
emerged, the judge was required to “adjust, weigh and balance his steps”.271  
The quest for Arab (legal) unity272 
Although the Egyptian Civil Code influenced several civil codes in the region273  
for the next three decades, the three other countries under study were (with 
varying degrees) an exception.274 In Lebanon, the Mejelle was repealed under 
the French Mandate and replaced with the 1932 Lebanese Code. The Code 
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was drafted by a French jurist and later revised by Lebanese jurists to reflect 
local legal culture (including the incorporation of some provisions of Ottoman 
and Islamic law).275 Jordan continued to apply the whole of the Ottoman 
Mejelle until 1976, when the Jordanian Code was introduced.276  
Four different Arab approaches to law and judges 
Placed in this historical context, particularly from the late 19th century, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan responded differently to the overarching 
legal developments in the region which came to shape the legal systems and 
set the judicial role onto distinct paths of developments. In 1962, Sanhūrī wrote 
that there were three types of legal experiences in the Arab region. First were 
states that continued with an uncodified version of the Islamic Sharī’ʿa best 
exemplified by Saudi Arabia and the Ḥanbalī school. Second were states 
under Ottoman control during the second half of the 19th century, where the 
Mejelle was applied and remained after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
advent of the French and British mandates. Third were those jurisdictions 
which borrowed French law, such as Lebanon.277 With Sanhūrī’s own 
contributions, a fourth type of legal experience emerged in the region.  
 
These four different legal experiences shed some light on today’s diverse legal 
cultures in the region. These have also had an impact on the judicial role 
(illustrated in figure 3 below).  
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Figure 3. Sources of historical influence on current judicial roles in the Arab region 
 
 
Each historical influence conceived a particular role for the Arab judge. Early 
Islamic-based conceptions of the judge adopted a different notion of what the 
judicial role should be compared to the mechanical judicial function favoured 
by the Ottoman Tanẓīmāt. Even Sanhūrī’s conception of the Egyptian judicial 
role sought to reconcile two seemingly contradictory ambitions of “socialising 
modern law” and “modernising Islamic law”.278  
Summary  
This chapter sought to situate present judicial roles in the Arab region within 
an historical context. This brief historical review reveals a complex interaction 
of competing notions of law and judicial practice in the region. To classify the 
historical periods as an interaction between religious and secular notions of 
law and judicial practice would be an oversimplification. The conception of the 
Islamic judge, or Islamic Qāḍī, evolved from pre-Islamic Arab Bedouin judicial 
practice.279 The different schools of Islamic law also devised different roles for 
the Islamic Qāḍī. The Islamic judge would eventually be replaced with the 
                                               
278  Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017)., p. 21  
279  Simonsohn, U. (2011). A Common Justice: The Legal Allegiances of Christians and Jews 
Under Early Islam. University of Pennsylvania Press. p.75 
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secular Ottoman judge, only to be later replaced with Sanhūrī’s conception of 
the judicial role. It is in this context that the present day Arab judge operates. 
How these historical experiences inform the way today’s Arab judges perceive 
their roles (and whether they consider it within their role to be political) forms 
the main focus of the research in this thesis.  
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Chapter 4. Research approach and methods 
This chapter explains the analytical approaches and research methods used 
in this multi-part study of judicial power and role conceptions in the Arab Middle 
East. An overall research approach used here can be described as “law in 
practice”. This thesis adopts an approach that not only considers formal laws 
and legal rules, but also examines what actually happens in practice. 
Information arising out of empirical research into the reality of the role of Arab 
judges forms an important element of the thesis, as it provides details about 
the judicial role that cannot be found in official legal documents about Arab 
judiciaries.  
Research approach 
Based on the unique characteristics of Arab states it was decided that this 
research would focus on three main themes which may affect the political 
significance of courts and judges. The first was the institutional, that is, the 
extent to which the composition and organisation of courts in Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan would indicate a judicialisation. This also includes 
the prescribed judicial role, i.e. the formal and informal expectations, 
mechanisms and procedures that facilitate or impede judicial activism within 
the judicial organisations particularly in relation to factors that directly affect 
the professional status of the judge. The second theme was pre-appointment 
attributes i.e. career experiences and sources of individualisation of Arab 
judges and whether such extra-legal attributes have an impact on their current 
functions. The final theme was the subjective, i.e. understanding the 
expectations individual judges perceive as applicable to their judicial function 
including their expectations towards actors within the judicial community and 
outside. The three themes were decided to provide for a window through which 
to better understand Arab judicial roles and the extent to which they may be 
politically significant. In relation to these themes, this study attempted to 
answer the following questions: 
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Legal system and individual status within the judiciary  
1) Does the composition and organisation of courts in Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan indicate a judicialisation of politics?  
2) Does judicial selection, training, career, and discipline in the 
Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, Lebanese and Jordanian judiciaries promote 
or impede judicial activism?   
 
Career experiences and sources of individualisation 
3) What are judges prior (and concurrent) career experiences and 
sources of individualisation? 
4) How may these affect judicial role perceptions of Arab judges?  
 
Expectations and attitudes of the judicial role 
5)  What norms and expectations might Arab judges have about their 
jobs as judges? 
6) To what extend does individual judges identify themselves as part of 
a judicial collective?  
7) What norms and expectations might Arab judges have towards their 
peers within the judicial community and towards non-judicial actors?  
 
The research primarily consisted of two main components. The first 
component was to textual analysis of legal documents to identify the structure, 
operation and powers of the judiciary in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia. The second component was to empirically explore and obtain 
information and insight from Arab judges about their: a) background and 
experiences as judges and; b) their attitudes to their judicial role including their 
attitudes towards actors within and outside the broader judicial community. 
Based on this general approach, three studies were conducted to understand 
the role and political significance of Arab judges: 
 
1. A mapping of judicial systems in the region to assess the political 
significance of Arab courts and judges (Research questions 1 and 2); 
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2. A profiling of Arab judges’ education and career experiences based on 
empirical research (Research questions 3 and 4);  
3. A survey of Arab judges’ attitudes to being a judge and their judicial role 
conceptions (Research questions 5,6 and 7).  
 
General obstacles to accessing data from the region 
The Arab Middle East carries significant complexities for any one that wishes 
to undertake research. While each country poses different challenges, the 
following sections discuss risks and obstacles that relate to the whole region 
that may occur when trying to conduct empirical research.  
Elite groups  
Individuals belonging to an elite group are understood to hold some form of 
leadership position in powerful public institutions. According to Hoffmann-
Lange, elites can be found in any social system and are defined by their 
influence on decisions that shape living conditions in a society:280 
“Elite research is devoted to studying the characteristics of 
politicians and other holders of leadership positions in powerful 
public institutions and private organizations who are 
distinguished by their regular participation in (political) decision-
making.”281  
 
Because members belonging to the elite are in high profile positions, their 
actions are typically subject to public scrutiny, which according to Nir, “may 
harbor justifiable fears of injuring their reputations or public personas”.282 This 
is particularly true in relation to Arab judges who have traditionally shied away 
from academic research.  
 
Judges are moreover legally obliged to abide by rules of judicial independence 
and seek to uphold the dignity of the judiciary at all times. Like judges in several 
                                               
280  Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Methodological Developments in Elite Research (Dept of Political 
Science, University of Bamberg, Germany 2006), p.1 
281  Ibid. 
282  Esther Nir, “Approaching the Bench: Accessing Elites on the Judiciary for Qualitative 
Interviews” (2018) 21 International Journal of Social Research Methodology 77, p.77 
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jurisdictions, Arab judges can be said to be hidden behind a “purple curtain” 
that obscures their decisional processes and perpetuates the myth of judicial 
objectivity.283 The judicial systems examined in this thesis, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon, tend to emphasise that judges “speak with one 
tongue”.284 The Higher Judicial Councils in these countries, in particular, have 
taken on a paternalistic role and made considerable efforts to conceal judges 
from media and academic research. Further complexities can also arise in 
relation to Arab judges, such as social and cultural barriers, general suspicion 
towards Western research and security concerns.  
Security risks and political instability  
Security concerns can exist for the elite group as well as for the researcher. 
Especially since the “Arab Spring”, the political situation in the region has 
heightened the security risks in conducting academic research. In Egypt, the 
country seems to be tightening its control on any research related to 
governmental branches, and the tragic death of Cambridge PhD student Giulio 
Regeni highlighted the risks posed to anyone who conducts field research in 
the country.285 In addition, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior in 2016 warned 
Egyptian citizens against taking part in surveys or polls by stating it was a 
threat to national security.286  
 
                                               
283  The metaphor relates to the closed system of the judiciary where judges hide behind a 
"purple curtain" in order obscure decisional processes and “sustain the myth of judicial 
objectivity which permeates the American judicial system”. Theodore L. Becker, “Surveys and 
Judiciaries, or Who's Afraid of the Purple Curtain?” Law & Society Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Nov., 
1966), p.134.  
284  See Chapters 2 and 9 for a fuller discussion. 
285  Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Ruth Michaelson, “Why Was He Killed? Brutal Death of Italian 
Student in Egypt Confounds Experts” Guardian (Cairo, 24 February 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/24/why-was-he-killed-brutal-death-of-italian-
student-in-egypt-confounds-experts>. accessed 30 August 2016. 
286  The law on Non-Governmental Organisations passed by the Egyptian Parliament on 29 
November 2016 adds a further obstacle to any fieldwork. While it specifically targets NGOs 
banning them from conducting fieldwork or polls without the approval of the government, the 
understanding is that any type of research conducted within the country needs a security 
approval which can only be obtained on-site. Amina Ismail, “Egypt Warns Citizens from 
Participating in Foreign Polls” (Cairo, 29 November 2016) 
<https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKCN1LF21C-OZATP> accessed 30 August 
2016. 
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In Saudi Arabia, judges are almost exclusively men, and difficulties can arise 
due to the society’s strict gender separation policy, which poses practical 
difficulties for female researchers. An added difficulty particularly in the Saudi 
context relates to the political and religious tensions between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, which have in recent years heightened significantly. This means that a 
researcher’s name that is Iranian or Shi’a sounding is likely to generate caution 
or suspicion.  
 
All of these factors had to be taken into consideration in deciding how to go 
about conducting the empirical parts of this research into the political 
significance of judges in the Arab region.  
Study 1: Factors in Arab judicial systems likely to affect the political 
significance of judges 
In their analysis of Western judicial systems, Guarnieri and Pederzoli argue 
that two structural variations found in judicial systems may be conducive to 
political significance of courts and judges (i.e., the judicialisation of politics).287 
The first variation relates to the territorial dimension of court systems and 
whether these are diffused. The second relates to the relationship between the 
different layers of courts, their internal dynamics and the role of the supreme 
courts in each country. This framework provided by Guarnieri and Pederzoli 
possesses a unifying capacity for explaining judicialisation of politics in 
general, and allows for the concept of the judicialisation of politics to be used 
comparatively. In light of this, two research questions were set for this first 
study:  
1. Whether Arab judicial structures are fundamentally different from 
Western democratic structures? 
 
2. Whether Arab judicial structures fit within any existing typology of 
judicial structures that are known in Western states to either promote or 
hinder judicialisation? 
                                               
287  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) – Chapter 2 - Judicial 
Systems.  
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Study 1 approach: Creating a typology and mapping judicial systems in 
the region  
The judicial structures in Arabic-speaking states are set out in formal legal 
texts. Therefore, the first stage of the study was devoted to mapping the 
judicial structures of a wide range of Arab states, based on readings of original 
legislative texts and other official documents. The research began with eight 
countries in the Arab region, looking at their respective legal history, regional 
trends, the concept of the judiciary in each country and possible dimensions 
that may indicate judicial activism.288 The initial analysis was descriptive in 
order to establish the scope of basic differences and similarities amongst Arab 
states. It was felt that to omit this descriptive research would make for 
uninformed assumptions.289 Specifically, the following factors were 
considered:  
• Jurisdictional scope of officially recognised courts;  
• Interrelationship between courts; 
• Legal history and legal adaptations, primarily from Western legal traditions;  
• Political system. 
 
A detailed tabulation was produced with key information relating to structural 
and institutional facts for eight Arab countries: Bahrain; Egypt; Jordan; 
Lebanon; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Tunisia; and the United Arab Emirates. This 
created an outline of the key similarities and differences between countries. 
What emerged from this initial mapping exercise were four distinct models of 
judicial structures that seemed best represented by four Arab states: Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. (Appendix 1 provides a table with key 
variables for the remaining four countries).  
 
                                               
288  The following countries were considered: Bahrain; Lebanon; Jordan; Egypt; Saudi Arabia; 
Syria; Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates. 
289  See generally Daniele Caramani, “Of Differences and Similarities: Is the Explanation of 
Variation a Limitation to (or of) Comparative Analysis?” (2010) 9 European Political Science 
34. 
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Following the creation of this typology, an in-depth analysis of the structural 
set ups of the judiciaries in these four countries was undertaken. The data 
derived from primary sources of laws in Arabic, and secondary sources where 
official information was not available. The inquiry was done in three stages. 
The first stage set out the jurisdictional scope of courts. The second stage, 
evaluated the interrelationship between the various courts. Based on this 
inquiry, the final stage sought to analyse the extent to which judicialisation of 
politics might be promoted. The results are presented in Chapter 5 and include 
descriptions of each country’s judicial system along with detailed diagrams of 
the four archetypal judicial systems, which were constructed specifically for 
this research, and represent the first attempt to create a typology judicial 
systems in these Arab states. 
Limitations of comparative study 
The principal function of comparison is that of developing, testing and refining 
a theory.290 Comparative approaches usually allow for two types of analysis, 
the “explorative type” which aims at identifying relationships which may be 
conducive to theory formation, and “theory type” which aims at testing causal 
relationships and corroborate and develop theories further. This study is 
exploratory in nature and aims to further formulate the theory of judicialisation.  
 
Although diversity, “historical particularity, specificity and locality”291 have been 
taken into account in the study, there may be limitations in terms of 
generalisation. The legal systems under review are not identical, but they are 
considered to be similar to the extent that they can be analysed using the 
variables as established by the conceptual framework employed in this 
research. Conscious efforts to consider every unit (judicial system) was made 
in light of the four factors described above, and initially in isolation from each 
other. However, like any other study, this study “begins with certain, tacit or 
                                               
290  See generally Adam Przeworski Henry Teune "The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. 
(1970): New York, Wiley. 
291  Marsh, David, and Gerry Stoker. Theory and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print. p. 250 
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outspoken, assumptions about comparability of the chosen units”.292 Another 
important limitation relates to the issue of representation (a limitation that is 
relevant for the whole thesis). In relation to Study 1, the comparative study is 
confined to a small number of jurisdictions and therefore constitutes a limitation 
and should not be considered representative of the region as a whole.  
Reliability and Accuracy  
The judicial structures in Arab states are set out in formal legal texts, and this 
study was devoted to mapping the judicial structures of a wide range of states 
based on readings of original legislative texts and other official documents. 
Attempts were made to keep up to date with new developments in the four 
legal systems and ensure that the information provided was accurate and most 
recent. However, there may be new developments that have not been covered 
because the four states are currently undergoing several reforms in the justice 
sector.  
 
In terms of the illustrative figures created for this study, the purpose was to 
provide for a broad overview of the judicial structures in Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, especially in relation to the elements thought to be 
conducive to judicialisation. Although the figures have been reviewed and 
approved by judges from the four countries under study, they have not been 
officially approved by the judiciaries in the countries, and they must therefore 
be considered as unofficial. 
Advantages 
Despite these limitations, the classification of the various judicial systems in 
the region into four judicial “families” provides for a useful taxonomy.  It helps 
to explain the diversity of Arab judicial systems and serves as a way of 
understanding the organisation of the various courts and their jurisdictional 
scope in each country.293 Moreover, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia 
                                               
292  Reza Azarian, “Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social Science” 
(2011) 1 International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 113, p.120 
293  An additional purpose in classifying Arab legal systems into four models is to provide for 
an understanding of legal culture from a comparative point of view.  
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share sufficient similarities and differences that would make a regional 
comparative study viable.294 Specifically, the legal and judicial systems under 
review are not identical, but considered to be similar to the extent that they can 
be analysed using the variables as established by the conceptual framework 
employed in the study. This in turn helps to provide a reliable comparative 
framework within which to pose questions about judicialisation.  
Study 2: Profiling Arab judges’ education and career experiences  
The judiciary, like any institution, has mechanisms aimed at assimilating new 
appointees. According to Waldeck and Myers, traditional approaches to 
socialisation view new members as “blank slates, ready to be written upon by 
institutional procedures, norms, and existing culture that effectively allows 
organizations to shape their attitudes and behaviors”.295 In this approach, the 
individual is conceived as a recipient, where a set of institutionally prescribed 
behaviours are induced.296 However, this approach fails to account for 
individual judges being active in creating roles for themselves within the judicial 
organisations.297 For instance, judges may attempt to individualise and 
influence as well as negotiate their role throughout their judicial career, 
drawing on values and knowledge acquired from prior professional and 
educational experiences.298  
 
According to Gibson, research about judges tends to rely on “implicit 
assumptions about the nature of the linkages between demographic attributes, 
attitudes and values”.299 In order to understand the role and potential 
                                               
294  Comparative study usually allows for two types of analysis: (1) the explorative type, which 
aims at identifying relationships which may be conducive to theory formation, and (2) theory 
type, which aims at testing causal relationships and is necessary to corroborate existing 
theories and develop them further. The latter type is employed in this research.  
295  Jennifer H Waldeck and Karen K Myers, “Organizational Assimilation Theory, Research, 
and Implications for Multiple Areas of the Discipline: A State of the Art Review” (2007) 31 
Annals of the International Communication Association 322, p.329 
296  Ibid., p.324 
297  Ibid. 
298  Ibid., p.329 
299  James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7., p.21 
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significance that Arab judges play, it is important to consider the processes 
through which judges’ attitudes, values and role orientations are acquired. The 
second study is an empirical exploration of Arab judges’ professional and 
academic backgrounds; it treats social and professional background attributes 
of Arab judges as “surrogates for other variables”, which help in understanding 
their judicial role perceptions (then examined in Study 3).  
Study 2 approach: LinkedIN and Arab Judges Survey 
Access to information about the personal background of Arab judges is limited. 
No such information is available from any official government or judicial 
organisation in the Arab states covered in this thesis. As a result, two sources 
of information were used to provide an initial assessment of the personal and 
professional backgrounds of Arab judges:  LinkedIN and a voluntary online 
survey (the “Arab Judges Survey” explained in detail below under “Study 3”).   
LinkedIn analysis 
The first source of data on the personal and professional background of Arab 
judges was obtained through biographical information freely available from 
judges on the online platform LinkedIN. LinkedIN is an online business and 
employment-oriented service.300 With over 500 million members, the platform 
is intended to connect professionals with colleagues, and to increase the 
number of business connections and networks within an industry.301 Users of 
LinkedIn provide professional, resume-like profiles on their LinkedIn page 
showing their professional and educational experience in order to allow other 
site members to learn more about their professional background.302 LinkedIN 
operates through a "gated-access approach", which means that contact with 
any professional requires either an existing relationship or the intervention of 
                                               
300  The basic functionality of LinkedIn allows users (workers and employers) to create online 
profiles that typically consist of a curriculum vitae (CV), which describes and outlines work 
experience, education and training, and skills. 
301  Josh Gallant, “45 Eye-Opening LinkedIn Stats Every B2B Marketer Needs to Know” 
[2018] Foundation Inc. <https://foundationinc.co/lab/b2b-marketing-linkedin-stats/> accessed 
30 August 2018. 
302 Chad Brooks, “What Is LinkedIn?” [2012] Business News Daily 
<https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2489-linkedin.html> accessed 30 August 2018;  
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a third party as contact.  This system is intended to build trust among the 
service's users.  
 
LinkedIN does not provide information on the total number of members that 
are judges, in part because of the global and decentralised nature of the 
platform. In light of this, a non-probability snowball sampling technique was 
used.303 Three steps were taken in order to investigate the profile of Arab 
judges’ on the platform: 
1. Identify judges’ profiles through open search on LinkedIN in French, 
Arabic and English. 
2. Once a potential profile was identified, an invitation to connect was sent 
to the user.  
3. If accepted, the professional network of the new connection was 
explored in order to identify further potential judicial profiles to connect 
with.  
 
For a profile to be included in the primary investigation, it was considered that 
the following information had to be available:  
• Country of origin and current residence 
• Current judicial status   
• Type of court  
• Gender  
• Domestic and/or foreign education 
 
On this basis, 163 profiles on LinkedIN were reviewed. Because the main 
purpose of the study was to explore the social and professional attributes of 
Arab judges, the 163 profiles were analysed for the following additional 
background characteristics of the judges: 
• Professional experience prior to joining the judiciary  
• Prosecutorial experience (if any) 
• Whether any non-judicial job held concurrent with a judicial post   
                                               
303  Noy C, ‘Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in Qualitative 
Research’ (2008) 11 International Journal of Social Research Methodology 327, p.330 
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Indications of lateral professional mobility and lateral recruitment were also 
taken into account. For lateral mobility, judicial secondment, extra judicial-
activities, and professional experiences made in between the judicial office 
were considered. For lateral recruitment, experiences prior to judicial 
appointment was considered.304   
 
In total, 112 profiles were considered to have sufficient elements to make an 
analysis viable. These profiles of judges were in a mix of Arabic, English and 
French.  Most judges in the LinkedIn study came from Egypt, Jordan and 
Lebanon.305 Table 6 below presents a breakdown of the 112 profiles by 
country, types of judges, years in post and gender.  
 
Table 6. Sample of LinkedIN profiles and Jordanian Constitutional Court judges 
(n=112) 
Gender  Country Type of court Years in judicial office  
Male 93 Egypt 62 Trial Only 58 Less than 1 year 1 
Female 19 Lebanon 28 Specialised 24 1-6 years 23 
 
 Jordan 22 Appellate and Trial 17 7-11 years 34  
 
Appellate 12 12-16 years 16 
Trainee  1 17-20 years 11 
  
21- 30 years 5 
More than 30 years 2 
Not listed/Not clear 20 
Limitations of LinkedIN data 
There are several limitations to the data available on LinkedIN. First and 
foremost, not all Arab judges are on LinkedIN, so this cannot be considered a 
representative sample of all Arab judges. In addition, data is not consistent for 
all judges, with some judges providing more information than others. 
                                               
304  The Jordanian Judicial Council website also provided some information on this issue for 
current members of the Jordanian Constitutional Court as well as the educational and 
professional experience of each member of the Court.Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - 
Constitutional Court, “Constitutional Court Members” <http://www.cco.gov.jo/en-
us/Constitutional-Court/Court-Members> accessed 30 August 2018. 
305  In addition, nine other profiles were considered from judges in Bahrain, Palestine, UAE, 
Tunisia and Sudan. Because of the scarcity of judicial profiles from these countries, these 
were omitted from the analysis.   
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Furthermore, it is not possible to verify whether the information posted on 
LinkedIN is accurate in terms of judges’ actual educational and professional 
experience. Because LinkedIN is an employment led website, there may be 
incentives on the part of users to misrepresent their actual experiences in order 
to appear more attractive to employers.306 Despite these limitations, LinkedIn 
provided a source of information on the background of Arab judges in the 
absence of any other sources. As such the results presented in Chapter 6 
should be seen as a limited, initial attempt at exploring the background 
attributes of judges in the region, and not as a definitive assessment.  
Study 3: Arab judges’ view of the judicial role 
Role theory emphasises the controlling power of an individual’s immediate 
social environment.307 It also examines how behaviour is shaped by the 
demands and rules of others, as well as by the individual’s own understanding 
and conceptions of what his/her behaviour should be:308  
“A role conception is determined by social norms, demands and rules; 
by the role performances of others in their respective positions; by those 
who observe and react to their performance and by the individual’s 
particular capabilities and personality”.309 
 
Central to role theory is the idea of role expectations; these are beliefs about 
the qualities, behaviours, and characteristics suitable to a specific social 
role.310 Judges are part of an identifiable social group, the judiciary, and they 
                                               
306 Social desirability bias may be an additional limitation of this sample. As discussed in 
relation to the Arab Judges Survey below, there is a strong likelihood that the profiles used in 
this study have been overreported by the judges to appear in a more favourable light.  
307  Rather than one theory, role theory is a set of concepts and interrelated theories found in 
anthropology, social psychology and sociology. Its agreed-upon set of core ideas is that 
human beings behave in ways that are different and predictable depending on their respective 
social identities and the situations. The theory aspires to understand, predict and control 
particular phenomena included in its domain of study. See for example, B. J. Biddle, “Recent 
Developments in Role Theory”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 12 (1986), pp. 67-92; James 
L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial 
Behavior" (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7; Bruce J Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, 
and Behaviors (Academic Press 1979); Bruce J Biddle (ed), Role Theory: Concepts and 
Research (Nachdr, Wiley 1970).  
308  Bruce J Biddle (ed), Role Theory: Concepts and Research (Nachdr, Wiley 1970)., p.4  
309  Ibid. 
310  According to Nugent, role expectations are understood as “beliefs concerning the qualities, 
behaviors, and characteristics suitable to a specific role; [they] could be conveyed to the role's 
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therefore have social roles. Judges, like others with social roles, can change 
their behaviour to fit the expectation both of themselves and other judges.311  
Study 3 attempts to examine the role conceptions and expectations of Arab 
judges. It does this by directly asking Arab judges their views about the judicial 
role, based on five conceptual categories.312 These categories are based on 
an existing framework in judicial role theory provided by Wahlke et al., and 
they are illustrated in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4. Conceptual categories in judicial role theory 
 
                                               
holder by other individuals within their group, or put in place by the holder themselves.” See 
Nugent, Pam M.S., “Role Expectations” (PsychologyDictionary.org, 28 April 2013) 
<https://psychologydictionary.org/role-expectations/> accessed 30 August 2018. 
311  McLeod, S. A. (2008). “Social roles” retrieved from 
https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-roles.html 
312  Biddle categories roles into three categories. The first category is written rules and conduct. 
The second category is spoken injunctions that provide for models of behaviour. Rules of 
conduct amongst small-group members, for example, prescribe certain norms and members 
may be judged by either conforming to them or not conforming to the injunctions that have 
been stated for their behaviour. The final extension of the dramaturgical analogy involves the 
concept of the “mind of the performer”. Here the role-holder acts the in a particular way: “not 
because written instructions have been given to him [her], nor because of injunctions spoken 
by others, but rather of his [her] own internalised standards”. According to Biddle, the last 
category involves a difficult assumption: that individual role-holders are aware of their 
expectations and can state them if asked. Bruce J Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, 
Identities, and Behaviors (Academic Press 1979) p.117 
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The first category, “consensual norms”, includes all those formal as well as 
informal “rules of the game” that judges work within. The second category, 
“purposive norms”, are those objectives judges perceives are important for  
judges. The third category, the “representational role”, is interlinked with the 
purposive norms. The representational role is understood as an instrument 
that judges use in order to realise their purposive norms. A clear example of 
when the representational role is being used is through judicial decision-
making. Exploring the methods and decisional criteria judges’ resort to during 
the process of decision-making may indicate what purposive norms are being 
pursued.313 The fourth category, “clientele-role sector”, is the relationship 
between judges and the judiciary as an institution, and all relevant persons, 
groups and events outside the judiciary. This can have an important effect on 
how judges think about their own role.314 Finally, individuals occupy roles and 
in order to arrive at a complete understanding of the judicial role, individual 
judges’ own backgrounds and personal attributes should also be taken into 
account. This is referred to here as “the self” and was covered above in the 
discussion of “Study 2”.  
Study 3 approach: Judicial attitudes and role perceptions (Arab Judges 
Survey)  
In order to develop an understanding of Arab judicial role conceptions within 
the framework of role theory, an online survey, the Arab Judges Survey, was 
created. As far as is known, this is the first survey undertaken of judges across 
the Arab Middle East. The survey explored judicial roles primarily in Egypt, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and explored these judges’ own 
interpretation and understanding of their judicial roles in their respective 
countries.  
 
                                               
313  John C. Wahlke, Heins Eulau , William Buchanan , LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative 
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (John Wiley & Sons 1962) p.12  
314  Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975). “The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science, 19(2), p.286 
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The survey was created and administered via the online survey tool, Opinio,  
UCL’s online survey research tool. Opinio is freely available to UCL 
researchers, is generally thought to be reliable and provides several reporting 
functions that made it preferable to other web-based survey tools.315 
 
In order to measure Arab judges’ internalised impressions of their roles, a 
closed-question survey was considered the best approach. This was 
corroborated by the fact that similar survey techniques have been used by 
previous studies in this field. For example, Ungs and Baas, Flango et al., Glick 
and Becker amongst others used forced-response questions in order to 
measure how judicial roles may operate in individual judges mindsets and to 
determine which types of roles dominated in the courts they investigated.316 
The Arab Judges Survey drew on many of the questions used in these 
previous surveys in order to carry out the first comparative assessment of 
judicial roles amongst Arab judges and judges in a range of other jurisdictions.  
The Survey 
Survey languages  
 
The survey was drafted first in English and then translated by the researcher 
into Arabic and French.317 Although the working language in Arab courts is 
always Arabic, English and French are used interchangeably with Arabic in 
court and in society.318 Bearing in mind the sensitive nature of the topic and 
the research population, translating the Arab Judges Survey in the local 
language was also thought to have a symbolic effect which according to 
                                               
315  A useful function of Opino is that surveys can be delivered by invitation to a specified list. 
In addition, Opinio supports surveys in several languages which was crucial for this study.  
316  See for example: Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, “Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-
Technique Study of Ohio Judges” (1972) 6 Law & Society Review 343; Theodore L Becker, 
“A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations” 
(1966) 60 American Political Science Review 677; Manfred W Wenner, Lettie M Wenner and 
V Eugene Flango, “Austrian and Swiss Judges: A Comparative Study” (1978) Comparative 
Politics 499; Henry Robert Glick and Kenneth N Vines, “Law-Making in the State Judiciary: A 
Comparative Study of the Judicial Role in Four States” (1969) 2 Polity 142. 
317 I speak, read and write French, Arabic and English fluently. My translations were later 
reviewed and approved by trilingual and bilingual judges and academics.  
318  This is in part due to the legacy of the British and French colonial presence in the region.   
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Harzing et al. may influence response rates as it demonstrates to the 
respondent that the researcher has gone through the effort and expense to 
make responding as easy as possible.319 In order to ensure that the meaning 
of concepts in the translated questionnaire were conceptually equivalent to the 
original version, simple sentence structures as well as clear and familiar 
wording was used much as possible.320 Furthermore, the translations were 
reviewed and approved by bilingual and trilingual judges and academics during 
the pilot testing. Despite this, some key concepts may have been “lost in 
translation” and the different survey versions may compromise the 
comparability between the countries and the survey versions.321  
 
Judges in the survey used the different languages in their responses. As listed 
in Table 7 below, out of all of those who participated in the survey, 42 used 
Arabic version, 42 used the English version and 7 judges used the French 
version in their responses 
  
Table 7. Number of respondents according to language of the Arab Judges Survey  
 N=91 
Arabic    42 
English    42 
French 7 
Survey recruitment 
In a cover letter to the survey, the reason for conducting the survey was 
explained to judges (Appendix 3). The survey was described as seeking to 
explore individual judges’ experiences and views of being a judge in order to 
                                               
319 Harzing A.W., Reiche S., Pudelko M  Challenges in International Survey Research: A 
review with illustrations and suggested solutions for best practice,  European Journal of 
International Management, 2013 Vol.7 No.1, p. 17 
320 See Sekaran, U. (1983) ‘Methodological and Theoretical Issues and Advancements in 
Cross-Cultural Research’, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 61-
73.  
321According to Ackerman and Harzing the language of the questionnaire can impact 
respondents’ attitudes and behaviours and give rise to systematic bias. The authors argue 
that it is therefore crucial to ensure an overall conceptual equivalence and also consider 
vocabulary, idiomatic and syntactical equivalence. These were seriously considered in the 
drafting of the English version of the Arab Judges Survey. Akkermans, D., Harzing, A.W., 
and Witteloostuijn, A. van (2010) ‘Cultural Accommodation and Language Priming. 
Competitive versus Cooperative Behavior in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game’, Management 
International Review, Vol. 50 No. 5,pp. 559-584. 
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help increase understanding and knowledge of the work of judges in the Arab 
region. In addition, judges were told that the survey was voluntary and 
completely anonymous, and participants were assured that any information 
provided in the survey could not be traced back to any participant. This 
assurance was given in writing by the researcher and UCL, with an explanation 
of how anonymity was ensured through the security settings in Opinio. To 
further protect their anonymity, judges were specifically asked not to include 
their name anywhere in the survey. In order to reach as many Arab judges as 
possible respondents were encouraged to share the survey link with judges 
they thought would be interested in participating. A shorter version of the cover 
letter was also included in e-mail requests sent to judges. (An English version 
of the e-mail is provided in Appendix 3.) 
Survey questions 
The survey questions mainly contained closed single choice, multiple choice, 
rating and ranking questions. The survey included 33 questions covering the 
following general themes: 
• Current judicial post  
• Background questions including judges’ professional and educational 
experience 
• Being a judge in the respondent’s country 
• Judicial qualities 
• Judicial decision-making 
• Judges and the law 
 
All 33 questions had a comment section for judges to elaborate on their 
choices/answers should they wish to. 
 
In order to explore Arab judges’ purposive norms and representational roles 
Survey questions 12-14, 19-26 and 28 covered:  
• Judges’ characterisation of their judicial role 
• Judicial attitudes towards the public 
• Judicial attitudes towards precedent 
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• Judges’ views of justice and the rule of law 
 
Since role theory places value on the role-holders’ expectations, the survey 
examined judges’ expectations of what is proper judicial behaviour for 
themselves and what their relationship was with both judicial colleagues and 
other non-judicial actors. This relates to the “consensual norms” and the 
“clientele-roles sector”. Survey questions 9-11, 15-18, and 27 covered:  
• Arab judges’ expectations about what constitutes proper behaviour on 
his/her part toward other judges in the same position;  
• Arab judges’ perceptions of what other judges’ expectations are of the 
judicial role;  
• Arab judges’ perceptions of what constitutes a proper relationship with the 
public, media and the executive;  
• Arab judges’ perceptions of what the public, the media and the executive’s 
expectations are of the judicial role; 
• How Arab judges perceive the judiciary; and 
• How Arab judges feel they are perceived by the public. 
  
The survey was constructed so that judges were not required to answer all the 
survey questions. Taking into consideration the sensitivity of surveying Arab 
judges, especially on some difficult and controversial issues, it was felt that by 
allowing the judges the freedom to choose what questions they wanted to 
answer they might be more inclined to take part. As a result, some questions 
will have a higher response rate than others. This is made clear in the findings 
in the following chapters by including response rates in all results.  
Survey timeline  
The survey period was between October 2017 – May 2018. This included both 
the piloting stage and the full survey stage.  The piloting stage occurred in early 
October 2017. The stage included a general review of the questions and their 
relevance by judges from the region. Second, the piloting stage also included 
a review of the translated versions of the survey in order to make sure that 
they were correct.  
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A number of judges and professionals from Jordan, France and Saudi Arabia 
were asked to review the survey and comment on the questions and provide 
feedback to further improve the survey, particularly in relation to the translated 
versions in Arabic and French. The piloting stage was very helpful for this study 
particularly in relation to Saudi judges. During this stage, it became clear that 
Saudi judges were apprehensive to participate. It was previously assumed that 
this was due to the strict gender separation in Saudi culture. However, this 
turned out to be a misconception. The apprehension, as explained by one 
senior Saudi judge who promised to distribute the survey among his 
colleagues, was due to my surname (“Razai”) which is a common Iranian 
name. The view was that judges would be suspicious of a survey being run by 
someone with this name, considering the political and religious tensions 
between the two countries. To mitigate this factor, I was advised to use a 
(Sunni Muslim) surname. Thus, an identical copy of the Arab Judges Survey 
was created for the Saudi judge to share with his colleagues where with a more 
Sunni sounding surname.  
 
The survey was launched on 17th of October 2017 and closed on the 1st of May 
2018. The survey was open to all judges from across the Arab region. 
Sampling method  
As described earlier in this chapter, the research conditions were suboptimal 
because of the politically sensitive nature of the region coupled with the elite 
nature of judges as a research population. This meant that choosing a 
research methodology that conformed to the conventional notions of random 
selection and representativeness was inapplicable. Nonetheless, Arab judicial 
attitudes was considered an important topic to explore even if access to 
information is limited.322 In light of this, a snowball sampling method was 
                                               
322 According to Kircherr and Charles, researchers grounded in quantitative thinking may 
consider non-probability sampling methods, such as snowball sampling, “when confronted 
with difficult-to-reach populations, particularly if the dismissal of snowball sampling would 
mean that no research could be conducted at all” Kirchherr J, Charles K (2018) Enhancing 
the sample diversity of snowball samples: Recommendations from a research project on 
anti- dam movements in Southeast Asia. PLoS ONE 13 (8): e0201710., p.3 
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deemed the only feasible method to find participants for the Arab Judges 
Survey.323  
 
Snowball sampling is defined by Atkinson and Flint as a technique for 
gathering research subjects through “the identification of an initial subject who 
is used to provide the names of other actors”.324 The snowball sampling 
method is used as a method where the research population is hidden, hard to 
reach and when other preferred methodologies are not feasible because of 
obstacles found in the research environment.325 The method therefore is 
usually not “and should not be the first choice of research methodology when 
a more representative sampling method is available”.326 
  
The conceptual framework of judicialisation of politics, including the research 
questions stemming from it, was the central strategy used for the sampling 
method. Furthermore, in the absence of a sample frame, the following 
pathways were taken to ensure a degree of sample diversity:327 Personal and 
professional contacts of judges and key figures in the judiciary; academia; 
legal profession and local and international organisations collaborating with 
Arab judiciaries and judges. These contacts helped to generate new contacts 
throughout the distribution of the Arab judges Survey. Distribution of the survey 
through different avenues in order to ensure that the initial set of respondents 
were sufficiently varied.328 The survey was distributed via the following 
avenues:  
                                               
323 Although the intent of the study is not to generalise Arab judges, but to explore whether 
there may be a variety of judicial role conceptions in the region, the conclusions made in this 
research cannot be claimed to constitute valid and reliable research findings as required by 
quantitative principles. 
324 Lewis-Beck M, Bryman A and Futing Liao T, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science 
Research Methods (Sage Publications, Inc 2004) 
<http://methods.sagepub.com/reference/the-sage-encyclopedia-of-social-science-research-
methods> accessed 27 April 2019 
325 Cohen N., Arieli T., (2011)Field research in conflict environments: Methodological 
challenges and snowball sampling Journal of Peace Research, 48(4) p.427 
326 Ibid. 
327 Kirchherr J, Charles K (2018) Enhancing the sample diversity of snowball samples: 
Recommendations from a research project on anti- dam movements in Southeast Asia. 
PLoS ONE 13 (8): e0201710., p., 12 
328 According to  Kircherr and Charles, “the best defence' against a lack of sample diversity is 
to begin the sample with seeds that are as diverse as possible.” Similarly, Etikan et al  argue 
that it is “compulsory for the researcher to ensure that the initial set of respondents is 
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• LinkedIN 
• Suggestions from academics and professionals with contacts in 
the judiciary in the region 
• Organisations contacted with requests to distribute the survey 
through their mailing lists  
• Judicial Councils (Yemen, Palestine and Lebanon) 
• Key figures within the Arab judiciary identified by the researcher 
• Arab judges already known to the researcher 
 
Reminders were sent after three weeks from initial contact. Out of all the 
avenues, LinkedIN, suggestions from individuals with contacts in the judiciary, 
and existing relationship with judges proved the most successful. This was in 
part because many judges who were contacted had already accepted my 
invitation to connect on LinkedIN as part of Study 2 of this thesis. As 
anticipated, the Judicial Councils in the three countries refused to distribute 
the survey. With the help of the International Bar Association (IBA), the 
Tunisian Team for the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) 
posted a link to the survey on 30 November 2017 to one of ILAC’s private 
Facebook groups, which has almost 600 judges from Tunisia (Figure 5).  
 
Given the subjectivity of the selection mechanisms inherent in this sampling 
method, there are limitations in relation to the data obtained, its analysis, 
interpretation and presentation. In this study, judges were not collected 
randomly as expected by pure sampling principles. Participation in the Arab 
Judges Survey depended on referrals from other judges as well as their 
willigness to participate. Therefore, the sample of judges in this study may be 
more biased towards more cooperative participants.  
 
                                               
sufficiently varied' See Kirchherr J, Charles K (2018) Enhancing the sample diversity of 
snowball samples: Recommendations from a research project on anti- dam movements in 
Southeast Asia. PLoS ONE 13 (8): e0201710., p.3; Etikan I, Alkassim R, Abubakar S. 
Comparision of Snowball Sampling and Sequential Sampling Technique. 
Biometrics Biostat Int J. 2016; 3(1), p.55 
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Figure 5. Facebook post inviting Tunisian judges to participate in Survey (30 
November 2017) 
 
 
Survey responses 
In total, 91 judges participated in the survey. These were represented by: 
Egypt (28); Saudi Arabia (25); Lebanon (22); Tunisia, (9); Jordan (4); Palestine 
(2) and; Syria (1). Table 7 below presents a breakdown of the 91 judges 
according to gender, country, status, type of court and years of experience.  
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Table 8. Sample profile in Arab Judges Survey (n=91) 
Gender329 Status Type of court Country 
Years in 
court330 
Femal
e 7 
Full 
time 81 Trial only 48 Egypt 28 
Less than 
1 year 3 
Male 42 Retired 3 Trial and Appellate 32 
Saudi 
Arabia 25 1-6 19 
  Other 7 Appellate 5 Lebanon 22 7-11 19 
    Other 6 Tunisia 9 12-16 21 
      Jordan 4 17-20 14 
      Palestine 2 21- 25 6 
      Syria 1 26-29 6 
        More than 30 years 2 
 
Out of the 91 judges, 48 judges fully completed the survey.331 
Limitations of the survey 
Representativeness  
This study was a first explorative attempt to obtain the views and experiences 
of Arab judges about their role as judges. For the reasons explained earlier in 
this chapter, the working assumption was that the survey would not generate 
large numbers of responses from judges across the Arab Middle East. For 
reasons also explained at the outset of the chapter, the size and the nature of 
the sampling used in this study meant that it would not be possible to assess 
the representative nature of the responses.  
 
The relatively small number of responses to the survey (91 responses, with 48 
complete responses) was, therefore, not surprising. Although many previous 
surveys of judges in other jurisdictions have also had small numbers of 
responses, these earlier studies were usually confined to a few courts in one 
                                               
329  Forty-two 91 respondents did not indicate their gender in the Arab Judges Survey.  
330  One respondent from Jordan did not state how many years of court experience he/she 
had.  
331  These were represented by Egypt (15 judges), Saudi Arabia (15 judges), Lebanon (11 
judges), Tunisia, (3 judges), Palestine (2 judges) and Jordan and Syria with one judge each. 
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jurisdiction.332 Judges that participated in this survey come from across the 
Arab Middle East, mostly represented by Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. 
In addition, the respondents came from different courts within their respective 
judicial systems. Therefore, the single variable that unites them is that they 
hold a judicial post in the Arab region, and that they come from the region. And 
although judges constitute a peculiar, homogeneous subgroup within any 
national population, the issue of representation is a significant methodological 
limitation of this study.333 
Limitations in the survey question approach  
There are basically two types of survey questions that could be used in a 
survey such as this: open-ended and closed-ended questions. Both pose 
reliability and validity problems. One method used in defining the judicial role 
has been to ask the participants (judges) to define their own roles by using 
open-ended questions. An issue that arises of this approach is that it inevitably 
involves some subjectivity on the part of the researcher and respondent. 
Nisbett for example, argues that the accuracy of subjective reports is so poor 
that any introspective access is limited because:  
 
“[S]ubjects sometimes cannot report on the existence of influential 
stimuli and as a result, any verbal report by subjects about the cause of 
their responses would be at least partially in error.”334  
                                               
332  Flango surveyed 48 Austrian and 49 Swiss mid-level appellate court judges. Glick and 
Vines’ 1969 study surveyed 26 state Supreme Court judges from four U.S states. Similarly, 
Becker surveyed 22 judges from the Hawaiian state courts. Manfred W Wenner, Lettie M 
Wenner and V Eugene Flango, “Austrian and Swiss Judges: A Comparative Study” (1978) 10 
Comparative Politics 499; Henry Robert Glick and Kenneth N Vines, “Law-Making in the State 
Judiciary: A Comparative Study of the Judicial Role in Four States” (1969) 2 Polity 142; 
Theodore L Becker, “A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial 
Role Variations” (1966) 60 American Political Science Review 677. 
333  Leslie, for instance, argues that: ”researchers surveying issues directly related to 
homogeneous groups should not be overly concerned about the percentage of questionnaire 
returns. Representativeness will most likely be excellent. This presumes, of course, that 
enough responses are gained to meet statistical assumptions.” Larry L Leslie, “Are High 
Response Rates Essential to Valid Surveys?” (1972) 1 Social Science Research 323., p.332 
334   Nisbett, Richard E.; Wilson, Timothy DeCamp, “Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal 
Reports on Mental Processes” (1977) 84 Psychological Review 231. p.255 
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To overcome the problems of open-ended questions, some researchers have 
used closed-option questions when surveying judges. This presents the judge 
with a finite list of possible answer options, and responses may present more 
limited information than the open-ended approach. One way that this survey 
attempted to address this was to also provide the answer option of “other” and 
provide judges with the opportunity to write in another answer or elaborate on 
their closed-option answers.  
In studying judicial role conceptions, a number of researchers have used the 
closed-option questions in order to categorise judges into specific judicial role 
types. But Flango, early on, acknowledged that some limitations also exist with 
this approach:  
“[W]e do however, wish to point up the difficulties experienced in the 
past in defining judicial role through a neat categorization of judges into 
distinct ideal types with arbitrary labels. There is a general problem of 
getting direct information about judicial attitudes and orientations that 
might work as determinants of judicial decisions.”335  
The Arab Judges Survey had the aim of exploring and comparing Arab judges’ 
role orientations with previous research on this topic, and as a result the survey 
included many of the same questions used in previous surveys of judges in 
the US and Europe. This means it is possible that some of the survey questions 
might have been understood differently by Arab judges. This possibility is 
heightened by the availability of the online survey in three different languages. 
Efforts were made to word the questions in a simple and concrete manner as 
well as avoiding ambiguous words. While the translations were reviewed and 
approved by French and Arabic speaking judges, some key elements may 
have been “lost in translation”. As Ungs and Baas acknowledged in their study: 
                                               
335   Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975). “The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science, 19(2), p.287. For a detailed 
discussion about the limits of this approach and others seeking to explore judicial role 
orientations, see James L Gibson, “Judges’ Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An 
Interactive Model” (1978) 72 American Political Science Review 911. 
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“In the final analysis, it is the judge who, in ranking the statements, gives them 
meaning…”.336 
 
Furthermore, the Arab Judges Survey drew on many of the questions used in 
previous surveys in order to carry out a comparative assessment of judicial 
roles amongst Arab judges and judges in a range of other jurisdictions. The 
chosen approach carries some important limitations particularly in terms 
international comparisons. As mentioned above, this was a first attempt at 
studying the role perceptions of judges in the Arab Middle East. It was 
therefore considered important to follow the same pattern of earlier studies by  
borrowing their questions (that had the same explorative purpose) and follow 
precedent where possible.  
 
Furthermore, although these precedents relied are now decades old, they 
have been, and continue to be used by judicial behaviourists to measure the 
several aspects of potential role orientations and to understand judicial 
decision-making. The questions are reflective of recent studies into the role of 
judges: they are designed to investigate judges’ expectations about the 
purposes or objectives they should adopt and how they perceive decision-
making to operate on the court.337 
Social desirability bias  
In addition to the limitations discussed above, another nuisance factor of the 
survey responses relates to social desirability bias. The bias is understood to 
arise when sensitive topics are assumed to generate response errors and have 
an effect on the data quality.338 Unpopular answers such as executive 
                                               
336   Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, "Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges" (1972) 6 Law & Society Review, p.351 
337 See Carman RV, ‘The Development of the Judicial Role Orientation’ in Raymond V 
Carman, Making Good Law or Good Policy? (Springer International Publishing 2017); Lee 
Epstein, Stefanie A. Lindquist ‘The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behaviour’, Oxford 
Handbooks of American Politics (Oxford  University Press 2017) 
338 Social desirability bias occurs when respondents distort their answers by either 
underreporting socially undesirable behavior and/or overreporting socially desirable behavior 
in order to maintain a socially favourable self-presentation. Respondents willingness to provide 
truthful answers therefore may be compromised in surveys if the topic is perceived to be 
undesirable, intrusive, sensitive or if the answers carry the risk of being disclosed to third 
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interference with judicial work may have been under-reported by the judges 
who participated in the survey. Equally, favourable answers such as 
impartiality, judicial independence and strict adherence to the law may have 
been overreported. Despite attempts at containing the situational determinants 
that may exacerbate the bias (such as embedding sensitive questions with 
more general questions and assuring participants of confidentiality and data 
protection)339, there is a strong likelihood that judges may have overreported 
or underreported on some of their answers to appear in a more positive light.   
Benefits of the survey findings 
The limitations of comparative analysis by using a partial and nonprobability 
sample cannot be overstated. The intent of the study was not to generalise 
Arab judges. Rather, the objective was to explore whether there may be a 
variety of judicial role conceptions in the region. Therefore, the conclusions 
made in this research cannot be claimed to constitute valid and reliable 
research findings as required by quantitative principles.This study does not 
include all judges, nor does it assess the propability of the data because of the 
small and partial sample size. Despite these limitations, the Arab Judges 
Survey still provides important and unique information about judicial role 
conceptions in jurisdictions where this issue has not been empirically explored 
before. The survey is a first of its kind in the Arab region and as a result, it 
                                               
parties.Wlömert N and others, ‘Multidimensional Assessment of Social Desirability Bias: An 
Application of Multiscale Item Randomized Response Theory to Measure Academic 
Misconduct’ [2018] Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology p.2 
339 Social desirability bias could be reduced by appropriately tailoring the survey design. 
According to Krumpal “The literature review of the recent research indicates that cognitive 
psychologists, social scientists and survey statisticians have made some progress in reducing 
measurement errors due to deliberate misreporting on sensitive topics, principally by 
increasing the anonymity of the question and answer process (e.g. via the randomized 
response technique or self-administered interviews), by decreasing the respondent’s concerns 
in admitting to some taboo (e.g. via confidentiality assurances or clever wording and framing 
of the sensitive item)” , Krumpal I, ‘Determinants of Social Desirability Bias in Sensitive 
Surveys: A Literature Review’ (2013) 47 Quality & Quantity, p,2041. See also See Anton J. 
Nederhof, Methods of coping with social desirability bias: a review, European Journal of Social 
Psychology, Vol. 15, 263-280 (1985); Robert J. Fisher, Social Desirability Bias and the Validity 
of Indirect Questioning, Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Sep., 1993), pp. 303-
315 
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helps to begin to shed initial insight of Arab judges’ understanding of their role 
within the framework set by earlier Western judicial studies.340  
Summary 
The three studies conducted in this thesis aim to examine the role and political 
significance of Arab judges by: 
 
1. Mapping the jurisdiction and powers of courts and judges in 8 Middle East 
countries, which resulted in the identification of a new typology of judicial 
systems in the region centred around 4 main types of judicial systems, 
exemplified by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia; 
 
2. Profiling of the educational and professional backgrounds of Arab judges 
across the region, primarily through an analysis of 112 LinkedIN profiles of 
Arab judges and supported by additional information obtained through a 
voluntary online survey of Arab judges; and 
 
3. Undertaking an assessment of judicial role conceptions of Arab judges 
through the first ever survey of Arab judges. This survey explores the 
experiences and attitudes to being a judge, relationships with other judges, the 
public, media and government.  The Arab Judges Survey, in turn, enabled a 
comparative analysis of judicial role conceptions in the Arab region compared 
with previous empirical work with American and European judges. 
 
  
                                               
340 The study also offers initial insights into how Arab judges understand their judicial roles, 
including how these judges perceive both the formal and informal norms within which they 
operate.  
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Chapter 5. Four judicial systems in the Arab Middle East 
This chapter undertakes an assessment of Arab judicial systems by looking at 
the official laws regulating the organisation, composition and jurisdiction of 
courts in four Arab states. In this chapter, focus is placed on two structural 
variations that, according to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, are conducive to the 
judicialisation of politics (at least in Western legal systems).341 The first 
variation relates to the territorial dimension of court systems. The second 
variation relates to the relationship between the different levels of courts, 
their internal dynamics and the role of apex courts in each country. This 
chapter applies these principles to four Arab judicial systems, assessing how 
the organisation of courts may affect the political significance of the judiciary 
in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Although diversity, “historical 
particularity, specificity and locality”342 have been taken into account in the 
choice of the four countries, there may be limitations in this mapping exercise. 
The legal systems under review are not identical, but they are considered to 
be similar to the extent that they can be analysed using the variables as 
established by the conceptual framework employed in this research.343  
The role of judicial systems in judicialisation 
In order to explore Arab judicial roles as fully as possible, both macro and 
micro influences are important to consider: “What judges prefer to do and what 
they think they ought to do are not necessarily compatible with what they are 
encouraged or allowed to do”.344 This chapter (and the next chapter) explores 
the formal institutional machineries of  the Egyptian, Lebanese, Jordanian and 
Saudi Arabian judiciaries. The chapters sets the stage for the following 
                                               
341  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) Chapter 2 - Judicial 
Systems.  
342  Marsh, David, and Gerry Stoker. Theory and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print. p. 250 
343 Conscious efforts to consider every unit (judicial system) was made in light of the four 
factors described above, and initially in isolation from each other. The comparative study is 
confined to a small number of jurisdictions and therefore constitutes a limitation and should 
not be considered representative of the region as a whole.  
344 James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p. 27 
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chapters (Chapters 7, 8, and 9) which aims to explore what Gibson refers to 
as judges’ “informal norms that lubricate” the institutional machineries.345 As 
explained in Chapter 1, a political system can use two different elements to 
exert influence on courts.346 The first element aims at limiting court jurisdiction 
so that the impact of judicial decisions (and therefore a judge’s role in the 
political process) remains restricted.347 The second element which may affect 
judges’ scope of political participation relates to the actual organisation of the 
judicial system and the interrelationship between courts.348  
 
Jurisdiction over cases in Western democracies are generally described as 
either concentrated into a unitary system of courts, or fragmented into a 
plurality of different courts with their own separate hierarchical structures.349 In 
contrast with a unitary system of courts with a wide dispersal of jurisdictional 
powers, fragmented systems tend to have exceptional courts that run parallel 
alongside regular courts.350 The actual organisation of the judicial system may 
also influence judicial participation in the political process.351 Two models are 
used to describe the organisation of courts: co-ordinate systems where lower 
and intermediate courts make the majority of decisions, and hierarchical 
systems where a substantial portion of lower court decisions are re-examined 
by a final appellate court.352 Both models highlight the role of supreme (or 
apex) courts. A strong decision-making court at the top that is characterised 
as centripetal is assumed to be better equipped to ensure that judicial 
decisions are consistent, and therefore the final court is more likely to be 
                                               
345  Ibid. p.28 
346  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) Chapter 2 - Judicial 
Systems. p.78. 
347   Ibid.p.79 
348   Ibid.p.80 
349   Ibid.p.80 
350   See Damaška’s Chapter “Organization of Authority: The Hierarchical and the Coordinate 
Ideals”, in The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal 
Process (Yale Univ Press 1986). 
351   Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.81 
352   Damaška, Mirjan R., “Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure” (1975) 
84 Yale Law Journal 480., p.484 
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politically significant.353 By contrast, a court of final appeal with a centrifugal 
dynamic tends to reduce internal consistency by promoting the autonomy of 
lower and intermediate courts – which lowers the political significance for the 
apex court itself.354  
Identifying four types of judicial systems in the Arab Middle East 
As described in Chapter 4, the research began by examining eight countries 
in the Arab region.355 Each country was examined in light of three elements: 
the jurisdictional scope of courts; the interrelationship between courts; and the 
nature of the political system.356 On the basis of these elements, a taxonomy 
of four legal systems was constructed that arguably represents four distinct 
models of judicial structures in the Arab region within the framework of 
judicialisation of politics. The four judicial structures are represented by Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia as illustrated in Table 8 below.  
 
Table 9. Classification of four Arab judicial structures 
Classification based 
judicial structures Political System 
Country 
Dual religious  
court system Monarchy Saudi-Arabia 
Highly fragmented and 
hierarchical system Republic Lebanon 
Fragmented constitutional 
System Republic Egypt 
Quasi-unitary constitutional 
System Monarchy Jordan 
  
A new approach to understanding Arab judicial systems 
Arab Middle East jurisdictions are often categorised by legal scholars as 
inherently similar in terms of legal and judicial culture. States within the region 
                                               
353   Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.81 
354   Ibid.p.81 
355   The following countries were considered: Bahrain. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia and the UAE. 
356 The legal and judicial history was – albeit broadly- also considered (See Chapter 4) 
 106  
are said to reveal “strong trans-religious legal patterns”.357 To a certain degree, 
there is an inter-connected legal heritage that deserves attention (some of 
which was explored in Chapter 2). However, there are also important national 
differences across the Arab countries and these extend to their legal systems. 
The judicial systems assessed in this chapter reveal a complex organisation 
of different, contrasting and unique institutional arrangements. This also 
illustrates a spectrum of variations present in the Middle East court systems 
under study.  
 
Having identified the four Arab countries that are models of the range of judicial 
systems present in the region, the remainder of this chapter focusses on these 
four judicial systems. The analysis are presented in two ways. First, textual 
descriptions of each country’s courts are derived from the original laws in 
Arabic (and secondary sources where necessary). Second, detailed diagrams 
were constructed specifically for the purposes of this research, which are also 
drawn directly from the primary legal source material in Arabic.358  
 
Comparing and contrasting the four different court structures with each other 
in this way, enables characteristics which shape contemporary judicial 
structures in the Middle East to be identified. It also allows for a comparative 
analysis of Middle East judicial systems in relation to the existing research on 
Western judiciaries. The result of this diagrammatic mapping exercise and the 
analysis of court jurisdiction is the creation of a new typology of judicial 
systems in the Arab Middle East. It draws on the conceptual framework from 
Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s work, The Power of Judges.  
 
The analysis in this chapter includes a preliminary assessment of the extent to 
which Guarnieri and Pederzoli’s framework is applicable to judiciaries in the 
Arab Middle East, and therefore the extent to which the judicialisation of 
politics exists in these countries. The focus here is on three main factors which 
                                               
357   Chibli Mallat, Introduction to Middle Eastern Law (Oxford University Press 2007). p.23 
358 The purpose of the illustrative figures presented in this chapter is to provide for a  broad 
overview of the judicial structures in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, especially in 
relation to the elements thought to be conducive to judicialisation.   
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Guarnieri and Pederzoli argue are likely to influence the political significance 
of courts:  
• Legal provisions that relate to the composition and organisation of 
courts;  
• The manner in which the four legal frameworks grant jurisdiction to 
courts; and 
• A basic overview of the judicial structures.  
  
The three factors help to illustrate the interrelationship between the different 
layers of courts within each Arab legal system. The factors also help to shed 
some light onto the internal dynamics of each judicial system, including the 
degree of importance attached to courts at the apex of the judicial pyramid(s) 
in each country.  
Egypt: Fragmented constitutional system  
Egypt’s court system retains much of the fragmented civil law system design 
from the Ottoman and colonial period, with four distinct set of courts: ordinary, 
administrative, military and specialised courts. However, this is only partially 
accurate. The Egyptian court system (Figure 6) reveals additional features 
typically found within a unitary court system, particularly in relation to the tools 
and jurisdictional scope granted to the highest courts in the country. The wide 
reach of decisions rendered by these courts may, in part, be explained by 
Egypt’s distinct legal and judicial history. 
Mixed system history 
Although Egypt was technically under Ottoman sovereignty, in practice it 
enjoyed a degree of autonomy.359 For instance, the pace and content of 
Egyptian legal reform differed from the overarching Ottoman Tanẓīmāt  
reforms especially after the 19th century.360 One notable example was the 
foreign introduction of “Mixed Courts” (Maḥākim al-mukhṭaliṭah) in 1875, which 
                                               
359   M Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton University Press 
2008). p.7. 
360   Nathan J. Brown, “Reining in the Executive,” in Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron (ed), Judges 
and Political Reform in Egypt (The American University in Cairo Press 2015). p.29. 
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made an important impact on the modern Egyptian legal system.361 The Mixed 
Courts were a hybrid series of courts, established to deal with civil and 
commercial disputes between foreigners and Egyptians. Judges in these 
courts came from  a variety of Western nations, including France, England, 
Italy, Scandinavia countries and the US.362 This international dimension went 
beyond the model of Napoleonic and French courts.363 According to Hamad, 
this also introduced the principle of judicial discretion when the National Courts 
were established in 1883:  
“The Egyptian judiciary developed beyond the strict application 
of the law that usually characterizes the civil law and 
bureaucratic judiciaries to include the latitude in the decision-
making process which common law judges usually enjoy”.364 
 
                                               
361   Hoyle for instance argues that it is impossible to understand the modern Egyptian legal 
system without a knowledge of the Mixed Courts, Mark SW Hoyle, Mixed Courts of Egypt 
(Graham & Trotman 1991)., p.83 
362  Judge Brinton, who himself was an American appellate court judge in the Egyptian Mixed 
Courts, wrote that “each of the seven great Powers, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, 
Russia, Germany, France and Austria, should be entitled always to one seat in the upper 
court” see Jasper Y Brinton, “The Mixed Courts of Egypt” (1926) 20 American Journal of 
International Law 670, p.626. 
363  Hamad., M., When the Gavel Speaks: Judicial Politics in Modern Egypt (University of Utah 
2008). p.60  
364  Ibid. 
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Figure 6. Organisation of Courts in Egypt 
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Ordinary courts (Al-Qaḍā’ al-‘adi) 
Today, the “ordinary judicial branch” in Egypt is three-tiered and deals primarily 
with civil and criminal matters. The lower tier of the ordinary courts are divided 
into summary courts (Maḥakem al-ebtidaīah). In each court of first instance, 
there are a number of divisions headed by a presiding judge.365 And there are 
also a number of summary courts,366 where one judge hears cases of 
contraventions, misdemeanours and less serious civil issues.367  
 
Egypt’s courts of appeal (Maḥakem- al-isti’nafīah) have three main powers:  
• Examine and review awards issued by lower courts; 
• Review and examine questions of fact and law; and  
• Act as a court of first instance for capital crimes (Maḥkamat al-Jenaīat).  
They are located in Egypt’s largest cities368, and each court of appeal is divided 
into a number of divisions with each responsible for handling specific disputes. 
If found necessary, cases may be convened in another place within or outside 
the territorial jurisdiction (following the request of the chief judge of the court 
of appeal and subject to approval by the Minister of Justice).369 
Court of Cassation 
The highest court in the ordinary court structure is the Court of Cassation 
(Maḥkamat al-naqth), which in principle, is only accessible if a breach of law is 
claimed as a basis of final appeal. The Court has over 30 divisions to review 
criminal, civil, personal status laws and other cases flowing from the courts of 
appeal. The Court has over 400 judges, with roughly 100 out of these 400 
judges seconded to other countries in the Arab Middle-East, primarily to the 
Gulf region.370 The Court is headed by the Chief Justice, who also serves as 
                                               
365  Art 14, Law No. 46/1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt) 
366  For example, the North Cairo Court of First Instance has 169 summary divisions with each 
division responsible for reviewing specific types of legal disputes. 
367  Art 14, Judicial Authority Law (Egypt) 
368  Art 6, Judicial Authority Law (Egypt) 
369  Art 8, Judicial Authority Law (Egypt)  
370  David E. Risley, “Court of Cassation: The Supreme Court of Egypt’s Common Court 
System” (The Egypt Justice Project) <https://egyptjustice.com/court-of-cassation/> accessed 
11 July 2018. 
 111  
the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, along with a number of Deputy 
Chief Justices and Associate Justices. A special panel of 11 senior judges 
decides cases involving jurisdictional conflicts between two or more circuits. 
Similarly, in felony trials where the Court has earlier reversed criminal court 
judgments on two occasions, a third and final trial can be conducted by a 
special panel of five judges.371 In addition to considering disputes by parties 
(or disputes presented by the Public Prosecutor), the Court is also entrusted 
to review lawsuits based on a judge’s actions. The law grants the Court the 
power to revise court decisions and to set out general principles and rules 
relating to the interpretation of laws. In addition, the Court of Cassation is 
empowered to review the legitimacy of membership of the House of 
Representatives and the Consultative Assembly.372 Article 87 of the 2012 
Egyptian Constitution states that: “The Court of Cassation decides on the 
validity of membership for the members of both chambers; any challenge is to 
be submitted within thirty days.”373 
Administrative courts 
Separate and parallel to the Egyptian ordinary courts are the administrative 
courts introduced in 1946. Article 190 of the Egyptian Constitution defines the 
administrative branch as an independent judicial body exclusively competent 
to adjudicate in administrative disputes, disciplinary cases and appeals. The 
administrative judicial body is also competent: “to issue opinions on the legal 
issues of bodies to be determined by law, review and draft bills and resolutions 
of a legislative character, and review draft contracts to which the state or any 
public entity is a party”.374 The administrative judicial branch is composed of: 
• Administrative Courts (Maḥakem al-idarīah);  
• Disciplinary Courts (Maḥakem al-ta’dibīah); 
• Courts of Administrative Justice (Maḥkamat al-quthaa al-idari); and  
• Supreme Administrative Court (Maḥkamat al-idarīah al-‘Ulīah).375  
                                               
371  Ibid. 
372  Art. 82, Part three “The Public Powers”, Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt of 2012. 
373   Art. 87, Ibid. 
374  Art. 190, Egypt’s Constitution of 2014 
375  Law no.47/1972, “The State Council Law”, (Egypt) 
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The Administrative Courts serves as a first instance court and have exclusive 
jurisdiction over administrative disputes involving government personnel and 
disputes involving administrative contracts. The Administrative Courts of 
Justice are composed of circuits, each with three judges. Similar to the courts 
of appeal in the ordinary judicial branch, they serve as an appeals court from 
the Administrative Courts and Disciplinary Courts.376 They have jurisdiction 
over the validity of administrative decisions concerning public officials. The 
Administrative Court of Justice also acts as a court of first instance for disputes 
that falls outside the jurisdictions of Administrative and Disciplinary Courts. 
There are two types of Disciplinary Courts: one court deals with disputes 
involving high-ranking public officials and the other with lower ranking public 
officials. Both are courts of first instance. 
 
The Supreme Administrative Court (Maḥkamat al-idarīah al-‘Ulīah) sits at the 
top of the administrative judicial hierarchy and is chaired by the President of 
the State Council. The Court has jurisdiction over challenges against decisions 
issued by Administrative Courts of Justice, the Administrative Courts and the 
Disciplinary Courts, and there is no possibility for appeal from the Supreme 
Administrative Court. The Court is composed of several divisions, each chaired 
by five judges. 
Courts with special jurisdiction  
In addition to Egypt’s ordinary and administrative judicial branches, there are 
several courts with specialised jurisdictions:  
• Family Courts377 (Maḥakem al-usra); 
• Economic Courts (Maḥakem al-eqtisadīah); 
• Military Courts (Maḥakem al-‘askariyah)378 
                                               
376 Ibid. 
377 The family courts are embedded in the ordinary court branch.  
378 Egypt had, until recently, a dual system of State Security Courts; one formed under the 
Emergency Law No. 162 (1958) and the and another which was regulated by Law No. 50 
(1980). The Permanent Court was competent to look into crimes violating the decisions of the 
military governor under the state of Emergency. As stipulated by law, individuals tried were 
not entitled to due process. Although the state security courts were formally abolished in 2003, 
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• Environmental Courts (Maḥakem al-Beaeīah); and  
• The Supreme Constitutional Court (Maḥkmah al-dostoriah al-‘ulīah).  
The Supreme Constitutional Court  
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) has the sole power of judicial review, 
provided that any court of merit forwards the case to the SCC on a question of 
constitutionality. If any court in the course of deciding a concrete case finds 
that a law being applied may be unconstitutional, it can suspend proceedings 
and forward the case to the SCC for review. Alternatively, a party in a lawsuit 
can challenge the constitutionality of legislation, provided that the lower court 
finds the challenge plausible. If so, the lower court will allow the party a three-
month period to file a case before the SCC.379  
 
In addition to the traditional powers of review of legislation, the SCC has the 
authority to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between different judicial bodies.380 
It is also empowered to provide a definitive interpretation of legislation and 
legal decrees if a divergent interpretation has emerged during the course of 
their application.381 Following the constitutional amendments in 2005, the SCC 
is now empowered by law to review legislation prior to its promulgation, which 
effectively grants it wide powers of judicial review.382 The SCC is composed of 
a court president, who is officially nominated by the President of the Republic, 
and a number of judges.  
Judicialisation and the Egyptian judicial system 
Egypt can be characterised as a fragmented constitutional system in the 
sense that it has two or more judicial pyramids coexisting and forming 
autonomous subsystems.383 Despite the shared characteristics of a 
                                               
they now operate under the umbrella of military courts, which have acquired broad 
jurisdictional powers in relation to terrorism.   
379 Law. No. 48/1979 “Supreme Constitutional Court Law” (Egypt) 
380 Art. 25 Ibid. 
381 Ibid. 
382 Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017). p.93 
383 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002)  p.81 
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continental civil law system, Egypt differs in several respects, especially in 
relation to the role played by the highest courts in the country. The horizontal 
nature of the judicial system, the strong role played by the three top courts in 
the country (Supreme Administrative Court, SCC, and the Cassation Court) is 
best described as a hybrid between the two models that traditionally describe 
Western legal systems. The jurisdictional scope of the highest courts in the 
country are not strictly distinct from each other and have in the past engaged 
in “inter-court” dialogue. For instance, at the request of the legislature, the 
Court of Cassation has in the past ruled on the legitimacy of the People’s 
Assembly, and in turn requested the Supreme Administrative Court to 
determine the legality of political parties under the Political Parties Law.384 Both 
these Courts may also refer a political party to the Constitutional Court on the 
basis of contested constitutionality. The role played by these courts in 
particular appears to promote judicialisation in Egypt, where a number of 
important political issues are delegated by the legislature to the final decision-
making bodies of the judiciary.385  
  
                                               
384 Law No. 40 of 1977, “The Political Parties Law”Amended by Law No. 177/2005 (Egypt) 
385 Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017)., p.94  
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Saudi Arabia: Dual religious court system   
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia is unique in several respects, particularly 
within the region. The country’s judicial system is perhaps best characterised 
as a dual religious system. The organisation and composition of both judicial 
pyramids are set out in the Judicial Authority Law and the Law of the Board of 
Grievances, promulgated in 2007 as part of the Kingdom’s legal reforms.386 
While the internal dynamics of these courts might also be characterised as 
hierarchical, the majority of cases seem to be heard by the intermediate and 
lower courts, which indicates a centrifugal dynamic where a small number of 
complaints reach the top of the judicial pyramid.387  
 
Although the judicial system in Saudi Arabia has some similar features to the 
civil law system, the Kingdom’s legal system makes it unique to the Arab 
region. According to Article 7 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance (1992):  
“The government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its 
authority from the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet 
(PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this law 
and the other laws of the State.” 388 
 
Saudi courts and judges predominantly rely on Ḥanbalī jurisprudence, and the 
judicial process reflects a classical form of Islamic adjudication.389  
Use of Ijtihād in Saudi courts  
As discussed earlier, the doctrine of stare decisis is not widely practiced in 
Saudi Arabia, in part because of the concept of Ijtihād. As described in Chapter 
                                               
386  Royal Decree No. M/78 on 19 Ramadan 1428H (October 1st, 2007), “Law of the Judiciary 
2007” (Saudi Arabia). 
387 Ibid. 
388 Art. 7, The Basic Law of Governance, Royal Order No. A/90, (27/8/1412H, Mar. 1, 1992). 
(Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, Article 44 of the Basic law provides that the three branches of 
government “will cooperate in the performance of their functions, according to this Law or other 
laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities.” 
389 The Hanbali school of law is the predominant school of the judiciary, as it was selected to 
be considered as first among all the schools. Saudi Arabia created its own methodology for 
judicial analysis in 1928, and the laws in Sharī‘a Courts remain un-codified.  See Al-Hay’a al-
Qaḍā’iyya [Judicial Board] Decision No.3 (17/1/1347/ June 25, 1928), approved by the Royal 
Decree of 24/3/1347 - Sept. 8, 1928. A translated version is provided by Haitham H. Osta, 
“Modernization, Codification and the Judicial Analysis: Exploring Predictability in Law in 
Sharī‘a Courts in Saudi Arabia” (University of Washington 2016). 
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3, Ijtihād forms part of one of the four sources of Islamic law and is used where 
the two primary sources, the Qurʾān and Sunnah, are silent on a legal issue. 
Although authority is primarily sought within the Ḥanbalī school of thought, 
Saudi judges are free to practice the creative power of Ijtihād – independent 
legal reasoning. According to Hanlon, the Saudi legal system supports a 
judge’s freedom of Ijtihād which in turn restricts the scope of appellate 
review.390  
 
In Saudi Arabia, Ijtihād operates under the principle of “mutual acceptance”; 
that is, all Ijtihāds are equal and no Ijtihād “weighs more than the other”.391 The 
scope and decentralised nature of “judicial Ijtihād” was implemented by the 
High Court of Mecca in 1962 where the Court stated that, provided a judge’s 
decision does not differ with the sources of law, judgments cannot be reversed 
and must be respected: “… [N]o judgment requiring reversal shall be reversed 
except by the trial judge who issued it, as long as he does not refuse; if he 
refuses, the appeal court has to reverse it.”392 
 
According to Hanlon, Saudi judges’ independence and law-making powers are 
thoroughly respected in the Saudi legal system, even if this entails a slowing 
down of the decision-making process. The relationship with the lower courts 
are characterised by dialogue and guidance in order to seek clarification “to 
encourage and broaden the ijtihad of the trial courts”.393 In Hanlon’s view, “the 
Saudi appeal system differs from any continental (French) court of appeal 
system”.394 Though there have been several attempts at codifying the Hanbali 
                                               
390  Gayle E. Hanlon, “Saudi Arabia” in James R Silkenat and others (eds), The ABA Guide to 
International Business Negotiations: A Comparison of Cross-Cultural Issues and Successful 
Approaches (3rd ed, Section of International Law and Practice, Law Practice Management 
Section, American Bar Association 2009). 
391  Haitham H. Osta, “Modernization, Codification and the Judicial Analysis: Exploring 
Predictability in Law in Sharī‘a Courts in Saudi Arabia” (University of Washington 2016)., p.72 
392  Royal Decree No. 16-3-3136, Articles. 6 and 7, and quoted in Frank E Vogel, Islamic Law 
and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000). p.95. 
393  Gayle E. Hanlon, “Saudi Arabia” in James R Silkenat and others (eds), The ABA Guide to 
International Business Negotiations: A Comparison of Cross-Cultural Issues and Successful 
Approaches (3rd ed, Section of International Law and Practice, Law Practice Management 
Section, American Bar Association 2009)., p.874 
394 Ibid. p.877 
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Islamic Law by progressives, the prevailing view has been that codifying it 
would lead to an abandonment of Sharī’ʿa and “kill the creativity of judges”.395 
 
                                               
395 According to Osta, this opposition has a political dimension that relates back to the 
foundation of the Saudi Kingdom, which was formed under the tribal alliance between the 
political ruling house of Al Sa’ud and the religious house of al-Shaykh: “the governance in 
Saudi Arabia is understood, although silently, to be similar to a Catholic marriage between the 
two wings. Sa‘ud rules the country in political and administrative matters while paying respect 
to the family of al-Shaykh, who rules in matters related to religion, such as the judiciary… 
Within this understanding, codification can be looked at as a limitation of a power that has 
been enjoyed by one of the two ruling wings –that is the power of judiciary.” See Haitham H. 
Osta, “Modernization, Codification and the Judicial Analysis: Exploring Predictability in Law in 
Sharī‘a Courts in Saudi Arabia” (University of Washington 2016),p.86 
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Figure 7. Organisation of  Shari’a and Administrative courts in Saudi Arabia 
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Sharī’ʿa Courts (Maḥakem al-sharī’ʿa) 
In the Saudi system, the Sharī’ʿa courts are the ordinary courts that deal 
predominantly with civil and criminal matters. Under the Judicial Authority Law, 
first-degree courts are divided according to the type of dispute at hand: 
• General courts (Maḥakem al-‘amma) 
• Criminal, courts (Maḥkamat al-jenaīa) 
• Courts of personal status (Maḥakem al-aḥwal al shakhsīa)  
• Commercial courts, (Maḥakem al-tejareeya) 
• Labour courts (Maḥakem al-‘amaliah)   
 
Decisions rendered by first level courts may be appealed to appeal circuits 
(Dawa’er), each circuit corresponding to the given jurisdictions of the first 
instance courts. The appeals circuits usually review cases without holding 
hearings.396 Final judicial authority lies with the Supreme  Court (Maḥkamat al-
tamwīz), located in Riyadh and performing several legislative, consultative and 
judicial roles. Under the 2007 law, the Supreme Court replaced the Supreme 
Judicial Council’s primary role as the highest authority in the ordinary Sharī’ʿa 
branch. In addition to hearing legal disputes, the Supreme Court supervises 
the implementation of the Kingdom’s laws and regulations. The Court is also 
empowered to review the following:  
• Judgments issued by the intermediate courts that involve cases of 
serious crime and/or the death penalty; 
• Court of Appeal judgments alleged to be contrary to Islamic Sharī’ʿa or 
any other laws; and  
• Matters relating to jurisdiction, impropriety of court and/or decisions.397 
  
                                               
396  Abdullah F. Ansary, “A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System” 
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Saudi_Arabia1.html> accessed 20 February 2018. 
397  Law of Judiciary and the Board of Grievances promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/78 on 
19/09/1428H corresponding to 1 October 2007 (Saudi Arabia). 
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Board of Grievances (Dīwān al-mazalem) 
Parallel to the Ordinary/Sharī’ʿa court system is the administrative judicial 
pyramid, or Board of Grievances. The administrative judicial branch is three-
tiered and consists of the following:  
• High Administrative Court (Maḥkamat al-idarīah al-‘ulīah) 
• Administrative Courts of Appeal (Maḥakem al-Isti’naf al-idarīah)  
• Administrative courts (Maḥakem al-idarīah) 
 
The 2007 law created the High Administrative Court (composed of a president 
holding the rank of minister, being appointed directly by a royal decree or on 
the recommendation by the Administrative Judicial Council).398 The High 
Administrative Court exercises its jurisdiction through specialised circuits. In 
addition, the Court has a General Council, presided over by the chief of the 
High Administrative Court, and including all sitting judges within the 
administrative judicial branch.399 If an administrative circuit deems it necessary 
to depart from an interpretation (adopted by either the same or a different 
circuit of the same court), the case is referred to the chief of the High 
Administrative Court who will then refer it to the General Council for a 
decision.400  
“A system within a system” 
Like several other states in the region, Saudi Arabia there are specialised 
tribunals external to the ordinary judicial system.401 For instance, in mid-2017, 
the Ministry of Justice launched the opening of Commercial Courts in three 
commercially important cities. The establishment of these courts is intended 
                                               
398  Ibid. 
399  Ibid. 
400 Abdullah F. Ansary, “A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System” 
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Saudi_Arabia1.html> accessed 20 February 2018. 
401 Ahmed A Altawyan, “The Legal System of the Saudi Judiciary and the Possible Effects on 
Reinforcement and Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration” (2017) 10 Canadian International 
Journal for Social Science and Education. p.283. 
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to serve as a forum for dispute resolution and to “increase judicial efficiency 
and enhance investor confidence”.402 But according to Marar:  
“[…] a duality in the legal system has been created because the 
general Islamic law [was] by no means displaced in whole by 
these laws. Instead, a “system within a system” has been created 
contributing to the inefficiency of the financial system.”403 
 
Saudi model: one end of the Arab judicial spectrum 
In relation to its neighbours, Saudi Arabia can be placed at one extreme end 
of the judicial continuum in the Middle East. Judicial decisions of Saudi judges 
are valid law to the parties and cannot be overruled unless they conflict with a 
plain meaning of the primary sources. In the event the judge of the lower court 
persist with the original judgement, final decision will fall to the appellate courts 
to refer the case to another judge or panel of judges in the lower court level.404 
On the one hand this type of individual autonomy downplays the internal 
consistency of the judiciary to a certain degree and may reduce the political 
impact of the judiciary as a whole,405 particularly because the King sits at the 
top of the legal system and “acts as the final court of appeal and as a source 
of pardon.”406 On the other hand, this approach elevates the importance of 
decisions of individual judges and therefore provides the conditions that can 
promote the politicisation of individual judges.407 One potential exception to 
this relates to the newly rearranged courts and tribunals as part of the ongoing 
legal and judicial reforms in the kingdom. Although it is too early to assess the 
practical implications of these specialised courts, their creation will at the very 
least, promote the fragmentation of Saudi courts.  
                                               
402 John Balouziyeh, “Judicial Reform in Saudi Arabia: Recent Developments in Arbitration 
and Commercial Litigation” (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 31 December 2017) 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/31/judicial-reform-saudi-arabia-recent-
developments-arbitration-commercial-litigation/> accessed 8 November 2018. 
403 Amr Daoud Marar, “Saudi Arabia: The Duality of the Legal System and the Challenge of 
Adapting Law to Market Economies” (2004) 19 Arab Law Quarterly 91. p.112 
404  Royal Decree No M/1 of 22/1/1435 H (corresponding to 25 November 2013 G)  
405 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p.81 
406 “Legal and Judicial Structure” (U.S Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). 
407  Ibid. 
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Lebanon: Highly fragmented but hierarchical system  
The judiciary in Lebanon is fragmented into four main court systems, with each 
branch having a hierarchical structure (Figure 8). The judicial structure has a 
secular ordinary court system, but it places emphasis on religious diversity 
within this system. The Lebanese judicial system has an elaborate system of 
religious courts for each religious confession. These are deeply embedded in 
the judicial system and combine with other elements derived primarily from the 
French civil law system.  
“A house of many mansions”408  
Lebanon’s judicial system reflects the country’s multi-confessional society, 
which dates back for centuries.409 Following the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, Lebanon was placed under the French mandate (1920-1943). 
According to Mallat, it was under French control that Lebanon acquired the 
main elements of its legal and judicial systems: “The system is dominated 
legally by the centrality of codes, following the pattern of the so-called ‘civil law 
family’, as opposed to common law as in the United Kingdom and the United 
States.”410 
 
Still in force today, the Lebanese Code of Obligations and Contracts was 
promulgated in 1932 (during the French Mandate). While largely patterned on 
the French Civil Code, the Lebanese Code differs in one important respect: 
legal matters related to personal status and family are governed by a separate 
                                               
408  The expression comes from Kamāl aṣ-Ṣalībī, A House of Many Mansions: The History of 
Lebanon Reconsidered (Repr, Tauris 2003). 
409  Following the first Lebanese civil war in 1860, the Règlement Organique transformed the 
principality into a fully autonomous Ottoman province. The province’s political institutions were 
based on power sharing among the various confessional sects under an Ottoman-European 
consortium protectorate. The legal system applied in Lebanon was similar to the rest of the 
Empire:  Islamic law as formulated by the Hanafi School and separate religious courts for non-
Muslims in matters of family and personal status. See Zahar., M-J., “Power sharing in 
Lebanon: foreign protectors, domestic peace, and democratic failure” in Philip G Roeder and 
Donald S Rothchild (eds), Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Cornell 
University Press 2005). p.29 
410 Chibli Mallat, “The Lebanese Legal System” 
<http://rocket.asoshared.com/~mallatco/sites/default/files/The%20Lebanese%20Legal%20S
ystem.pdf> accessed 1 November 2017. 
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set of laws for the different sectarian communities.411 The Lebanese Code was 
initially drafted by a French jurist, but was subsequently revised by Lebanese 
jurists to incorporate some provisions of Ottoman and Islamic law and “to 
reflect local legal culture”.412 The structure and scope of the Lebanese judicial 
system is primarily governed by the “Judicial Organisation law”.413  
 
                                               
411 Dwight F Reynolds, The Cambridge Companion to Modern Arab Culture (2015). p.78  
412 Ibid.p.79 
413  Decree Law No. 7855 of 1961 (Lebanon)  
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Figure 8. Organisation of Courts in Lebanon 
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Ordinary Courts  
Ordinary courts in Lebanon are arranged in a three-tiered hierarchy and are 
subdivided into criminal and civil departments. At the base of the structure are 
the courts of first instance (Ghoraf al-ibtidaīah), where cases are heard either 
by a single judge or a three-judge panel. These first instance courts examine 
all civil, criminal and commercial disputes of minor importance and/or value.414 
Judgments from the courts of first instance can be appealed to the Lebanese 
Courts of Appeal (Maḥakem- al-isti’nafīah), which are also empowered to 
examine requests for dismissing judges in the lower courts.415 There are six 
courts of appeal in the country, located in six different districts (Moḥafazat). 
The courts are composed of specialised chambers, with each chamber 
presided over by a chief judge. In addition, each court has a public prosecution 
department headed by an attorney general.416  
The Court of Cassation, (Maḥkamat al-tamwīz), located in Beirut, sits at the 
apex of the ordinary courts and reviews points of law. The Court is comprised 
of several chambers, and each chamber has a specific jurisdiction headed by 
a president and two consultative judges.417 In its entirety, a “First President” 
heads the Court of Cassation. The Court is entrusted to settle any jurisdictional 
conflicts arising between:  
• Two judicial courts;  
• A judicial court and a religious court; and  
• Between two religious courts. 
The Court also has the authority to object to a final judgment issued by a 
religious court, its jurisdiction or the merit of the decision.418 In circumstances 
                                               
414  Article 86 Civil Code on Procedure (Lebanon) 
415  Ibid. 
416  Law No. 150 1983 (Lebanon)  
417 Chibli Mallat, “The Lebanese Legal System” 
<http://rocket.asoshared.com/~mallatco/sites/default/files/The%20Lebanese%20Legal%20S
ystem.pdf> accessed 1 November 2017. 
418 The Lebanese Court of Cassation has often intervened in reconciling between individual 
rights and rights of the religious communities. See ‘“Extending the Power of the Constitutional 
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of jurisdictional conflict between the administrative and civil jurisdictions, a 
tribunal is formed called a “Court of Conflict Resolution”. The tribunal is 
composed of judges from the Cassation Court and the State Council, and 
solves the issue of competence.419 The First President of the Court of 
Cassation also heads a specialised court, the “Supreme Judicial Council” (Al-
Majlis al ‘Adli),420 which has final and original jurisdiction over sensitive criminal 
offences of a political nature. 
Administrative Court branch  
Following the abolition of the Special Administrative Tribunal in Lebanon in 
1975,421 a new law provided for the establishment of first instance 
administrative tribunals in each region of the country.422 However, the legal 
provisions relating to these courts are yet to be implemented.423 In effect, the 
only administrative court in the country in operation is the State Council (Majlis 
al-Shura), which sits in Beirut.424 The State Council has five “judicial 
chambers”425; it supervises and monitors the functioning of administrative 
courts and also adjudicates administrative disputes.  
Religious courts  
The Lebanese judicial system includes an elaborate system of religious courts 
for each confession, and the religious court branch is subdivided according to 
the State’s officially recognised denominations.426 Ecclesiastical Courts 
                                               
Council - Catching up with the Global and Arab Changes in Constitutional Justice”’ (2016) 
http://www.cc.gov.lb/en/node/5808. 
419 See the Lebanese Ministry of Justice website: https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-
details/21/1   
420 The First President heads the Supreme Council of Justice, the Judicial Council, the General 
Assembly of the Court of Cassation, the Disciplinary Council for judges and the Supreme 
Council for prosecuting presidents and ministers. Lebanese Ministry of Justice: 
<https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/6/1> 
421  Article 144 of Law No. 10343/75 and amended by Law No 227/2000 (Lebanon)  
422 Amendment Law No. 227 (2000) (Lebanon)  
423  Lebanese Ministry of Justice: <https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/20/1> 
424  Created in 1924, and currently regulated by Law No.10434/75 (Lebanon) 
425 Lebanese Ministry of Justice: <https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/20/1> 
426  Article 4 of Legislative Decree No. 60 (1936) recognises the existence of all religions to 
freely organise and manage their own affairs within the limits set by the law. Furthermore, 
Article 9 of the National Reconciliation Accord “Ta’ef Agreement” (1989) ensures its citizens 
freedom of conscience, and grants the heads of legally recognised communities the right to 
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consist primarily of Christian Courts, and are established by decrees issued by 
the religious authorities of each Christian denomination.427 These Courts 
chiefly decide matters related to Personal Status and Family laws. Judges 
sitting on these courts are religious lay judges and do not have the same status 
as civil judges, placing them outside the statutes that govern the judiciary and 
the authority of the High Judicial Council.428 Catholic courts are made up of a 
unified first instance tribunal for the entire Lebanese territory and one Court of 
Appeal. 429 Final appeals either are presented before the civil division of the 
Cassation Court, or before the Rota courts in the Vatican.430 Similarly, 
Christian Orthodox courts have a unified first instance tribunal in each region 
and one court of appeal for the entire Lebanese territory. 431 Final appeals may 
be presented before the civil division at the Cassation Court. 
 
Unlike Ecclesiastical courts, Sharī’ʿa432 and Madhabi Courts433 can decide on 
matters relating to succession. For each of the three denominations (Shi’a, 
Sunni and Druze), there is a first instance tribunal in each district and a 
separate appeal court in Beirut. Final appeals are heard by the Plenary 
Assembly of the civil chamber of the Court of Cassation. Judges at Sharī’ʿa 
Courts are appointed by a decree of the Council of Ministers, but they too are 
not subject to the authority of the High Judicial Council.  
Specialised tribunals  
In addition to the religious courts in Lebanon, there are a number of specialised 
tribunals, including Labour Courts, State Audit Courts, Juvenile Courts, 
Financial Courts and the Supreme Judicial Council. As described earlier, the 
                                               
consult an autonomous council, the Constitutional Council, to examine the constitutionality of 
laws related to personal status, the freedom of belief and religious practice. The Ta’ef 
Agreement brought a formal end to the Lebanese civil war (1975-1991) and was an 
amendment to the 1926 Constitution.  
427  Law on the Powers of Christian and Jewish Religious Authorities (1951) (Lebanon) 
428 Lebanese Ministry of Justice:  <https://www.justice.gov.lb> 
429  Catholic Courts Law No.1 (1991) (Lebanon) 
430  Ibid. 
431  Orthodox Law No. 1 (2003) (Lebanon) 
432  Law for Sunni and Shi’a (1963) (Lebanon) 
433  Decree No. 3473 (1960) (Lebanon) 
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Supreme Judicial Council is a specialised tribunal tasked with reviewing 
serious crimes of a political nature. Lebanon also has a separate military 
judicial branch, which deals with matters involving the armed forces.434  
 
Constitutional Council (Majlis al-dostori) 
The Constitutional Council is described as “an independent constitutional body 
of judicial nature”.435 The Council was established in 1993 and is tasked with 
reviewing constitutional challenges as well as challenges relating to electoral 
matters involving the President of the Republic and Parliamentary elections..436 
The Council is a ten-member committee that consists of judges ( ordinary, 
administrative and financial); academics (in law, political science, or 
administration) and; lawyers.437  Five members are appointed by the 
Parliament and the other five by the Cabinet.438 
 
The Council has the sole jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of draft 
laws.439 No other court has the jurisdiction regardless of whether a challenge 
is based on an indirect or direct claim. In contrast with several Arab states, the 
powers of the Constitutional Council of Lebanon are limited, particularly in 
terms of  access.440 First, the Council cannot act on its own initiative and 
individuals cannot refer a case to the council, nor can a court in any of the 
court branches. Those who can file a constitutional review is are the heads of 
                                               
434  The branch consists of the Military Cassation Court, the Permanent Military Court and 
courts presided over by individual judges in the Lebanese provinces. Lebanese Ministry of 
Justice: <https://www.justice.gov.lb/index.php/court-details/20/1> 
435  Art. 19, Lebanese Constitution 23 May1926 (Lebanon) 
436  Art. 19 the Lebanese Constitution, Law No. 250, 14 July 1993, amended by: Law No. 305, 
21: March 1994; Law No. 150, 30 October 1999; Law No. 650, 4 February 2005; 
Law No. 9 June 2006; Law No. 43, 3 November 2008; and Law No. 242, 22 October 2012 
(Lebanon)  
437  All members of the constitutional council must have had at least 25 years’ experience. Art 
3, Law No. 43 of 3 November 2008 (Lebanon) 
438 Georgi Azar, ‘Lebanon Elections: 17 Appeals Submitted to Constitutional Council’ An-
Nahar (Beirut, 6 June 2018) <https://en.annahar.com/article/814847-lebanon-elections-17-
appeals-submitted-to-constitutional-council> accessed 9 August 2018. 
439  According to Articles 1 and 18 of the law establishing the Council, and Article 1 of its 
internal statutes. 
440 See generally Antoine Nasri Messara, “Rapport national du Conseil constitutionnel du 
Liban” (2017).   
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the government (President of the Republic, the Prime Minister); the Chief of 
Parliament, or a minimum of 10 members of Parliament and; the heads of 
religious communities for challenges involving a religious nature.  
Lebanese model: The other end of the Arab judicial spectrum 
Lebanon can be characterised as hierarchical to the extent that the country’s 
legal system have two or more judicial pyramids coexisting, forming 
autonomous subsystems. Administrative cases follow their own appeals 
structure, while the remaining special courts - ordinary, military and religious - 
may be appealed to the Court of Cassation. There are also several judicial 
bodies operating within the ordinary judicial structure of Lebanon.441 The 
jurisdictional boundaries of the Lebanese courts, councils and committees are 
broad in nature, but the law can be appealed before the courts of appeal and 
finally, before the Court of Cassation. Despite the unique nature of the 
Lebanese legal system, particularly in relation to the religious branch, it 
resembles the fragmentation strategy as seen in the French model.   
 
However, the hierarchical model fails to incorporate the institutionalisation of 
religious courts that in some instances goes beyond the judicial structure. The 
Ta’ef Agreement that put an end to the second civil war sought to 
accommodate the several religious groups in the Republic. The organisation 
of courts in Lebanon is a clear reflection of an attempt to ensure the 
representation of each religious group in the country – not only in the form of 
religious courts but also within the secular judicial branches. The Lebanese 
judicial structure highlights a secular ordinary court system but places 
emphasis on religious diversity. As opposed to the Saudi judicial structure 
where religious minorities are subject under the Islamic laws, Lebanese courts 
have an elaborate system of religious courts for each confessional minority. 
The mix of hierarchy and fragmentation on the one hand appear, to hinder the 
                                               
441 Some of these bodies are regulated under the Urgent Proceedings and Land Court Law 
No. 186/1926; Arbitration Council Decree No. 54/422; The Customs Committee Decree No. 
59/2868; Labour Arbitration Council Labour Law (1946); Expropriation Commissions Law No. 
58/1991); Customs Court Customs Law (1974); Court for Liquidation Matters Decree No. 
79/1663; and High Banking Committee Decree No. 67/28. 
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politicisation of the judiciary among the judicial branches to a certain extent 
particularly in relation to constitutional rights and the limited powers of the 
Constitutional Council. On the other hand, the Court of Cassation’s wide 
powers in relation to settling jurisdictional issues, particularly in relation to the 
religious courts may foster politicisation. The Cassation Court is furthermore 
empowered to create a council for ministers for grave crimes.   
Jordan: A quasi unitary – constitutional system  
Similar to Lebanon, Jordan’s judicial system can be characterised as 
hierarchical as has two or more judicial pyramids forming autonomous 
subsystems (Figure 9).442 Furthermore, while there courts are divided into 
three branches, which may appear hierarchical, the branches are not 
completely separate from each other, as the Court of Cassation is the final 
court of appeal for all of them.  
 
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy and bases its governance on the 1952 
Constitution, its subsequent amendments (including most notably the 2011 
amendment following a series of popular unrests) and other laws that establish 
specialised courts443. Following the promulgation of the Jordanian Civil Code 
in 1976, Islamic Ḥanafī jurisprudence remains a part of the Code.444 Article 99 
of the Jordanian Constitution divides courts into three categories: ordinary 
courts (Maḥakem al-Nizamyieh), religious courts (Maḥakem al-dinīah) and 
                                               
442 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.81 
443 Another aspect of law widely practiced in (but not exclusive to) Jordan is the exercise of 
tribal dispute resolution. Although the Jordanian tribal courts were officially abolished in 1976, 
tribal custom still continues to complement the civil legal system and is subject to state 
oversight. Tribal customs are undertaken with the agreement and on the initiative of the 
conflicting parties without the intervention of the state. 
444 Saleh writes that the drafters of the Code elevated Islamic jurisprudence “to a more 
pervading and active role”. They, Saleh writes, “have rendered the code unique compared to 
earlier civil codes of the area by enhancing the position and status of the Sharī’ʿa based on 
the Mejelle”. Nabil Saleh, “Civil Codes of Arab Countries: The Sanhuri Codes” (1993) 8 Arab 
Law Quarterly 161. p.164 
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special courts (Maḥakem al-khassa).445 Religious courts form part of the 
special courts.446 
                                               
445 Article 99 Jordanian Constitution (1952) and amended in 2012  
446 Law of non-Muslim religious denominations No. 22/1938 (Jordan); Law of the Composition 
of Sharī’ʿa Courts No. 19/1972 and amended in 2001 (Jordan) 
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Figure 9. Organisation of Courts in Jordan 
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Ordinary courts  
Ordinary courts are three-tiered with the magistrate courts (Maḥakem al-sulḥ) 
and courts of first instance (Maḥakem al-ebtidaīah) at the bottom of the judicial 
hierarchy. The magistrate courts are presided over by one single judge for civil 
cases and two judges for criminal cases. They adjudicate on all civil, 
commercial and criminal cases of minor monetary value or possible sentence 
not exceeding two years. First Instance Courts have also the capacity to act 
as a primary court of instance for misdemeanour cases, and it receives 
appeals against magistrate court rulings.447  
 
There are three regular courts of appeal (Maḥakem- al-isti’nafīah) and two 
courts of appeal specifically dealing with custom and income tax disputes 
(Maḥakem isti’naf al-jamarek). Each court is presided over by a three-judge 
panel of civil judges. The courts adjudicate primarily on questions of law and 
fact and have jurisdiction over appeals submitted against rulings issued by the 
lower courts.  
 
The Jordanian Court of Cassation (Maḥkamat al-tamwīz) is the highest judicial 
body in the country.448 The Court is composed of 24 judges and 67 
administrative officers. The President of the Court serves as the country's 
Chief Justice. All seven judges of the court sit in full panel in cases deemed 
sensitive or important. For most appeals, however, only five judges rule on the 
cases. The Court primarily considers appeals of felonies in criminal cases 
where the law gives a right of appeal, and in civil cases where the sum exceeds 
a certain amount. The Court may consider cases regardless of amount if 
deemed complex, concerns the public or authorised by the Chief Justice.449  
                                               
447 Article 8, Law on the Establishment of Regular Courts No. 17/2001 (Jordan) 
448 Law on the Establishment of Regular Courts No. 17/2001 (Jordan)  
449 Art. 10 Law on the Establishment of Regular Courts No. 17/2001 (Jordan) 
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The new administrative courts  
Until 2014, there was only one administrative court in Jordan, the High Court 
of Justice.450 The Court was abolished by the Administrative Courts Law of 
2014 and was replaced with a two-tiered court system for administrative 
disputes. The new courts are the Primary Administrative Court and the High 
Administrative Court located in Amman.451 According to the new law, 
administrative judges in the two courts fall under the Jordanian Judicial Council 
and are bound by the same laws as judges in the ordinary and judicial 
branches.452  
 
Within the ordinary and specialised judicial branches are several autonomous 
courts, which further diffuses the judicial structure. While decisions of the High 
Criminal Court and the Juvenile Courts may be appealed to the Court of 
Cassation, other courts do not have the option of appeal.  
Religious courts  
Similar to Lebanon, the Jordanian religious courts deal with matters relating to 
personal status and family law. Each religious denomination has its own court 
system (except for Christian Protestants whose matters are dealt with by civil 
courts). Sharī’ʿa Courts comprise a Sharī’ʿa Court of first instance and the 
Sharī’ʿa court of final appeal. Similarly, Catholic and Orthodox Courts are 
made up of a first instance and appellate court. Depending on the case at 
hand, the case may be appealed to any civil court in the ordinary court 
structure.453 
Jordanian Constitutional Court 
A recent addition to the special court branch is the Jordanian Constitutional 
Court, issued by law No. 15 of 2012.  Following protests in 2011, King Abdullah 
                                               
450 Article 26(b) Law No. 12/1992 (Jordan) 
451 Law No. 27 /2014 (Jordan)  
452 Art. 40 Law No. 27 /2014 (Jordan). For a concise description of the Administrative Courts 
see: Steven Schaaf, “The Administrative Judiciary in Jordan” (American Center of Oriental 
Research 2017) <https://www.acorjordan.org/2017/12/21/administrative-judiciary-jordan/> 
accessed 8 November 2018. 
453 Art. 15, Law of non-Muslim religious denominations No. 22/1938 (Jordan) 
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II promulgated the constitutional amendments in a decree establishing a new 
Constitutional Court, with all nine members directly appointed by the King. The 
Court is described as an independent and separate judicial body, and it 
oversees the constitutionality of laws.454 The Court of Cassation is the only 
judicial body entrusted with the exclusive power to raise the question of 
constitutionality.455 Similar to several European constitutional courts, the 
Jordanian Constitutional Court may be described as having a hybrid role 
between justice and politics in which the “guardians are mainly chosen by the 
very institutions they have to guard”.456 
 
Somewhat similar to Lebanon, Jordan can be characterised as hierarchical to 
the extent that its court system has two or more judicial pyramids coexisting 
alongside each other. Albeit separate, the judicial pyramids are not entirely 
autonomous from each other and it appears that cases from these judicial 
branches can be a matter for the ordinary civil courts, particularly the Court of 
Cassation.  
Arab judicial structures and the political significance of courts  
Continental European systems usually have clear divisions between ordinary, 
administrative and specialised courts with the purpose of containing the 
potential reach for judicial-decision making. In the French model, the judiciary 
is not intended to limit the power of the popular majority. According to Guarnieri 
and Pederzoli, popular sovereignty and parliamentary supremacy, instituted in 
the wake of the French Revolution, were intended to act as powerful checks 
over external controls over legislation, particularly for judiciaries: 
“continental systems have often presumed that the judiciary itself 
is a power to be checked. The memory of the abuses committed 
by the courts of the ancient régime and the general fear of 
‘government by judiciary’ have helped to shape constitutional 
                                               
454 Art. 4, Law Creating the Constitutional Court No. 15/2012 (Jordan) 
455 Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017)., p 271 
456 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p 138  
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frameworks based on a rigid separation of powers, rather than 
on checks and balances”. 457 
 
In addition, a limited court jurisdiction may also be the result of the executive 
branch seeking to reduce the potential impact of judicial decisions. The more 
fragmented the judicial system, the more likely courts are to be “politically 
neutralised”.458 Solomon calls this type of executive control the “Spanish 
Solution”; during the later decades of the Franco regime, ordinary courts were 
independent because they lacked power and the government created a special 
set of tribunals staffed with politically appointed judges.459  
 
Regardless of any formally stated goals, the creation of a separate 
autonomous set of courts inevitably curtails the scope of “ordinary” courts, 
especially over politically sensitive issues.460 Although this type of jurisdictional 
fragmentation is typically attributed to continental European judiciaries, similar 
patterns are found in the Arab context. The Arab judicial systems covered in 
this chapter roughly resemble the European continental judicial systems, with 
separate and autonomous judicial pyramids. Considering the historical 
influence of the French civil law model on the region (particularly during the 
late 18th to 19th century), it is perhaps not surprising that the following 
characteristics are (to varying degrees) visible in the judicial systems of Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia: 
• A three-tiered hierarchy of ordinary courts hearing both criminal and civil 
cases; 
• A set of separate administrative courts, dividing the judicial community; 
and  
• Specialised courts for issues that are considered to be exceptional 
(religious, military or national security).  
 
                                               
457 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p 88–89. 
458 Peter H Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes” (2007) 60 World Politics 
122. p.126 
459 Ibid. 
460 Quoted from Guarnieri, C. “L’ordine pubblico e la giustuzua penale”, in R. Romanelli (ed.) 
Storia dello Stato in Italia. Rome: Donzelli, 367. 
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However, reviewing how these characteristics are manifested in each of the 
four Arab judicial systems helps to explain why the nature of the judicial system 
in each country can have a bearing on the political significance of courts.  
Centripetal and Centrifugal Dynamics: Judicial Review  
As described in the beginning of this chapter, in Western democracies the 
organisation of courts has been described by two judicial system models: co-
ordinate and hierarchical systems. The difference between the two models 
relate to the system’s internal dynamics and the role supreme courts play in 
ensuring consistency in judicial decisions. According to Guarnieri and 
Pederzoli, a centrifugal dynamic often described as a feature of continental 
judicial systems, tend to promote autonomy of lower and intermediate courts 
and thereby reduces the internal consistency of the judiciary as a whole. While 
this may undermine the certainty of law and the coherence of the system, such 
“pluralist jurisprudence” may also strengthen the perception that individual and 
lower-ranking judges are impartial and less influenced by supreme court 
ruling.461 This in turn may enhance the political significance of individual 
judges. In contrast with a centrifugal dynamic are judicial systems that have a 
strong decision-making court at the top have a centripetal dynamic which 
may increase the political significance of the judiciary. This dynamic is often 
represented by the English and American judicial systems.  
 
One way in which the centripetal dynamic of a judicial system is manifested 
relates to judicial review of legislation. Generally, the most visible difference 
between European continental and Anglo-American court systems relates to 
judicial review, “which in continental Europe is entrusted to separate 
constitutional courts” and tends to be limited.462 According to Guarnieri and 
Pederzoli, at least three elements need to be taken into account in order to 
assess whether the institutional position of organs entrusted for judicial review 
have scope for politicisation:  
                                               
461 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p.81 
462  Ibid. 
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• Whether constitutional adjudication is “centralised” or “diffused”;  
• The actors allowed to initiate constitutional litigation and the instruments 
available to them and; 
• The point at which constitutional adjudication can be initiated, i.e. 
whether the review is a priori or a posteriori. 463 
 
In Western legal systems, the differences between centralised and diffuse 
review often relate to the divisions between the common and civil law legal 
traditions. In several civil law jurisdictions, centralised review is entrusted to a 
single and separate court “in order to remove inherently political issues from 
ordinary courts”.464 By contrast, “diffuse review” is spread across the entire 
judicial system and all courts can declare a law unconstitutional. This type of 
review is represented by the U.S court system where any court can review 
legislation on the basis of constitutionality. However, only the U.S Supreme 
Court has the power to null and declare a law void. 
 
The second element relates to accessibility and what actors are allowed to 
present challenges directly before the constitutional courts. At least three 
forms of access are important for the political significance of courts. The first 
relates to “incidental proceedings” where litigants may challenge the 
constitutionality of the law applied in their case. In these circumstances, the 
court in which the dispute is being hears must assess whether there are 
sufficient grounds to refer the challenge to the constitutional court. According 
to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, this approach allows the ordinary judiciary to 
become “an unavoidable part of the process of constitutional review” 465, even 
if the initial purpose was to confine constitutional issues to a separate 
specialised court:  
“[O]rdinary courts may raise constitutional issues on their own 
volition in the course of a particular case, and such proceedings 
can then become a vehicle for ‘judicial polities’. By asking for a 
constitutional court ruling, such actions can be a means of 
                                               
463  Ibid. 
464  Ibid. p.143. 
465  Ibid. p.144 
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promoting the personal values of individual judges and even 
those of their reference groups.”466 
 
The third element which indicates the degree to which judges may intervene 
in the political process relates to the point in time where review may be 
initiated. Courts that have a priori review can only review legislation in a short 
time span between the law’s passage by parliament and its promulgation 
whereas a posteriori review allows for the constitutional court’s intervention to 
review and validly enacted laws on the basis of constitutionality.467 For 
instance, the French Conseil Constitutionnel can only engage in a priori review 
(e.g. review the law’s passage by parliament but before it is promulgated by 
the President of the Republic).468 By contrast, a posteriori review allows for a 
greater scope of political intervention because the constitutional court can 
protect constitutional rights against their alleged violation by a validly enacted 
law. 
Constitutional and judicial review in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia  
The four Arab countries studied in this research demonstrate differences in 
relation to constitutional and/or judicial review.  The most visible differences 
relate to the three elements of constitutional review discussed above. With the 
exception of Saudi Arabia, all countries assessed here have constitutional 
courts in the legal system. These are presented in Table 9 below. 
                                               
466  Ibid. 
467  Ibid. p.143 
468  Ibid. p.89 
 140  
 
Table 10. Characteristics of Constitutional courts/councils in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia 
 Egypt Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia 
 Supreme Constitutional Court 
Jordanian Constitutional 
Court 
The Constitutional 
Council N/A 
Created 1979 2012 1993 N/A 
Number of 
members Ten, all of which are judges 
Ten sitting members 
(Cassation judges, professors 
of law, and senior lawyers)469 
Ten-member committee 
(judges, academics and 
lawyers) 
 
N/A 
Appointment 
Since 2017, SCC selected its 
own chief justice and other 
justices, and even decides 
how many justices will serve 
on the court.470 
Directly appointed by the King 
Five members appointed by 
Parliament and five 
members by the Cabinet 
N/A 
Type of judicial 
review A posteriori A posteriori A priori 
Decentralised judicial 
review 
Direct appeal by 
individuals Partly No No Yes 
Indirect appeal 
through 
judiciary 
Yes, cases transferred from 
courts of merit 
Courts can only refer through 
Court of Cassation No Yes 
Institutions able 
to initiate review Courts of merit 
The Court of Cassation, the 
Senate, the House of 
Representatives and the 
Council of Ministers 
 
The President of the 
Republic, the Chief of 
Parliament, the Prime 
Minister, at least 10 MPs 
and the heads of religious 
communities 
 
All courts 
                                               
469 Art 6, Law Creating the Constitutional Court No. 15/2012 (Jordan) 
470 Law No. 13 of 2017 amending Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt). See Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of this 
implication.  
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In Egypt, the SCC can engage in a posteriori review, which allows the 
constitutional court to review validly enacted law.471 This power, absent in the 
French context, accords constitutional courts greater scope for political 
intervention. According to Sultany, this renders Egypt one of the “most 
developed instances of judicial review in the Arab world.”472   
 
Although not as pervasive as in Egypt, the powers of the Jordanian Court of 
Cassation appear wide. Decisions rendered by the Jordanian State Security 
Court are subject to appeal before the Jordanian Court of Cassation,473 and 
the Court of Cassation has a gate-keeping role in relation to constitutional 
challenges. The Court of Cassation is the only judicial body empowered to 
assess whether there are grounds to refer a case to the Jordanian 
Constitutional Court. This suggests a possibility in which the Court itself may 
                                               
471 One notable example relates to the recent legal and political controversy with regards to 
the executive’s decision to transfer the sovereignty of the strategically important Islands of 
Sanafir and Tiran to Saudi Arabia in 2016. The decision sparked a judicial controversy and 
involved the Ordinary and Administrative Courts and the SCC. Since the executive decision 
was made public, the various courts have adjudicated on the legality of the decision with court 
cases filed back and forth across the judicial branches. The recent judgment of the SCC put 
an end to the case, which has been described as a “tense, multilayered political and legal 
battle that has been waged in both the [ordinary] and administrative court systems.” The SCC 
ruled in favour of the executive decision and wrote that: “no judicial body should interfere in 
the procedures for the conclusion of treaties. Once a treaty is issued and has passed into law, 
judicial oversight then falls under the purview of the SCC”. “Tiran and Sanafir: Developments, 
Dynamics, and Implications” <https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Tiran-and-
Sanafir-Developments-Dynamics-and-Implications-web.pdf> accessed 1 September 2018.  
472 Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017), p.93 
473 The military court also prosecutes military personnel for all categories of offenses. See 
Maya Mansour and Carlos Daoud, “The Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary- 
Lebanon” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network 2010) 
<http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/the_independence_and_impartiality_of_the
_judiciary_in_lebanon.pdf> accessed 5 January 2016.  
For instance, in 1993, the Court of Cassation reversed a State Security Court judgment on 
the grounds that their confessions were abstracted under torture: Decision No. 74/1994 of 
the Court of Cassation, issued on 13 March 1995. The case related to a decision of the State 
Security Court convicting a group of army cadets of conspiring to murder the late King 
Hussein Bin Talal.  See Sufian Obeidat, “Rule of Law Quick Scan Jordan” (The Hague 
Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) 2012) 
<http://www.hiil.org/data/sitemanagement/media/QuickScan_Jordan_191212_GK.pdf> 
accessed 3 June 2015. 
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become a vehicle for judicial politics:“by asking for a constitutional court ruling, 
such actions can be a means of promoting the personal values of individual 
judges and even those of their reference groups”.474 By virtue of its direct 
access to the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation constitutes a direct 
channel into Jordanian politics. 
 
In contrast, the Lebanese Constitutional Council, although described as 
judicial, is separated from the legal system and access to it is limited. 
According to Messarra (a member of the Lebanese Constitutional Council), 
despite efforts by the Council, the powers of the Council are constrained; which 
is contrary to the general trend in the world and even in the surrounding Arab 
countries.475 Constitutional adjudication in Lebanon is likened to the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel, in that its powers are narrow (abstract review only) 
and constitutional challenges cannot be initiated by citizens. Despite this, 
judicialisation may still be fostered through the Constitutional Council. As 
Shapiro notes in the French context, abstract review has in the French context, 
enabled the transfer of political conflicts from the Parliament to the judiciary 
which has tended to act “as a true third chamber”.476 According to Guarnieri 
and Pederzoli, this has changed the relationship dynamic between 
parliamentary forces:  
“The mere possibility, if not the open threat, that a law will be 
referred to the Conseil Constitutionnel has forced the 
parliamentary majority to pay much more attention to legal 
implications when drafting bills in order to head off potential 
constitutional challenges”.477 
 
                                               
474  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002)  p. 144. 
475  “[L]es attributions limitées du Conseil constitutionnel du Liban, contrairement à la tendance 
générale dans le monde et même dans les pays arabes environnants, et malgré des efforts 
constants et confirmés du Conseil, ne favorisent pas la promotion et l’extension de l’Etat de 
droit.” Antoine Nasri Messara, “Rapport national du Conseil constitutionnel du Liban” (2017)., 
p.14-15 
476  Martin M. Shapiro, “Judicial Review in France” (1989) 6 J.L. & Pol., p.538 
477  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.145. 
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In Lebanon, constitutional challenges raised by both the Parliament and the 
executive have changed the political landscape. The possibility that a law may 
be referred to the Council means more attention is paid to constitutional issues 
and political discourse increasingly adopts legal language.478 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, one of the key indications of judicialisation according to Vallinder is 
when non-judicial decision-making forums become dominated by legal/judicial 
terminology, rules and procedures.479   
 
Unlike other Arab countries, Saudi Arabia does not have a formal written 
constitution. Instead, the Saudi government adopted basic laws in 1993 where 
the judicial, executive and regulatory authorities “cooperate in the performance 
of their functions” and where “the King is the ultimate arbiter for these 
Authorities”.480 Unlike other Arab countries that have constitutional provisions 
that declare Islamic Sharī’ʿa as a source of legislation, governance in the 
Kingdom is based on Islamic Sharī’ʿa and Shura (consultation)”.481 Courts 
apply rules of the Islamic Sharī’ʿa in cases that are brought before them, 
according to the sources of Islamic law.482 At the top of the legal system is the 
King, who acts as the final court of appeal and as a source of pardon. 
                                               
478 One recent example relates to the parliamentary elections held on 6 May 2018, where 17 
appeals were submitted to the Constitutional Council seeking to overturn the electoral results. 
See Georgi Azar, “Lebanon Elections: 17 Appeals Submitted to Constitutional Council” An-
Nahar (Beirut, 6 June 2018) <https://en.annahar.com/article/814847-lebanon-elections-17-
appeals-submitted-to-constitutional-council> accessed 9 August 2018. 
479  C Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. (NYU Press 
1995) p.13. 
480 “The Authorities of the State consist of: The Judicial Authority; The Executive Authority; 
The Regulatory Authority. These Authorities will cooperate in the performance of their 
functions, according to this Law or other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these 
Authorities” Art. 44, No: A/90, “Basic Law of Governance”, 27th Sha'ban 1412 H (1 March 
1992) 
481  Article 8 states that: “Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, 
Dhura (consultation) and equality according to Islamic Sharī’ʿa.” In the other three countries 
in this study, the importance of Sharī’ʿa law is different. For example, Article 2 of the Egyptian 
Constitution (2014) provides that “The principles of Islamic Sharī’ʿa are the principal source of 
legislation”. Article 2 of the Jordanian Constitution (1952 and its amendments through 2016) 
states that Islam is the religion of the State. Islamic Sharī’ʿa, however, is a matter for the 
specialised Sharī’ʿa courts for Muslims. (Article 103). In Lebanon, Article 9 of the Constitution 
guarantees absolute freedom of religion and conscience (1926 and its amendments through 
2004). 
482  Art. 48 “Basic Law of Governance” (Saudi Arabia) 
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According to Al-Jarbou, constitutional review in Saudi Arabia does not follow a 
decentralised model in which all courts participate in constitutional review.483 
Nor does it follow a centralised model, where review is exercised by a separate 
constitutional court.484 Statutes and laws cannot be directly challenged before 
the Sharī’ʿa Courts or the Administrative Courts. Despite this, a form of judicial 
review exists by virtue of the powers of Sharī’ʿa and the ability of the 
Administrative Courts to apply and review Sharī’ʿa law. According to Al-Jarbou, 
this is a form of judicial review exercised by courts “to maintain the supremacy 
of the Islamic Sharī’ʿa.” Saudi courts have no powers to nullify laws or 
regulations: “They may only notify the legislative authority vested jointly in the 
King, the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council, and recommend 
amending the regulations.”485  
 
A centrifugal dynamic can be said to exist in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the 
unique nature of the law applied in the two court systems and the available 
judicial tools. As described earlier, the nature of ijtihad tends to reduce the 
internal consistency of the judicial system as a whole. The recent judicial 
reforms have sought to change this by introducing separate courts that apply 
codified laws. For the Sharī’ʿa and Administrative courts, however, this may 
undermine the certainty of law and the coherence of the system as a whole by 
virtue of a “pluralist” jurisprudence. With regards to the political significance of 
judges, individual and lower-ranking judges are afforded more autonomy and 
are less influenced by the Saudi Supreme Court who in theory acts as an 
advisor.  
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight key features in these four 
Arab judicial systems where the political significance of courts may be 
                                               
483 Ayoub M. Al-Jarbou, “Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia” (2004) 19 Arab 
Law Quarterly 5, p.50 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid.p 51 
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promoted based on court jurisdiction and the relationship between courts. The 
chapter is largely based on a formal legal analysis of judicial structures, 
interpreted in the light of existing theories of judicialisation. The next chapter 
explores more judge-specific aspects of the judicial systems in the Arab region, 
particularly the way judges are selected and trained, and how their careers are 
managed. This is the second element  that may help to explain the political 
significance of judges in the Arab region.  
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Chapter 6. Arab judges: selection, career and status 
This chapter describes socialisation patterns of judges in Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Socialisation patterns are important forms of 
control exercised by the judicial systems in each country. The forms of 
institutional controls may, in turn, constrain judicial activism and affect the role 
perceptions of Arab judges.  
 
In this chapter, focus is placed on four types of socialisation patterns for Arab 
judges: (1) judicial selection and recruitment; (2) judicial training; (3) career 
advancement and (4) judicial discipline and sanctions. As well as official laws 
and secondary materials that set out the judicial selection and career 
advancement process, this chapter includes information gathered directly from 
Arab judges about their personal experiences of selection and training as part 
of the Arab Judges Survey conducted for this thesis. The analysis in this 
chapter will in turn provide a basis for exploring judicial role perceptions of 
judges in the four countries in subsequent chapters.  
Judicial socialisation from within 
Alpert, Atkins and Ziller define socialisation for judges as “the adjustment to 
life on the bench, including the adoption of new roles in response to new 
environmental demands."486 It is a form of adaptation where the judge is 
integrated into the judicial organisation. In this regard, socialisation is 
understood from an institutional aspect: the institution that the individual enters 
into has a set of mechanisms aimed at assimilating him/her. The individual is 
conceived as a recipient, where a set of institutionally prescribed behaviours 
                                               
486 Alpert, Lenore, Burton M. Atkins and Robert C. Ziller, “Becoming a Judge: The Transition 
from Advocate to Arbiter” (1979) 62 Judicature 325, p.325. 
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are induced.487 At the individual level, conformity to the “collective reality” of 
judges often stems from a social obligation or professionalisation.488  
 
Furthermore, it might be in the individual judge’s self-interest to conform to the 
behaviour of the organisation.489 For example, disregard of well-established 
rules set by the judiciary may alienate judges who fail to conform to the rules 
and may hamper ambitions of career advancement or, in worse cases, result 
in sanctions.490 The institutional norms that guide judges may furthermore 
affect the willingness of judges to intervene in the political process.491 Glick 
suggests that criticism by colleagues, legal organisations and other groups can 
be viewed as sanctions “which limit the adventures of certain judges”.492  
 
                                               
487 Jennifer H Waldeck and Karen K Myers, “Organizational Assimilation Theory, Research, 
and Implications for Multiple Areas of the Discipline: A State of the Art Review” (2007) 31 
Annals of the International Communication Association 322, p.324. 
488 See generally: Kimberly A Wade-Benzoni and others, “Barriers to Resolution in 
Ideologically Based Negotiations: The Role of Values and Institutions” (2002) 27 Academy of 
Management Review 41.  
489 Whether judges obey a social norm generally depends on two types of expectations: 
empirical and normative. Empirical expectations relate to the individual judge’s expectation 
that the norm is to be followed by the majority of judges in the appropriate circumstances. 
Empirical expectations to conformity are necessary but may not be a sufficient or compelling 
reason for individual compliance. According to Biccheri, this is because social norms usually 
prescribe behaviour that may be in conflict with narrow self-interested motives. For judges, a 
straightforward reason may relate to career advancement. This introduces the second type of 
expectation, that is a normative expectation which involves the individual judge’s belief that 
he/she has an obligation to comply. Provided empirical and normative expectations are met, 
individuals must in addition have a conditional preference for following a particular norm. For 
some individuals, recognising the legitimacy of others’ expectations might be enough (when 
combined with empirical expectations) to induce a preference for conformity. Others might 
require further inducements, such as the threat of sanctions by those who expect and want 
their conformity, such as the judicial collective. See Cristina Bicchieri and Erte Xiao, “Do the 
Right Thing: But Only If Others Do So” (2009) 22 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 191. 
490 Henry Robert Glick, Judicial Role Perceptions and Behavior: A Study of American State 
Judges (PhD Tulane University 1967) p.248. 
491 Guarnieri and Pederzoli for example relate this to the degree of independence judges enjoy 
within the system. For the authors, it is impossible to speak of judicial intervention in the 
political process without judicial independence. Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The 
Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas 
(Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.18.  
492 Henry Robert Glick, Judicial Role Perceptions and Behavior: A Study of American State 
Judges (PhD Tulane University 1967), p.248. 
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Two distinct patterns of judicial selection and recruitment 
To become a judge generally requires the approval of the judicial system. 
Biddle calls this a social selection, where the organisation exercises a degree 
of control over those who are allowed entry.493 Entry requirements, such as 
educational qualifications and work experience, are “filters” that are put in 
place and are especially relevant for roles in a society that are considered 
important and difficult to perform, like judging.494  
 
A distinction is generally made between two patterns of judicial recruitment: 
the “bureaucratic model” and the “professional model” of recruitment, 
often represented by the continental European (civil law) and Anglo-American 
(common law) respectively.495  
 
The bureaucratic model tends to recruit members into the judiciary with little or 
no prior professional experience. Candidates enter the competition shortly 
after graduation from law school, and are selected through written and oral 
examinations aimed at testing their legal knowledge.496 In theory, socialisation 
under this model is achieved almost exclusively from within: candidates are 
generally young and inexperienced. Upon entry, they will learn the required 
norms and approved organisational behaviours in order to effectively 
participate in the judiciary.497 Candidates are placed at the bottom of the 
judicial pyramid, and are regularly supervised by senior judges who exercise 
a degree of power over their professional status. Furthermore, professional 
training and experience are often acquired within the judicial organisation, 
where judges are expected to remain until their retirement.498  
 
                                               
493 Bruce J Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic Press 
1979) p.316. 
494 Ibid. 
495 See generally Mirjan R Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative 
Approach to the Legal Process (Yale Univ Press 1986). 
496 C Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder (eds), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New 
York University Press 1995) p.158. 
497 Giuseppe Di Federico, “The Italian Judicial Profession and Its Bureaucratic Setting” (1976) 
Part 1 Law Journal of Scottish Universities pp. 40, p.47. 
498  Ibid. 
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By contrast, in the professional model, entry into the judiciary is usually 
confined to individuals with an extensive amount of prior legal professional 
experience, which means that those who become judges are often at the 
middle to end of their careers in legal practice. Although a degree of “re-
socialisation” can occur within the judiciary, these individuals are more likely 
to bring values and experiences from outside the judiciary into their working 
life as judges, and continue to maintain ties with their former colleagues in the 
legal profession.499 
Judicial recruitment in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia  
The judicial systems in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia include 
elements of both the professional and bureaucratic models. In all the four 
countries, young inexperienced individuals as well as individuals with 
extensive legal experience may be admitted to the bench. Value is placed on 
previous professional legal experience such as legal advocacy and legal 
scholarship. In each country, Judicial Councils formally govern judicial 
recruitment, transfer, discipline and career. In practice, however, judicial 
selection also involves other actors external to the judicial branch. The 
following sections describe the methods of recruitment and training in each of 
the four jurisdictions based both on official laws and evidence of what actually 
happens in practice obtained from empirical research.  
Formal and informal judicial selection requirements 
Table 10 below sets out the official qualifications and entry requirements for 
judges in each of the 4 Arab jurisdictions. All require formal legal qualifications 
and have age restrictions. 
 
  
                                               
499  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p 20. 
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Table 11. Entry requirements to the judiciary in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and 
Lebanon 
 Age 
restriction 
Educational Requirement Exam Probation 
 
Egypt 500 
 
Not younger 
than 30 
 
Bachelor’s degree in Law and the 
license to practice law 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Jordan501 
 
Not older than 
40 
 
Bachelor’s degree in law and license 
to practice law, or an awarded Judicial 
Diploma 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Saudi 
Arabia 
502 
 
Not younger 
than 22 
 
Bachelor’s degree in Law 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Lebanon 
 
Not older than 
35 
 
Bachelor’s degree in Law 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
However, the official process of judicial selection and recruitment in the four 
countries provides for only a partial picture. In addition to formal requirements, 
entry into the judiciary is also facilitated (or impeded) by extra-legal 
backgrounds, status and personal relationships with those who can influence 
the decision-making process. The judiciary may exercise certain forms of 
control by requirements or practices that are not made explicit. Individuals that 
belong to a particular social group, for example, may find it easier (or more 
difficult) to be selected to the judiciary. 
Egypt: Quasi professional and bureaucratic judiciary  
The approach to judicial appointment in Egypt is neither strictly bureaucratic, 
nor strictly professional. Judicial recruitment in Egypt reveals a hybrid system 
with a strong preference for individuals who have prior prosecutorial 
experience. To a certain extent, Egypt is similar to Italy and France where 
judges and members of the public prosecution coexists within the same 
organisation,503 and judges and prosecutors can move between the two 
                                               
500  Art. 38 of Royal Decree No. M / 78, date 19/9/1428 “Law of the Judiciary” (Saudi Arabia) 
501  Art. 10 of Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan) 
502  Art. 31 of Royal Decree No. M / 78, date 19/9/1428 “Law of the Judiciary” (Saudi Arabia) 
503  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p 66. 
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professions.504 Law graduates that join the Egyptian Public Prosecution are 
eligible for judicial appointment once they reach the age of thirty,505 and judges 
are free to work as public prosecutors even after they have worked in the 
judiciary.  
 
There are no public competitions or examinations to become a judge in Egypt. 
Applicants are required to submit a written dossier that sets out their 
educational, professional and social background. Once checked and cleared 
by security organs506, applicants are invited for an interview with the Judicial 
Council’s “Seven Board Committee”.507 Those that pass the necessary 
requirements are appointed by the Judicial Council (followed by a Presidential 
decree).508 For administrative judges, the State Council is in charge of 
appointments with a similar procedure of dossier submission followed by an 
interview. In addition, there are also lateral forms of judicial recruitment in 
Egypt; the Judicial Authority Law requires that a quarter of judges in Egypt are 
appointed without any prior prosecutorial experience but with previous legal 
experience.509  
 
In practice, according to Sultany, judicial appointments in Egypt are based on 
connections rather than just formal qualifications and merit. Such connections 
include “hereditary judicial offices” where judges “bequeath” their judicial office 
                                               
504  This also applies to prosecutors wishing to become judges. See Art. 15 of Law No. 46 of 
1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt). 
505  In the Survey conducted for this research, one Egyptian judge explained that “one of the 
path[s] to become a judge in Egypt is to first be appointed as a public prosecutor and when 
you reach age of 30 you get the post of a Judge”. Comment from Judge 2081484 (Arab Judges 
Survey).  
506  According to Al-Hajjaj, the National Security Agency investigates candidates’ and their 
families’ political affiliations. Moreover “The SJC and the Ministry of Justice practice a zero-
tolerance policy regarding political history, specifically with regard to any affiliation with Islamist 
or liberal parties or groups”. Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, “The Dilemma of Judicial Appointment in 
Egypt Questions of Gender Equality, Elimination of Political Opposition and Underprivileged 
Citizens” (2018) 11 DePaul Journal for Social Justice. 
507  The “Seven Board Committee” [Lagna-al-Sobaiya] consists of Egypt’s most senior judges, 
including two of the most senior prosecutors and is presided over by the Chief Justice of the 
Court of Cassation. See Art. 77 of Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” 
(Egypt) 
508  Ibid. 
509  Ibid. 
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to their relatives.510 The preference for individuals from favourable social and 
economic backgrounds has also been reflected in public statements made 
recently by two former Egyptian Ministers of Justice, Mahfouz Saber, and his 
successor, Ahmed el-Zind. In 2015, Saber publicly stated that the judiciary was 
not a suitable career option for the “offspring of rubbish collectors and other 
modest occupations” because "a judge must hail from an appropriate 
environment".511 His successor as Minister, Ahmed el-Zind, has also been 
reported to favour individuals from a particular social standing.  According to 
Hendawi, the now former Minister has defended a “decades-old practice” that 
favours and prioritise children of judges and other members of the judiciary.512  
Lebanon: largely bureaucratic judiciary 
Judicial recruitment in Lebanon aligns itself closer to the European continental 
bureaucratic model, even though some lateral forms of recruitment exist. Most 
judges in Lebanon are recruited at a very early age by examination513 run by 
a board of examiners of the Judicial Council.514 This board, made up 
exclusively of judges,515 reviews applications and invites successful applicants 
to take a written examination, followed by an interview. For candidates that 
apply to administrative judicial posts, similar procedures apply except that the 
relevant body in charge is replaced by the Council of State. Occasionally, a 
lateral form of recruitment exists where candidates are chosen from the 
                                               
510  Nimer Sultany, Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism after the Arab Spring 
(First edition, Oxford University Press 2017) p.165.  
511  Khaled Diab, “Egypt’s Justice Minister Tells It like It Is” Al Jazeera (12 May 2015) 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/05/egypt-justice-minister-mahfouz-saber-
150512115245779.html> accessed 8 November 2018. 
512  “Anti-Brotherhood Judge Named Justice Minister” San Diego Union Tribune (20 May 2015) 
<http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-anti-brotherhood-judge-named-justice-minister-
in-2015may20-story.html> accessed 8 November 2018. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
dossier application is devised in order to help with the selection of candidates from favourable 
social and familial backgrounds. Comments from several judges that took part in an 
exploratory stage of this research suggested that this practice was also visible in relation to 
lateral recruitment, where positions are often allocated to individuals that have connections 
within the judiciary. 
513 Individuals with a doctorate in law are exempt from the general entrance examinations. 
Article 68 of Decree Law No.150/83 (Lebanon)   
514  Art. 59 Ibid. 
515  Art. 60 Ibid. 
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members of the Lebanese Bar.516 One Lebanese Appeal Court judge, who had 
been a practicing lawyer before being recruited this way, described his 
selection process as a “tough examination”.517  
 
In practice in Lebanon, the selection of judges is also dependent on the 
religious denomination of the candidate.518 If a certain religion or sect is under-
represented in the judiciary, a candidate’s religion will be considered in the 
selection process.  This reflects the sensitive nature of power sharing between 
the Muslim, Druze and Christian communities.519 
Jordan: interweaved bureaucratic and professional judiciary 
Unlike the Egyptian and Lebanese judicial recruitment process, it appears that 
there is an equal opportunity for both inexperienced law graduates and 
experienced legal professionals to enter the Jordanian judiciary. Judges in 
Jordan are officially appointed by a royal decree, but the appointment process 
is overseen and managed by the Judicial Council.520 For those that are 
recruited without any legal practice experience (bureaucratic model), 
applicants are required to have obtained at least a bachelor’s degree in law.521  
An application form is submitted where the candidate is required to list three 
references. If successful, applicants are invited to take an entry examination. 
Those that are recruitment from practice (professional model) must be 
                                               
516  It is a practice occasionally exercised by the Judicial Council to fill vacant judicial positions 
due to retirement or resignation. 
517  Comment from Judge 2077935 (Arab Judges Survey) 
518  “The Lebanese High Judicial Council in Light of International Standards” (2017) Briefing 
paper <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Lebanon-Memo-re-HJC-Advocacy-
Analysis-Brief-2017-ENG.pdf> accessed 2 August 2018. See also Antoine Nasri Messara, 
“Rapport national  du  Conseil Constitutionnel du Liban” (2017). 
519  Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution (1926) states that “the principle of confessional 
representation in public service jobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, 
and in public and mixed agencies shall be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of 
national reconciliation”. This has, however, not yet been achieved: see International 
Commission of Jurists, “The Lebanese High Judicial Council in Light of International 
Standards” (2017) Briefing paper 
520  Art 14 of Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan)  
521  Art 10 Ibid.
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practicing lawyers with at least four years’ experience, and these applicants 
are exempt from taking an entry examination. 522  
Saudi Arabia: largely professional judiciary 
In Saudi Arabia both inexperienced law graduates and experienced legal 
professionals may be selected for the bench. One of the main prerequisites to 
become a judge in Saudi Arabia is the level of education obtained from one of 
the Sharī’ʿa colleges in the Kingdom. Candidates must demonstrate adequate 
knowledge and understanding of Islamic jurisprudence. Candidates are also 
required to have a good comprehension of socio-cultural issues.523 Lateral 
recruitment exists, and usually depends on the candidate’s previous 
experience in teaching Islamic jurisprudence and the level of education 
obtained.524  
 
Although the Saudi judiciary system does not specify gender in the 
requirements to be appointed judge in practice, judicial posts in Saudi Arabia 
are almost exclusively held by men. The increasing societal and political 
changes in the Kingdom and recent reports suggest that this might change in 
future. In 2016, Shaimaa Sadeq Al-Jibran was the first female appointed as a 
commercial judge.525 Her appointment was based on the recommendation of 
and request from a prominent legal advisor. Despite opposition to her 
appointment from senior figures in the judiciary because of her gender, her 
appointment was upheld by the Administrative Appeals Court.526 There are 
further indications of Saudi women joining the judiciary in the near future wiith 
the recent Shura Council issuing a statement in this regard.527 
                                               
522  Ibid. 
523  Art. 33 of Royal Decree No. M / 78, date 19/9/1428 “Law of the Judiciary” (Saudi Arabia)  
524  Art. 35 Ibid. 
525  “First Female Commercial Judge Appointed” Arab News (Dammam, 2 August 2016) 
<http://www.arabnews.com/node/963446/saudi-arabia> accessed 8 November 2018. 
526  “Saudi Appoints First Female Commercial Judge” Gulf Business (2 August 2016) 
<http://gulfbusiness.com/saudi-appoints-first-female-commercial-judge/> accessed 2 August 
2018. 
527 Recently, the Shura Council issued a recommendation “to empower competent Saudi 
women who are legally and religiously qualified to hold judging positions”. According to Habib, 
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Judicial training in in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia  
Acceptance of an individual’s application to become a judge is not always 
unconditional, and may not guarantee direct entry into the judiciary. As 
indicated in Table 10 above, judicial appointees in Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia all undergo a probationary period after appointment. In addition, in all 
four countries, judicial education or training for new recruits is mandatory. The 
mode and methods of judicial training differ across the jurisdictions and span 
the spectrum from relatively short induction training (Saudi Arabia) to in-depth 
training programmes that last many years (Lebanon and Jordan). Table 11 
below sets out the basic judicial training requirements in each of the 4 different 
Arab judiciaries.   
 
Table 12. Judicial Training in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
 Institution Duration of 
formal training 
course 
Compulsory 
for new 
recruits 
On the job 
training 
Egypt 
Cairo’s national 
centre for Judicial 
Studies 
1-year course 
(officially) 
 
Yes Yes 
Jordan 
 
Judicial Institute in 
Jordan 
3 years 
 Yes No 
Lebanon Lebanese institute for Judicial Studies 3 years Yes No 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Judicial Academy, 
the Institute of 
Public 
Administration 
8 weeks 
 Yes Yes 
 
                                               
the recommendation was issued by members within the Islamic Affairs and Judicial Committee 
and called upon the justice ministry to help with the appointment of women as judges stating 
that there were competent Saudi women to perform the judicial function especially in light of 
the general shortage of judges in the Kingdom. According to the members “Not appointing 
women in the judiciary is incompatible with the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 which calls for 
empowering women and investing in their potential and aptitudes”. Habib writes that the 
recommendation also cited scholarly references that argue that there are no religious texts 
that bars women from becoming judges. Reference were made to other Arab and Islamic 
countries that had appointed women as judges such as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan 
“since the 1960s while Jordan appointed its first woman judge in 1996, Egypt in 2003 and 
Bahrain in 2006”. See Habib, T. “Saudi Arabia could soon appoint women as judges- Shura 
members argue no “male requirement” for appointment” Gulf News (6 August, 2018) 
<https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-could-soon-appoint-women-as-
judges-1.2262252> [Accessed 7 September 2018] 
 156  
Similar to most European civil law and Anglo-American common law countries, 
almost every entry-level judge is required to complete some form of training.528 
This was corroborated by data derived from the Arab Judges Survey where, 
62 of 72 judges from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon indicated that they had 
received judicial training when first appointed to the judiciary. However, the 
mode and manner is more variable among the four countries. For Jordan and 
Lebanon, new recruits undergo an initial period of probationary training at the 
Judicial institute. By contrast, in Saudi Arabia and Egypt judicial training 
appears to be carried out on the job and is generally supervised by senior 
judges.  
Institutional socialisation in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia 
For the four Arab jurisdictions, judicial socialisation takes place within and is 
controlled by members of the judiciary. However, the members in charge differ. 
For Jordan and Lebanon, socialisation is primarily under the auspices of the 
judicial institutes. For Saudi Arabia and Egypt, socialisation is through senior 
judges, which constitutes a less institutionalised relationship.  
 
In Lebanon, successful candidates undergo a salaried three-year traineeship 
at the Lebanese Judicial Institute which is regulated by the Lebanese Judicial 
Council. Training includes attending hearings, examining case files and 
preparing draft decisions that are evaluated by the presiding judge of the court 
where the candidate is trained. Subject to completion of the training course, 
the board of the Judicial Institute nominates successful candidates to the 
Judicial Council.  
 
Similar training occurs in Jordan, where successful candidates undergo a non-
academic qualification program for three years at the Judicial institute of 
Jordan. Established in 1988, the Judicial Institute forms part of the Judicial 
Council and is the only body responsible for training new recruits in Jordan.529 
                                               
528 See “CA Thomas, Review of Judicial Education and Training in Other Jurisdictions Judicial 
Studies Board of England and Wales (May 2006). 
529 The Jordanian Judicial Institute also trains new judicial recruits from abroad, predominantly 
judges from the Palestinian Territories. See the Institute’s website:  <http://www.jij.gov.jo/> 
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Upon completion, candidates are awarded a diploma that qualifies them for 
the judicial office.530 
 
In Saudi Arabia, where there are no public competitions for judicial posts and 
initial selection is by application, successful applicants to the ordinary and 
administrative courts undergo a training course provided by the Judicial 
Academy.531 Although mandatory, training is brief and appears to run between 
one or two months. Upon completion, recruits become assistant judges and 
work under an initial probation period before they receive a permanent position 
within the judiciary. The probation period is officially for two years, during which 
time assistant judges shadow senior judges in their work. In the Arab Judges 
Survey, one Saudi judge described his judicial training as a “three-year on-the-
job training”.532 According to Al-Najjar, their work is under strict and regular 
supervision by higher-ranking judges and includes the review and approval of 
judgments by senior judges.533 During the probation period, if assistant judges 
are considered unfit for the role, they are dismissed for lack of competence.534  
 
In Egypt, judicial training is offered by the National Centre for Judicial Studies 
where prosecutors and judges are trained together. While the official training 
period is for one year, in practice this can be from a few weeks to a few 
months.535 The variability in judicial training in Egypt was corroborated by a 
number of Egyptian judges that participated in the Arab Judges Survey. One 
explained that he underwent three months’ training at the Judicial institute 
                                               
530 Admission to the Judicial Institute Diploma program is not limited to Jordanian students, 
with a proportion of places provided for students of Arab and Islamic countries. Arts 61 and 64 
Decree Law No.150/83, (Jordan)  
531 Established by the Royal Decree No. 4 of 3/12/1385 AH (Jordan) 
532 Comment from Judge 2013369 (Arab Judges Survey) 
533 Nathalie Najjar, Arbitration and International Trade in the Arab Countries (Brill Nijhoff 2018).  
534 Arts 44 and 69 Royal Decree No. M / 78, date 19/9/1428 “Law of the Judiciary” (Saudi 
Arabia). See also Usa Int’L Business Publications, Saudi Arabia Criminal Laws, Regulations 
and Procedures Handbook: Strategic Information: Regulations, Procedures. (Intl Business 
Pubns Usa 2015). 
535 David Risley, “Egypt’s Judiciary: Obstructing or Assisting Reform?” (2016) p.10 
<https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Risley_Egyptjudiciary.pdf> accessed 1 
August 2018. 
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once appointed to the judiciary.536 But another Egyptian judge wrote that he 
underwent a “training course for just two weeks”.537 Furthermore, an 
administrative judge commented that he “had training twice as a criminal 
prosecutor and as a judge at the Egyptian Conseil D’état”.538  
 
Generally, individuals entering organisations will learn from within the 
organisation as they interact with one another, and apprehend the norms and 
the day-to-day contextual nuances.539 According to Biddle, older members will 
often be observed “showing the ropes” to, or frowning at, inappropriate judicial 
behaviour in the neophyte.540 All four countries subject new judicial recruits to 
some form of supervision and evaluation by senior judges. This may constitute 
an additional, albeit less institutionalised, selection process controlled by 
senior members of the judiciary. This is especially true for younger graduates 
with little experience. New judges will have to undergo repeated evaluations, 
which can provide a strong incentive to comply with the norms set by superior 
judges. This is notably true where career advancement is facilitated or 
conditioned by the approval of senior judges. This can be an additional form 
of social control which continues throughout the individual’s professional 
judicial career.541  
Judicial career patterns and socialisation post-appointment 
Once appointed, judges must rise through the ranks in order to obtain a 
position with greater authority and responsibility.542 Career advancement is 
generally considered competitive: judges are regularly monitored and 
                                               
536 Comment from Judge 2030119 (Arab Judges Survey) 
537 Comment from Judge 2078119 (Arab Judges Survey) 
538 Comment from Judge 1980070 (Arab Judges Survey) 
539 Jennifer H Waldeck and Karen K Myers, "Organizational Assimilation Theory, Research, 
and Implications for Multiple Areas of the Discipline: A State of the Art Review" (2007) 31 
Annals of the International Communication Association 322, p.323. 
540  Biddle BJ, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic Press 1979), 
p.318. 
541  Ibid. 
542  Ibid. p.316.  
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promotions are granted according to formal criteria which combine both 
seniority and merit.543  
 
In the strictly bureaucratic model, promotions are the most important way to 
reach the higher rungs in the career ladder. The longer the judge stays within 
the career hierarchy, turnover opportunities tend to become fewer. According 
to Mestitz and Pederzoli, the assumption is that any opportunity would require 
a basic reconversion of one's professional knowledge and abilities which tends 
to diminish over time.544 In other words, judges' careers appear to be 
exclusively regulated by the “mere passing of time”.545 By contrast, under the 
professional model, career advancement is less structured and promotions are 
usually less widespread.546 But while the professional model tends to have 
less formal provisions of advancement, higher-ranking judges may exert some 
influence over the promotion of lower-ranking judges.547  
Judicial career patterns in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia  
Career advancement in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia is, in 
principle, under the auspices of the Higher Judicial Councils. In all cases, 
however, promotion tends to reflect elements from both the bureaucratic and 
professional models. On the one hand, merit and seniority appears to be a 
condition for advancement, at least in principle.548 On the other hand, 
hierarchical superiors play a fundamentally important role for any judge that 
hopes to rise up the ranks.  
 
Relationship structures such as the newcomers’ relationships with supervisors 
and colleagues appears to be another important aspect of promotion. Of 
                                               
543  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p 66. 
544  Anna Mestitz and Patrizia Pederzoli "Training the Legal Professions in Italy, France and 
Germany"" in C Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. 
(NYU Press 1995) p.169. 
545  Ibid. 
546  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p 67. 
547  Ibid. 
548  Ibid. p 38. 
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particular relevance is the relationship with judicial supervisors and the 
existence of informal mentoring. But there are also those beyond the judicial 
branch that are empowered to supervise and evaluate the work and conduct 
of individual judges. In all four countries, promotion is closely linked with 
satisfactory evaluations often made by actors both within and outside the 
judiciary (Table 12).  
 
Table 13. Elements of judicial career advancement in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Institution 
officially in 
charge of career 
advancement 
Official criteria 
for career 
advancement 
Role of senior 
judges/presiding 
judges 
Role of 
Inspectorates 
 
Egypt Supreme Judicial Council 
Seniority and 
merit 
Presiding judge in 
court nominates 
judges for 
advancement 
Evaluations for 
low-ranking 
judges. 
 
Jordan 
 
Judicial Council, 
Ministry of Justice 
and Royal 
Decree 
 
Seniority and 
merit, once 
promoted 
probation for 3 
years (higher 
grades) 
Presiding judges in 
each court exercise 
administrative 
oversight over judges 
in their courts 
Judicial council 
and Inspectorate 
(part of Ministry of 
Justice) evaluate 
judges 
annually549  
 
Lebanon 
Higher Judicial 
Council and 
Minister of 
Justice 
 
Rank based with 
automatic 
advancement 
every 2 years 
 
 
Presiding judge in 
court will submit 
reports to Judicial 
Inspectorate for 
review 
Judicial 
Inspectorate, 
(part of the 
Ministry of 
Justice) reviews 
monthly reports 
submitted by 
presiding judges 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Supreme Judicial 
Council 
 
Seniority and 
merit (teaching 
experience) 
Reviews are made on 
a yearly basis, and 
relate to proficiency 
and competency 
made by presiding 
judges 
Promotions are 
subject to 
mandatory review 
by Judicial 
Disciplinary 
Committee (For 
first and appellate 
levels).550 
 
The focus here is on two elements that are likely to influence a judge’s 
aspirations for career advancement. The first element relates to how judges 
are supervised, which also includes the potential impact hierarchical superiors 
                                               
549  Except for assessment of first instance judges. 
550  According to Article 55 of the Law of the Judiciary “A department for judicial inspection 
shall be set up at the Supreme Judicial Council” Royal Decree No. (M/78) 19 Ramadan 1428H 
- 1 October 2007 (Saudi Arabia).  
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have on judicial promotions. The second element relates to the role played by 
inspectorates empowered to supervise and discipline judges. The following 
sections explore career patterns in each jurisdiction in light of these two 
elements. 
Career advancement for Egyptian Jordanian, Lebanese and Saudi 
judges  
In Egypt, career advancement for administrative and state judges is officially 
based on age and experience.551 To move up the career ladder, judges are 
required to have accrued specific work experience based on their level of 
court. Generally, when a vacancy arises, the presiding judge in a court will 
select a judge from a list drawn up by the court’s senior judges. The nominee 
is reviewed by the Judicial Council and, if the nomination is approved, the 
Council prepares a decree of appointment (which is signed by the President 
of the Republic).  
 
At the appellate levels, promotions in Egypt appear to be more political in 
nature, and there is a degree of executive interference. Under the recent 2017 
amendment to the Judicial Authority Law552, the President of the Republic can 
directly appoint chief justices to all the highest courts without approval or 
review from the Judicial Council or the Ministry of Justice. Prior to this 
amendment, the relevant law empowered the Judicial Council to choose their 
own judges and placed the onus of disputing their decision on the President.553  
While seniority and merit typically played a large part in the decisions under 
the old law, the new amendment does not provide the same clear guidance on 
appointments.554 The amendment has been described as an alien 
                                               
551 The same applies to Administrative judges: see Law no. 47 of 1972 as amended by law 
no.136 of 1984. (Egypt) 
552 Law No. 13 of 2017 amending Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” 
(Egypt) 
553 Brad Youngblood, “Tipping the Scales: Egypt’s New Judicial Authorities Law” (Tahrir 
Institute for Middle East Policy, 28 April 2017) <https://medium.com/tahrir-institute-for-middle-
east-policy/tipping-the-scales-egypts-new-judicial-authorities-law-1c45b21af181>. 
554 Sufian Obeidat, “Jordan’s 2016 Constitutional Amendments: A Return to Absolute 
Monarchy?” Constitutionnet (27 May 2016) <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/jordans-
2016-constitutional-amendments-return-absolute-monarchy> accessed 8 November 2018. 
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development within the Egyptian judiciary that will further foster partisanship 
and factions among high-ranked judges.555  
 
In Saudi Arabia, judges at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy will usually be 
required to satisfy additional requirements in order to be promoted. They need 
to have obtained training degrees from the Judicial Academy, teaching 
experience in Islamic law and work experience in court.556 Subject to 
satisfactory reports of judges, the Judicial Council usually follows the principle 
of absolute seniority. When two or more judges have served for equal periods 
of time, the decision is determined on the basis of the proficiency reports of 
each candidate. Promotions for lower courts and appellate levels are subject 
to mandatory review by the Judicial Disciplinary Committee, which forms part 
of the Saudi Judicial Council.557 Judges may not be promoted unless their work 
has been inspected at least twice.558 Reviews are made on a yearly basis, they 
relate to proficiency and competency and are made by both presiding judges 
and the Judicial Disciplinary Committee. Judges who receive a “below 
average” rating in three consecutive reports are placed on mandatory 
retirement. 
 
Similar to Egypt, promotions to the higher courts in Saudi Arabia appear to be 
more political in nature. The King directly appoints higher-ranking judges by 
virtue of his constitutional role in overseeing the implementation of Islamic law 
in the Kingdom.559 But in practice, the King’s promotion powers appear to be 
                                               
555 Yussef Auf, “The Escalating Battle over Appointing Judges in Egypt” The Daily Star 
(Lebanon) (20 January 2018) <https://www.pressreader.com/lebanon/the-daily-star-
lebanon/20180120/281702615130484> accessed 15 June 2018. 
556 Usa Int’L Business Publications, Saudi Arabia Criminal Laws, Regulations and Procedures 
Handbook: Strategic Information: Regulations, Procedures. (Intl Business Pubns Usa 2015). 
557 According to Article 55 of Law of the Judiciary Royal Decree No. (M/78) 19 Ramadan 1428H 
- 1 October 2007 (Saudi Arabia), a department for judicial inspection shall be set up at the 
Supreme Judicial Council.  
558 Usa Int’L Business Publications, Saudi Arabia Criminal Laws, Regulations and Procedures 
Handbook: Strategic Information: Regulations, Procedures. (Intl Business Pubns Usa 2015). 
559 Article 55 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance states that: “… the policy of the nation, a 
policy in accordance with the provisions of Islam; the King oversees the implementation of 
Islamic Sharī’ʿah, the system of government, the state’s general policies and the protection of 
the defense of the country”. 
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more pervasive and include lower courts. For example, in late 2017 and 
coinciding with an anti-corruption crackdown, the King issued a royal order that 
promoted twenty-six judges and appointed thirty others at different levels of 
the judiciary.560  
 
In Lebanon, career patterns are officially rank-based. Judges at the bottom of 
the judicial pyramid are automatically granted first rank after successful 
completion of their traineeship at the Judicial Institute. Subject to satisfactory 
reports, they will be automatically transferred to a higher rank every two years. 
No further distinction exists between judges regardless of their functions, 
specialisations or experience. Promotions are also based on the reports of the 
Judicial Inspectorate, which is part of the Ministry of Justice.561 The 
Inspectorate has a legal mandate to monitor the conduct of judges in 
administrative and ordinary courts.562 They review monthly reports submitted 
by each court. Based on these reports, the Inspectorate also advises the 
Ministry of Justice on the number of judges needed in the country. The Ministry 
uses the information to assign new judges and rotate existing judges.563 But 
appointments to senior judicial positions are, in practice, subjected to a 
religion-based power sharing agreement. As a matter of established practice, 
the top judicial positions are shared by religious denominations. For example, 
at present the First President of the Court of Cassation is a Maronite Christian, 
the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and President of the Judicial 
                                               
560 Dahlia Nehme, “Saudi King Appoints 30 Judges, Promotes 26 amid Anti-Graft Purge” 
Reuters (9 November 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-judges/saudi-king-
appoints-30-judges-promotes-26-amid-anti-graft-purge-idUSKBN1D91NX> accessed 10 July 
2018. 
561 Under Decree-Law No. 150/83, the Judicial Inspectorate works under the supervision of 
the Minister of Justice. The Judicial Inspectorate is composed of a president, four inspectors 
general and six inspectors, all appointed by Cabinet decree on the proposal of the Minister of 
Justice, and from among various judicial grades (depending on the position). 
562 Under Decree-Law No. 150/83 (Lebanon) 
563 Maria Dakolias et al., “Lebanon, Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment” (World Bank 
2005) Working Paper 32144 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/478751468056940276/pdf/321440LE0Legal010
judicial0.pdf> accessed 11 July 2017. 
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Inspectorate are Sunni Muslim, and the Director of the Institute of Judicial 
Studies is Shi’a Muslim.564  
 
In Jordan, the promotion of a judge to a higher rank is officially based on 
competence and qualification.565 Judges are promoted to higher levels based 
on credentials and excellence of service that are assessed by the Judicial 
Council and according to the reports of inspectors. For promotions in higher 
courts, judges are required to submit a self-authored legal paper which is 
reviewed by the Judicial Council. Once a judge is appointed to a higher rank 
for the first time, they are on probation for a period of three years.566 Following 
constitutional amendments in 2016, the King now has the sole power to 
appoint the Chief Justices and other members of the Jordanian Constitutional 
Court without any countersignature by the relevant government officials (which 
was the previous practice).567  
Judicial evaluation and discipline in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia  
Another aspect closely linked to career advancement is how judges are 
supervised and disciplined. The nature of judicial discipline can also hamper 
the political significance of judges. According to Shetreet, judicial disciplinary 
proceedings are important to explore because they relate to the extent to which 
individual judges are protected from undue pressures from within the judiciary 
(fellow judges and, above all, superiors) or externally.568 In the four Arab 
                                               
564 International Commission of Jurists, “The Lebanese High Judicial Council in Light of 
International Standards” (2017) Briefing paper <https://www.icj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Lebanon-Memo-re-HJC-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief-2017-ENG.pdf> 
accessed 2 August 2018. 
565 “Royal Decree Approves Promotion, Appointment of Judges” The Jordan Times (2 
January 2017) <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/royal-decree-approves-promotion-
appointment-judges> accessed 11 August 2018. 
566 Art. 20 of Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan)  
567 Sufian Obeidat, “Jordan’s 2016 Constitutional Amendments: A Return to Absolute 
Monarchy?” Constitutionnet (27 May 2016) <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/jordans-
2016-constitutional-amendments-return-absolute-monarchy> accessed 8 November 2018.  
568 Shimon Shetreet and International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace 
(eds), The Culture of Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 
637–638. 
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judiciaries analysed here, supervision and discipline is greatly dependent on 
evaluation of individual judges. Hierarchical superiors as well as actors 
external to the judiciary can play an important supervisory role. There are 
inspectorates in all four countries that are empowered to hear grievances 
against individual judges. According to the respective laws of each country, 
the evaluations take place periodically, and can be initiated on an impromptu 
basis. Table 13 below summarises how the evaluation and discipline of judges 
is conducted in the four Arab judiciaries, and it highlights the role of non-judicial 
actors in judicial evaluation, especially in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  
 
Table 14. Evaluation and discipline of judges in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi 
Arabia 
 Groups responsible 
for evaluation of 
judges 
Frequency of 
evaluation 
Groups responsible 
for  
judicial Discipline  
Egypt • Inspection Board 
(HJC)  
(only first tier court 
judges)  
• Ministry of Justice 
• Senior judges 
Impromptu 
Discipline of judges at 
all levels undertaken 
by a “Disciplinary 
Committee” composed 
of senior heads. 
 
Jordan 
 
• Senior judges,  
• Inspectorate (HJC)  
• Ministry of Justice  
Annually 
Disciplinary Council 
composed of at least 
three judges from 
Judicial Council    
Lebanon  
• Senior judges,  
• Inspectorate (HJC)  
• Minister of Justice  
Monthly reports 
Disciplinary Council by 
the Judicial 
Inspectorate is 
composed of presiding 
judge and two judges 
of the same court. 
Also, presidents of the 
Court of Cassation and 
Court of Appeal 
Saudi Arabia • Senior judges  
• Judicial 
Disciplinary 
Committee. (HJC) 
Annually Senior judges, Judicial Council  
 
In Egypt, both the Minister of Justice and the General Assembly are 
empowered to supervise judges and courts,569 and the heads of courts have 
the right to evaluate judges at their will. They are furthermore empowered to 
                                               
569 Art. 93 of Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt) 
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warn individual judges on their own accord.570 All three bodies can also refer 
an individual judge to the public prosecutor for disciplinary actions. The 
Inspection Board has the right to take undertake investigations in relation to 
first tier court judges,571 but judges at the appeal level and higher are exempt 
from investigations. Disciplinary actions can be brought against judges who 
fail to observe obligations associated with the judicial office, and the discipline 
of judges at all levels is undertaken by a committee composed of the most 
senior judges.572  
 
In Saudi Arabia, the president of each court is empowered to supervise and 
warn judges if they suspect that a judge has acted contrary to his judicial 
duties. The president of the court may also alert the Saudi Judicial Council to 
any concerns.573 Inspection of members of the judiciary is carried out annually. 
 
The Lebanese Judicial Council can dismiss any judge if it considers that the 
individual judge is no longer entitled to exercise his/her judicial functions. 
Provided that eight of the ten members of the Council agree, the Council can 
dismiss a judge without the need to consult or obtain approval of the Minister 
of Justice. In Lebanon, the Inspectorate is entitled to take actions on its own 
initiative, such as visiting courts and examining the work of judges.574 Judges 
can be brought before the Disciplinary Council for “any breach of professional 
duty, honour, dignity or courtesy”.575 
 
                                               
570 All three organs can refer to the public prosecutor for disciplinary actions see “Judicial 
Authority Law” (Egypt) 
571 Article 78 the Inspection Board appeals to only evaluate lower court judges 
572 Art. 98 of Law No. 46 of 1972, 5 Oct. 1972 “Judicial Authority Law” (Egypt) 
573 Article 58 states that: “Without prejudice to the impartiality and independence of the 
judiciary and the right of the Supreme Judicial Council to supervise courts, judges and their 
work, the chief judge of each court shall have the right to supervise the judges of his court and 
notify them of all acts violating their duties or requirements of their positions after hearing their 
statements” Art. 58 Royal Decree No.: M / 78, date 19/9/1428 Judicial Authority Law (Saudi 
Arabia)   
574 Elias Chalhoub, “State of the Judiciary in Lebanon” (The Arab Center for the Rule of Law 
2004) 30–31.  
575 According to the relevant law, breaches include unjustified absence, delay in the 
adjudication of pending cases, unjustified discrimination between the parties, and delay in 
delivering judgement. 
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In Jordan, inspection of members of the judiciary is carried out annually.576 The 
Jordanian Inspectorate issues recommendations and submits them to the 
Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation.577 Judges 
in Jordan may be disciplined for "any violation of duty and any act that relates 
to the dignity and honour of the position".578  
Promotion as a means of judicial socialisation 
Promotion illustrates a powerful tool of social control that is both centralised 
and decentralised in Arab judiciaries. Officially, promotion is under the 
auspices of the Judicial Councils. However, courts also exercise a degree of 
influence over their judicial colleagues. Similar to the bureaucratic model, 
salary, prestige and personal influence in the four Arab judiciaries depend on 
a judge’s position in the hierarchical ladder, which can only be improved by 
seniority and merit. However, the existence of evaluation reports of judicial 
conduct and work performance allows for an influence which is similar to the 
professional model. Promotion relies on these reports that are usually written 
by senior and presiding judges of the same court, which are in turn reviewed 
by the judicial inspectorates.  
 
The fusion between the two models will inevitably produce strains in how 
judges seek career advancement. It also demonstrates a difference of status 
between lower court judges and high court judges in relation to career 
advancement. Lower court judges are subject to several evaluations and 
written reports. This might compel ambitious persons to conform to the 
established social norms prevalent in the judiciary in order to climb the ranks. 
For higher court judges, career advancement is not automatic but is more 
                                               
576 See for example Jordanian Judicial Council, “The Strategy of Building” Annual Report for 
Judicial Strategy 2012–2014 <http://www.jc.jo/sites/default/files/ja-sp-low.pdf> accessed 3 
August 2018.  
577 Article 41 states “the judicial inspection staff is considered related to the Ministry and 
inspectors present their reports about judges to the Chairman and the Minister.” Law No. 15 
of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary Law” (Jordan)  
578 These include: delays in rendering judgments; failure to set a date for judgment; 
discrimination between the parties; breach of confidentiality; absence without excuse; and 
failure to abide by work hours Article 37 of Law No. 15 of 2001 “Independence of the Judiciary 
Law” (Jordan)  
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political in nature, which may incentivise ambitious judges to seek support from 
outside the judicial branch.  
 
As mentioned above, because promotions are according to official standards 
rooted in seniority and merit, proliferation of extra-judicial activities may be an 
issue. This is seen in Italy and France, where automatic promotion has 
encouraged the proliferation of part time and fulltime extra-judicial activities. 
According to Guarnieri, this has grown substantially because such activities do 
not prevent judges from being promoted or reassigned to their previous 
position.579 This appears to also occur in the Arab context, in particular for 
Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese judges. The nature of automatic 
promotions means that, provided the reports are satisfactory, judges may 
establish relations with other institutions and the broader social and economic 
environment. Since promotion within the judiciary is “almost always certain” 580, 
this may foster informal links between courts and politics. This in turn, can 
undermine the autonomy of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other branches of 
government and increase the political significance of courts. 
Summary 
The analysis in this chapter sets out the first process of socialisation for Arab 
judges in four judiciaries. The processes of judicial selection, training and 
career advancement for judges are all forms of social control exercised over 
individual judges. These mechanisms of control take on different forms and 
may involve those who can influence the status of individual judges, such as 
senior members of the judiciary and the executive. The processes further 
reveal that such social controls in Arab judiciaries are not strictly confined to 
either the Western bureaucratic or professional models. Both models fail 
somewhat to accurately represent the way judges are socialised (and 
controlled) in the four countries. Each Arab judicial system discussed here is 
                                               
579  Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p 58. 
580 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002), p 58 
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perhaps best described as somewhere in the middle of the bureaucratic-
profession continuum depending on the type of control explored. While none 
perfectly fits the Western-based models, the models provide the basis for 
understanding some important differences in institutional socialisation across 
these four countries in the Arab region. The next chapter explores a second 
source of socialisation for Arab judges: their educational and professional 
experiences prior to joining the judiciary.
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Chapter 7. Pre-appointment socialisation of Arab judges  
Professional socialisation and sources of individualisation 
The previous chapter explored socialisation through judicial institutions 
primarily through four types of processes: judicial selection; training; discipline 
and; career advancement. However, the judicial role in Arab countries cannot 
be accounted for by only considering institutional socialisation.581 The reason 
is that the concept of institutional socialisation conceives of the individual as a 
recipient rather than an initiator or co-participant. Institutional socialisation is 
premised on the notion that the individual’s socialisation is successful to the 
extent that role expectations or behaviours are induced.582 According to 
Waldeck and Myers, such traditional understandings of socialisation view new 
members as “blank slates”, “ready to be written upon by institutional 
procedures, norms, and existing culture” which effectively allows organisations 
to shape individual attitudes and behaviours”.583 But this fails to account for 
the active part individuals can play in innovating and creating roles for 
themselves within the organisation.584 For instance, judges may use values 
and knowledge acquired from their experiences before entering the judiciary 
to individualise, influence or negotiate their roles throughout their judicial 
careers.585 This in turn may shed some light into whether judicialisation of 
politics is a product of the judge’s individual experiences as opposed to the 
structural set up of the legal system the judge operates within (Chapter 5); 
and/or because of institutional socialisation (Chapter 6). 
 
                                               
581 Jennifer H Waldeck and Karen K Myers, "Organizational Assimilation Theory, Research, 
and Implications for Multiple Areas of the Discipline: A State of the Art Review" (2007) 31 
Annals of the International Communication Association 322, p.324. 
582  Biddle BJ, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic Press 1979), 
p.283. 
583  Jennifer H Waldeck and Karen K Myers, “Organizational Assimilation Theory, Research, 
and Implications for Multiple Areas of the Discipline: A State of the Art Review” (2007) 31 
Annals of the International Communication Association 322, p.329 
584  Ibid. p.324. 
585  Ibid. p.329. 
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This chapter looks at the socialisation of Arab judges based on pre-
appointment attributes of individual judges, in particular, their education and 
professional experience before entering the judiciary. The chapter also offers 
some preliminary analysis of judges’ personalities that relate to the processes 
through which attitudes, values and role conceptions are acquired through the 
lens of self-esteem and the degree to which judges consider belonging to the 
judiciary is important.586 The chapter uses primary data derived from analysing 
112 Arab judges’ professional profiles obtained from LinkedIN as well as data 
from the Arab Judges Survey conducted for this thesis. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, this empirical research is not meant to provide a representative 
sample of Arab judges in all Middle East countries. Instead it provides an initial 
insight into the background of some Arab judges in the absence of any other 
source of direct information about judges in the region. This in turn provides a 
basis for exploring judicial role perceptions of judges in the four countries in 
subsequent chapters. 
Pre-appointment socialisation 
Legal education  
For many judges, entry into the judiciary is the last step on a path that usually 
begins as a law student and progresses through different legal professional 
environments. As a result, the acquisition of experiences and norms may have 
occurred in the “pre-bench” period.587 One of the major types of socialisation 
outside of the judiciary is law school. Similar to civil-law countries, one of the 
distinctive features of higher education in Arab states is the weight given to 
                                               
586  James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p.26 
587  Atkins identifies four major stages of socialisation for judges. The first relates to 
professional socialisation, the period where individuals learn the basic legal norms and values. 
The second stage involves initiation as well as the stages of adjustment to the specific 
demands of the new role. The third stage is defined as “establishment”, which Atkins describes 
as a period of “settling into the judicial institution including the important decision of whether 
to make a career out of being a judge”. The fourth and final stage relates to commitment, the 
point at which the decision to remain a judge is made. These stages should be treated as 
amorphous and by no means static. Yet they help in exploring the nature of individuals that 
enter into the judicial office. Alpert, Lenore, Burton M. Atkins and Robert C. Ziller, “Becoming 
a Judge: The Transition from Advocate to Arbiter” (1979) 62 Judicature 325, p.325. 
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purely theoretical learning with little emphasis on experiential learning. This is 
notably true for legal degrees where practical legal training is limited in 
scope.588  
 
Moreover, relatively recent trends in the region opens up questions about the 
type of law degrees obtained. Legal education abroad is becoming 
increasingly common among young Arab students. With perceptions of the 
benefits of international degrees in law, there has been a marked increase in 
individuals that complete at least part of their university education abroad. In 
addition to self-funded students from the region, the trend has been fuelled by 
government sponsorship schemes, primarily from the richer Gulf countries.589 
With Arab law students increasingly being educated in other legal systems 
(and in foreign languages), questions arise as to what types of legal knowledge 
are being imported back into the judiciary once law students enter the judicial 
profession. This complexity is further enhanced with post-graduate law 
degrees that are more research oriented and require advanced skills in 
analysis, critical evaluation and the student’s ability to solve complex legal 
problems and concepts. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the four Arab countries analysed here require 
judicial applicants to have obtained at least an undergraduate degree in law in 
order to be considered for a judicial post. Table 14  below, presents the results 
of an analysis of 112 Arab judges’ educational profiles obtained through an 
analysis of their LinkedIN profiles.  
 
 
                                               
588 Anna Mestitz and Patrizia Pederzoli "Training the Legal Professions in Italy, France and 
Germany"" in C Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. 
(NYU Press 1995)in C Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial 
Power. (NYU Press 1995) p.163 
589 Laura Bridgestock, “Middle Eastern Students Abroad: In Numbers” QS Top Universities (10 
April 2015) <https://www.topuniversities.com/blog/middle-eastern-students-abroad-numbers> 
accessed 31 August 2018. 
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Table 15. Region where Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese judges obtained their 
law degrees (n=112, LinkedIN) 
 Home university 
Other university in 
the Arab region 
University outside 
the Arab region 
Egypt 25 0 37 
Jordan 1 14 7 
Lebanon 12 0 16 
 
The clearest difference overall in terms of where law degrees were obtained is 
between judges from Jordan compared with judges from Egypt and Lebanon. 
Egyptian and Lebanese judges in the sample had law degrees only from their 
own jurisdiction (37) and jurisdictions outside the Arab region 52).  In contrast, 
most Jordanian judges in the sample (14 of 22) had law degrees from a 
university outside their jurisdiction but in the Arab region. 
 
Figure 10 breaks this sample down further by the specific jurisdiction where 
the law degree was obtained. Amongst the 112 judges in the sample that 
obtained a law degree outside their home jurisdiction, law degrees from 
American universities (24) and French universities (18) were the most 
prevalent, followed by degrees from other Arabic-speaking countries (14) and 
the UK (13).  
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Figure 10. Where judges in 3 Arab countries obtained law degrees (LinkedIN, 
n=112) 
 
 
Types of law degrees 
The majority of Arab judicial profiles analysed indicated a postgraduate degree 
obtained before becoming a judge. Figure 11 below, shows that of the 112 
Arab judges examined on LinkedIN, almost two-thirds (63%) had obtained an 
LLM (post-graduate law degree), 29% had PhDs and only 8% had an LLB as 
their highest law degree. However, given the source of the information 
(LinkedIN), this could reflect a higher education status amongst Arab judges 
choosing to be on LinkedIN.590  
 
                                               
590 In addition, a more international outlook among judges could also be a reason why so many 
judges had obtained a post-graduate degree. As discussed in Chapter 4, this further reduces 
the representativeness of this sample. 
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Figure 11. Highest legal degree obtained by Egyptian, Lebanese and Jordanian 
Judges (LinkedIN, n=112) 
 
 
Looking at the LinkedIN sample by country, most Egyptian judges (53 out 
of 62) had at least one post-graduate degree, 11 of whom had received 
doctoral degree in law. In Lebanon, almost half of the sample (13) had 
obtained a post-graduate degree before they became trainee judges; the 
other half (15) obtained it during the course of their judicial post. In Jordan, 
4 had a doctoral degree, all of which are judges of the Constitutional Court, 
and these PhDs were all obtained from universities in Egypt.  
 
The fact that a large proportion of the judges in the sample obtained a 
foreign post-graduate degree may indicate that many of the judges in the 
sample come from favourable economic background and/or had 
government support in pursuing costly studies abroad. In addition, legal 
education is usually specific to the country/region where it is obtained, and 
the high proportion of Egyptian, Lebanese and Jordanian judges that 
obtained law degrees outside of their own jurisdiction introduces another 
possible channel of influence on the judiciary. This is of particular relevance 
for individuals who obtain their law degrees in American and British 
universities, where legal education is based on common law doctrines such 
LLB
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as stare decisis. Such post-graduate experiences may have an influence 
over how judges perceive their role.  
Career experiences  
Judges may also bring in external values to the judiciary as a result of their 
professional experiences prior to joining the judiciary. This will usually be in 
legal practice as advocates, but it could also be experience in other areas of 
law such as academia or in government service.591 According to Gibson, 
career experiences have a significant impact on the substantive values of 
judges which they will use once they enter the judiciary.592 In addition, a prior 
legal career may weaken the capacity for internal control by the judiciary, as 
individuals are likely to maintain ties with their former profession. This may 
suggest that judges are more likely to bring values into the judiciary from other 
environments and, according to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, can become “an 
important point of reference for the judiciary as a whole”.593 Therefore, the 
relationship between the judiciary and other legal professions, including 
possible channels that foster professional mobility between judges and other 
professions need to be considered.594  
 
Figure 12 below shows the prior professional experience of the 112 Arab 
judges in the LinkedIN sample. Judges who were prosecutors make up the 
single largest group (34) amongst the sample of judges, followed by private 
lawyers (30) and academics (23). There were also a number of judges in the 
sample who had served in a government (18) or international regional advisory 
role (17) before joining the judiciary. 
                                               
591 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) 
592 James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7, p.21 
593 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002),p. 20 
594 Ibid. 
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Figure 12. Lebanese, Jordanian and Egyptian judges’ professional experience prior 
to joining the judiciary (LinkedIn, n=112)595 
 
 
Amongst the 62 judges from Egypt in the LinkedIN sample, prosecutorial 
experience was the most commonly held profession prior to becoming a judge 
(29). The prosecutorial experience ranged from a few months to nine years. A 
number of the Egyptian judges (11) had experience in private legal practice 
before joining the bench, primarily in corporate and banking. A few judges (8) 
had worked as public legal advisors for government branches, and a few (5) 
judges indicated they had worked with government branches such as the 
Egyptian Ministry of Interior, Education and Tourism. Two indicated that they 
had previously been police officers before entry to the judiciary.  
 
Amongst the 28 number of judges from Lebanon in the LinkedIN sample, 
almost half (11) had academic teaching experience before becoming a judge, 
and a quarter (7) said they have continued to teach at universities and judicial 
institutes on a part-time basis since joining the judiciary. Similar to Egypt, prior 
experience for judges in Lebanon also included work with other branches of 
                                               
595 Some of the 112 judges profiled had several different professional roles before joining the 
judiciary, which is why the total number of judges with professional experience (144) is greater 
than the sample size (112). 
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government, such as Parliament, Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Religious 
Affairs.  
 
In Jordan, amongst the 22 judges in the LinkedIN sample, professional 
experience was mostly related to private law and legal academia. For instance, 
of the two-thirds of judges (15) who currently sit on the Constitutional Court, 
five had previously held ministerial positions and the other half were 
academics and private lawyers.  
 
Several Lebanese, Jordanian and Egyptian judges listed work experience with 
their home Ministry of Justice prior to joining the bench. This work ranged from 
research assistance to legal advice.596  
 
Information about judges’ professional experience before joining the judiciary 
was also explored in the online Arab Judges Survey, where judges were asked 
to indicate what their previous professional experiences encompassed. 
Judges were asked to select from a list of four options (private lawyer, public 
lawyer, legal academic, appointed directly from law school), but they were also 
given the opportunity to write in any other profession. Figure 13 below shows 
the results of the online survey of Arab judges, which includes responses from 
78 judges that were predominantly from Egypt (24); Saudi Arabia (22); and 
Lebanon (20). Other countries were Tunisia (6), Jordan (3), Palestinian 
Territories (2) and Syria (1). The majority of judges who answered this survey 
question (50 out of 78) had some professional experience before joining the 
judiciary.  
 
                                               
596 One Lebanese judge had previously been a member at the legislative and consultative 
body of the Ministry of Justice. He described his work as primarily “advisory in nature” to the 
ministers.  
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Figure 13. Arab Judges’ prior experience before becoming a judge (Arab Judges 
Survey; n=78) 597 
 
 
The most prevalent pre-appointment experience was as a private lawyer (22 
of 50 judges), but a substantial number also chose the “Other” category.  
Experiences here included work in the executive branch. For instance, one 
Lebanese judge wrote that he held a senior position at the Sharī’ʿa Council. 
Two Egyptian judges wrote that they were police officers, one of which 
explained how he had become a judge after serving as a police officer: “In 
Egypt, police officers get a law degree and they can apply to join the judiciary 
(prosecutors first then judges at a later stage)”.598  
 
The survey was particularly helpful in understanding the professional 
background of judges from Saudi Arabia because there were no profiles from 
Saudi Arabian judges on LinkedIN. Of the 25 judges from Saudi Arabia that 
completed the online Arab Judges Survey, the overwhelming majority (22) 
were directly appointed to the judiciary following law school. Only two Saudi 
judges indicated that they had previously worked as private lawyers, and one 
judge indicated that he had been a legal advisor before entring the judiciary.  
                                               
597 In the Survey, 4 judges indicated that they had two prior experiences before joining the 
judiciary, which is why the total number of professional experience (85) is greater than the 
sample size (78). 
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Prior education and legal practice 
According to Heumann, law school and prior civil court experiences do not 
provide "a realistic perspective on the operations of the criminal court."599 He 
concludes that most newcomers to the bench are "not well prepared for their 
jobs in the court."600 To explore whether prior education and legal practice was 
sufficient preparation for Arab judges in their work in court, the survey asked 
judges to indicate the extent to which they felt their previous professional 
background prepared them for their judicial role.601 Figure 14 below presents 
responses from the 61 Arab judges who answered this question on the survey. 
 
Figure 14. Arab judges’ view of how well prior work prepared them for their judicial 
role (Survey n=61) 
 
 
More than half of the judges (35 or 58%) said that their previous work 
experience had prepared them to some extent. A third (21 or 33%) thought 
that it had “fully” prepared them, while only 6 (9%) judges did not consider that 
their prior experiences had prepared them at all. One Egyptian judge 
commented that his prior experience had given him “great exposure to the 
                                               
599 Milton Heumann, Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges and Defence 
Attorneys (University of Chicago Press 2006), p.153 
600 Ibid. 
601 Participants were asked to indicate on a 3-point scale of “fully”, “somewhat” or “not at all”. 
Fully
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legal practice from the perspective of a lawyer”.602 Another Egyptian judge 
wrote that beginning his judicial career as a public prosecutor “was significant 
to prepare me for the duties of a judge”.603  
Lateral professional mobility  
Another important feature in terms of individualisation for judges is lateral 
mobility - the professional mobility a judge may have throughout his/her career 
as a judge and the networks he/she establishes as a result of simultaneously 
holding jobs inside and outside the judiciary. Based on the information 
generated from LinkedIN, continued lateral professional mobility was found in 
48 out of the 112 Arab judges profiled, especially among senior judges (see 
Figure 15)
                                               
602 Comment from Judge: 2077920 (Arab Judges Survey) 
603 Comment from Judge: 2081484 (Arab Judges Survey) 
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Figure 15. Lateral professional mobility in Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt judiciaries (n=48, LinkedIN) 
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The greatest lateral professional mobility was found amongst Egyptian judges, 
with 25 of 62 holding another job addition to their judicial post. The most 
common jobs were in academia, government branches and ADR. One 
Egyptian judge presiding over a first instance court continued to work for the 
Ministry of Justice. He described his job as helping to "create fields of 
cooperation and signing protocols with international institutions and 
organisations”.604 Six of the 28 judges from Lebanon worked for various 
governmental branches and three were private lawyers. In addition, 7 judges 
were continuing to teach at universities and at the Lebanese Judicial Institute. 
One senior judge at the Lebanese State Council listed two additional jobs 
beyond being a judge: government advisor and professor at a Beirut university. 
There was some mobility within judiciaries in the region, with four judges (2 
from Egypt, 2 from Jordan) seconded to other Arab countries (mostly in the 
Gulf region). 
Individual judges’ personalities 
Another factor which forms part of the judicial role relates to how individuals 
internalise the expectations associated with the judicial role. While 
socialisation is easy to operationalise, exploring such covert expectations is 
next to impossible for a researcher. It would involve an exploration of the “real” 
self of the individual judge that may be different from those sets of identities or 
expectations the individual judge consciously or subconsciously chooses to 
reveal. However, some judicial behaviourists have argued that there may be 
certain elements that might provide some insight into how individual judges 
internalise the judicial role and how it may manifest itself in their performance 
and interactions within the judiciary and in the broader political system.605 For 
                                               
604 Judge EG50 (LinkedIN) 
605 See for example Burton Atkins, Lenore Alpert and Robert Ziller, “Personality theory and 
judging: a proposed theory of self-esteem and judicial policy-making” (1980) 2 Law & Policy 
189; Alpert, Lenore, Burton M. Atkins and Robert C. Ziller, “Becoming a Judge: The Transition 
from Advocate to Arbiter” (1979) 62 Judicature 325; James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to 
Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political 
Behavior 7; James L Gibson, “Judges’ Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An 
Interactive Model” (1978) 72 American Political Science Review 911. 
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instance, the impact of personality on behaviour may influence several aspects 
of judging and the perceived role of a judge. Atkins et al. argue that the 
influence of personality is mediated by a number of other individual situational 
and contextual variables:  
“[T]he conceptual utility of personality theory in a political context, 
as in all other personal interactions, lies in the extent to which it 
provides partial explanations of how an individual’s 
psychological characteristics facilitate or impede interactions 
with those persons who form the subsystems of politics within 
which he or she operates.”606 
 
Judges' personality attributes determine the manner in how judges deal with 
expectations and obligations that are associated with the judicial role.607 
According to Gibson, one important dimension of judicial personality is self-
esteem.608 For instance, willingness to make innovative decisions (“risky 
shifts”) and to dissent may be a function not only of the institutional context of 
decision-making, but also of the self-esteem of the judges.609 For Gibson, 
substantive values and role orientations may be, in part, a function of self-
esteem where “activist” judges are more likely to have a higher self-esteem 
than judges that practice judicial restraint.610  
 
In order to explore Arab judges’ personalities and capacities, judges were 
asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with two questions in the 
Arab Judges Survey:  
• "As a judge, I feel I provide an important service to society."  
 
• "Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-image."  
 
Both statements were intended to assess the degree to which individual judges 
distinguished between themselves and the judicial role they occupied in line 
                                               
606 Burton Atkins, Lenore Alpert and Robert Ziller, “Personality Theory and Judging: A 
Proposed Theory of Self-Esteem and Judicial Policy-Making” (1980) 2 Law & Policy 189., 
p.190 
607 James L Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7., p.22 
608 Ibid. p.26 
609 Ibid. p27 
610 Ibid. p.26 
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with Gibson’s argument that self-esteem may indicate judicial activism. The 
statements relate to self-esteem in the sense that they asked individual judges 
to evaluate their personal contribution in relation to the judicial role.  
 
The answer options were on a 5 point Likert scale from “Strongly Agree” to 
“Strongly Disagree”. In total, 65 Arab judges responded to both statements, 
and they came from Saudi Arabia (21 judges), Egypt (20 judges), Lebanon (14 
judges), Tunisia, Syria and Jordan (10 judges). Figure 16 below presents 
judges’ responses to whether they agreed that as judges, they felt that they 
provided an important service to society. 
 
Figure 16. Extent to which Arab judges feel they provide an important service to 
society (Arab Judges Survey, n=65) 
 
 
Out of 65 responses, nearly all judges agreed with the statement, with 47 
judges indicated that they “strongly agreed” and 17 judges “agreed”. Only 1 
Egyptian judge indicated that he “neither agreed nor disagreed”.  
 
Judges’ responses were more varied in relation to the second statement 
(“Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-image") which is 
illustrated in Figure 17 below. 
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Figure 17. Responses to "Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-
image" (Arab Judges Survey; n=65) 
 
 
Of the 65 responses to this statement, more than half (42 judges) agreed, with 
18 judges indicating that they strongly agreed with the statement. Eight judges 
disagreed with the statement, 3 of whom strongly disagreed. Just under a 
quarter (15 judges) neither agreed nor disagreed.611 A few judges offered to 
explain their choice. For instance, one Egyptian judge wrote that belonging to 
the judiciary was not important: “It is not very important for my self-image in 
my case as my status in the Arab legal sphere depends mainly on my 
publications in the UK, Germany and the MENA region.”612 Another Egyptian 
judge commented that “One makes his own image, by his manners, 
intelligence, and then his profession”.613 One Tunisian judge, who also 
                                               
611 Most judges in Saudi Arabia (14 of 21), Egypt (13 of 20) and Lebanon (8 of 14) agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement. Three judges from Saudi Arabia and three from Egypt 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. 
612 Comment from Judge 1980070 (Arab Judges Survey) 
613 Comment from Judge 2078058 (Arab Judges Survey) 
Strongly agree
28%
Agree
37%
Neither agree 
nor disagree
23%
Disagree
8%
Strongly 
disagree
4%
"Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-
image"
 187  
disagreed with the statement, commented that self-esteem is not only relevant 
to the function of the judiciary, “but about any job that will benefit the people”.614 
Summary 
Becoming a member of the judiciary involves at least two processes of 
socialisation. The first process relates to how the individual judge acquires the 
knowledge, skills and sense of occupational identity that are characteristic of 
a member of that profession. The second process of judicial socialisation 
(individualisation) focuses on the the extent to which the individual judge 
contributes to the judiciary, as opposed to someone who passively accepts 
existing norms that the judicial institution provides or imposes.615 
Individualisation involves a process where the individual is active in the 
definition of his/her judicial role within the judicial system.616 Through this 
process another important element needs to be considered: the individual's 
own behaviour and self-conception. Taken together with chapter 6, both 
processes of socialisation demonstrate how several factors, mechanisms and 
processes, are intertwined and may help to shape how Arab judges perceive 
their judicial roles: 
“When a man [or a woman] becomes a judge he does not forget all that 
he has done or learned or been exposed to in the past. Judges used to 
be law student and many used to practice law. they have been trained 
in the values and expectations which their profession espouses”.617 
 
The information generated from Egyptian, Lebanese and Jordanian judges’ 
LinkedIN profiles and the online Arab Judges Survey reveals a diverse set of 
background attributes for Arab judges based on education, as well as their 
prior and simultaneous professional experiences that are external to the 
judiciary. Some of these background attributes and experiences may help to 
                                               
614 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey) 
615 Porter et al uses the term “individualisation” to describe socialisation experiences in which 
the individual is active in contributing towards the organisation. See Lyman W Porter, Edward 
E Lawler and J Richard Hackman, Behavior in Organizations (McGraw-Hill 1974).  
616 Jennifer H Waldeck and Karen K Myers, “Organizational Assimilation Theory, Research, 
and Implications for Multiple Areas of the Discipline: A State of the Art Review” (2007) 31 
Annals of the International Communication Association 322, p. 324. 
617 Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state 
judges Ph.D. Tulane University, p.32 
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shape the judicial role beyond institutional controls. What this suggest is that 
despite these controls, judges are diverse individuals contrary to the idealised 
picture of mechanical appliers of the law as espoused by the institutions. The 
next chapter presents the findings of the empirical study of judicial role 
conceptions in the Arab Middle East, and it explores how these compare with 
prior studies of judicial role conceptions in the common and civil law worlds. 
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Chapter 8. Judicial role conceptions  
This chapter explores how Arab judges perceive their role based on findings 
from the online Arab Judges Survey conducted for this research. The main aim 
of the research presented in this chapter is to gain preliminary insight of Arab 
judges’ normative expectations about how a given judicial office should be 
performed”.618 As discussed in Chapter 2, previous studies of judicial role 
conceptions have been motivated by a desire to correlate judicial role 
orientations to specific types of judicial decision-making. The Arab Judges 
Survey is the first study of judicial role conceptions in the Arab region. As such 
the findings are of intrinsic value in themselves, but this chapter also places 
the findings within the context of earlier studies of judicial role conceptions and 
approaches to judicial decision-making outside the Arab region. The first part 
of this chapter presents the results of the Arab Judges Survey. The survey 
included a number of the same questions about judicial roles that have been 
asked in earlier studies with European and American judges. The second part 
of this chapter compares the findings from the Arab Judges Survey with the 
earlier studies of judicial role perceptions in common and civil law jurisdictions.  
Exploring Arab judicial role orientations  
Empirical research on Arab judicial attitudes appears non-existent, especially 
within the framework of role theory.619 This chapter aims to begin to fill this gap 
and to add to the existing body of research on judicial role conceptions in other 
jurisdictions. Despite the fact that the survey group of Arab judges is 
methodologically limited (as discussed in Chapter 4), the survey findings 
presented in this chapter are able to empirically explore role perceptions 
amongst Arab judges for the first time and compare these findings with existing 
scholarship on this issue with judges in other jurisdictions.  
 
                                               
618 See generally J. Woodford Howard Jr., “Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S. 
Courts of Appeals” (1977) 39 University of Chicago Press 916. 
619 Following a detailed search, no previous work on judicial role conceptions of judges in the 
Arab Middle East was found in English language based scholarship or in Arabic scholarship.  
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Earlier empirical studies have considered three elements as crucial to 
exploring judicial role orientations: how judges characterise their judicial role; 
what purposes/goals judges believe they do/should pursue as judges and; the 
degree to which judges believe legal precedents and public attitudes are 
important criteria for them in reaching judicial decisions.620 The three elements 
are collectively referred to as the “purposive role sector” in role theory, and are 
described as expectations judges have about their own particular position.621 
With focus on the purposive role sector, this initial study of Arab judges aims 
to understand the normative expectations of judges in the region and whether 
they fit within the framework of four judicial role orientations identified by earlier 
scholarship: the “executor”, “delegate”, “guardian” and “political” judge.622  
Survey approach to understanding Arab judicial role conceptions 
Three approaches were used in the survey to enable Arab judges to express 
their views about how they conceive of their judicial role: (1) ranking judicial 
roles in order of importance, (2) comparing their judicial role to judges in other 
jurisdictions and (3) stating their view of the importance of precedent and the 
public in judicial decision-making. 
First approach: ranking the importance of judicial roles  
In the Arab Judges Survey, judges were asked to rank the following judicial 
roles in order of importance:  
• Applier of the law;  
• Administrator of justice;  
• Guardian of the community;  
• Architect in the country’s body of law; 
• Enforcer of legal rules; 
• Arbiter of morality. 
                                               
620 Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, “Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges” (1972) 6 Law & Society Review 343. p.345  
621 As Ungs and Baas observe, the focus in this chapter is only on the “purposive sector”, but 
there are other aspects of the judicial role that deserve attention (some of the other aspects 
will be explored in Chapter 8).  Ibid. p.345 
622 See discussion of these four judicial role conceptions in Chapter 1  
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Each answer option presents a distinct conceptual role for judges that was 
considered relevant to the Arab context. The roles were, in part, based upon 
closely examining existing literature on judicial role perceptions in other 
jurisdictions and also in part tailored specifically to Arab judges. The first set 
of roles (“Administrator of justice” and “Applier of the law”) were considered as 
generic functions of any judge in any context. It was assumed that 
“administering justice” and “applying the law” are understood and accepted as 
principal judicial functions regardless of context. The two roles exclude the 
non-behavioural characteristics of those holding the judicial post (gender, 
race, nationality, and religion) as well as the concepts, attitudes, norms, 
values, sanctions and reactions of individual judges.623  
 
The second set of roles (“Guardian of the community” and “Architect of the 
country’s body of law”) are borrowed from Glick’s seminal study of American 
state judges’ role perceptions.624 The two roles conceive of judges as being 
potentially active and political.625  
 
The third set of roles (“Arbiter of morality” and “Enforcer of legal rules”) were 
created for this study as possible conceptual roles specifically relevant to the 
Arab region. These two roles take into consideration the existence of different 
judicial cultures in the region, dominated to varying degrees by religion, custom 
and Western influences (as discussed in detail in Chapter 3). These two 
conceptual roles were broadly defined and sit at opposite ends of the 
spectrum: at one end is the activist, political, public-regarding role of “Arbiter 
of morality” and at the other end is the passive “Enforcer of legal rules” (Figure 
19).  
 
                                               
623 Biddle BJ, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic Press 1979) 
624 Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.48 
625 For instance, Glick describes the “community Guardian” as a judge who acts as a moral 
force in the community: “he protects the people from outside threats or unwise values, and he 
may seem fatherly in his attitude toward the people in his jurisdiction. The judge is looked upon 
as a chaperone who acts to . . . protect the people from themselves.”. Ibid., p.60  
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Figure 18. Where judicial roles fall on judicial activism/restraint spectrum 
 
 
 
Most important judicial roles among Arab judges  
In order to establish a hierarchy of judicial role conceptions in Arab countries, 
judges were asked to rank all the six options in terms of importance (where “1” 
is the most important role and “6” is the least important role).626  Table 16 below 
presents 60 Arab judges’ assessment of the judicial roles they considered 
most important in their country. 
                                               
626 The question in the Survey read: Which of the following roles do you think are most 
important for judges in your country? Rank the following in terms of which roles are most 
important for judges in your country (where 1 = MOST IMPORTANT and 6 = LEAST 
IMPORTANT)  
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Table 16. Arab judges’ ranking of roles in order of importance (n=60) 
Judicial role conceptions 
 Restraint Generic  Activism 
 
 
 
 
Rank 
 
Enforcer 
of legal 
rules 
 
Administrator 
of justice 
 
Applier of 
law627 
 
Guardian of 
community 
 
Arbiter of 
morality 
 
Architect 
of the law 
1 7 27 20 10 3 2 
2 13 8 19 14 3 2 
3 12 12 12 13 4 8 
4 9 6 5 9 12 15 
5 12 5 0 9 16 14 
6 5 2 3 5 21 17 
 
Amongst all Arab judges combined, the role that was considered the most 
important (ranked most frequently as 1) was the more generic role of 
“Administrator of justice” (27 judges), followed by the other generic role of 
“Applier of the law” (20 judges) and the more activist role of “Guardian of the 
community” (10 judges). Twenty-one judges considered the most activist role, 
“Arbiter of morality”, as the least important role (ranked as 6). When only the 
top three highest ranked roles are considered, “Applier of the law” was 
selected most frequently (51 judges). This was followed by “Administrator of 
justice” (47 judges) and “Guardian of the community” (37 judges). Based on 
the total sample, roles that were least frequently ranked in the top three were 
the activist roles of “Arbiter of morality” (10 judges) and “Architect of the 
country’s body of law” (12 judges). 
 
Figure 19 below presents the top three ranked roles. The roles that correspond 
to a more activist orientation are presented in different shades of red. Those 
roles that are more generic/restraint-oriented in nature are presented in blue 
shades.628 
                                               
627 Because the generic roles are broadly defined, “Applier of the law” may also be considered 
a more passive, restraint-oriented role. However, this is doubtful for reasons discussed in 
Chapter 10.  
628Given the small number of responses and thus the lack of reliability, a country based 
analysis in the main text is not provided. Details by country can be seen in Appendix 4 
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Figure 19. Arab judges’ view of most important judicial roles (top 3 preferences combined) (n=60) 
 
 
Applier of the law 
27%
Administrator of 
justice 
25%
Enforcer of legal rules 
17%
Guardian of the 
community 
20%
Architecht of the 
country's body of law 
6%
Arbiter of morality 
5%
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According to Glick, the “community guardian” is generally a judge who acts as 
a moral force in the community and someone who protects the people from 
outside threats or unwise values.629 Whether judges conceived the “Guardian 
of the community” in line with this description cannot be definitely established. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the role was ranked high by many respondents 
indicates that, at minimum, the guardian role (however understood) was 
considered as an important role to have.630 
Second approach: comparing judicial roles between jurisdictions 
The survey also asked Arab judges to consider judicial role conceptions from 
a comparative perspective. This serves a number of purposes, including 
understanding how judges evaluate and understand their own role. It has been 
claimed that there are little differences in judiciaries across the Arab region 
and that the region has strong “trans-religious legal patterns” which renders it 
more or less the same in terms of law and legal culture. 631 Similarly, Mattei’s 
classification of the “Western legal tradition” treats the traditional distinction 
between common law and civil law as a subdivision “within a highly 
homogenous family of legal systems”.632 To explore whether Arab judges 
themselves perceive such similarities, judges were asked whether they agreed 
or disagreed that their own judicial role was different from the judicial role: (1) 
in other countries in the Arab region and (2) in Western countries.  
Comparing judicial roles within the Arab region 
The survey asked Arab judges to agree or disagree with the statement: “The 
role of a judge in my country is different than the role of the judge in other Arab 
                                               
629 Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.60 
630 The limitations of this was discussed in Chapter 4. As Ungs and Baas acknowledged: “In 
the final analysis, it is the judge who, in ranking the statements, gives them meaning…”. 
Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, “Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of Ohio 
Judges” (1972) 6 Law & Society Review. p.351 
631 One reason often mentioned is that the region reveals strong “trans-religious legal 
patterns”, which renders it more or less the same in terms of law and legal culture. See 
generally, Chibli Mallat, Introduction to Middle Eastern Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2007 (reprinted 2009), p.23 
632 Ugo Mattei, “Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems” 
(1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 5, p.23. 
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countries in the region”. The answer options were on a 5-point Likert scale 
from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. Of the 63 responses to this 
question, just over half (32 judges) agreed that the judicial role in their country 
was different from judicial roles in the Arab region; just under a quarter (14 
judges) disagreed with the statement and just over a quarter (17 judges) 
neither agreed nor disagreed (see Figure 20 below).633 One Lebanese judge 
explained that the judicial role is the same in all Arab countries, but because 
the laws and procedures differ, “the role of the judge look[s] different in each 
country”.634 Similarly, one Egyptian judge commented that “the Egyptian legal 
system has affected most of the Arab legal systems”.635  
 
Figure 20. Arab judges’ view of whether their role is different than the role of the 
judge in other Arab countries, all responses combined (n=63) 
 
  
 
 
 
                                               
633 In Figure 20 the category “agree” includes both “Strongly agree” and “Agree” responses 
and the category “disagree” includes both “Strongly Disagree” and ”Disagree” responses. 
634 Comment from Judge: 2003039 (Arab Judges Survey) 
635 This comment reflects the view of Sanhuri’s contributions to the region as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Comment from Judge: 2030119 (Arab Judges Survey) 
Agree
51%
Neither agree 
nor disagree
27%
Disagree
22%
"The role of a judge in my country is different than the role 
of the judge in other Arab countries in the region"
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Comparing judicial roles in Arab countries to those in the West 
There was more agreement amongst Arab judges when asked how the judicial 
role in their country compares with the role of judges in the West (see Figure 
21 below). Almost two-thirds of all the Arab judges who answered this question 
(40 out of 63) agreed that the judicial role in their own country was different 
from the judicial role in Western countries, with a quarter disagreeing (16 of 
63).  
 
Figure 21. Arab judges’ view of whether their role is different than the role of the 
judge in Western countries, all responses combined (n=63) 
 
 
 
The results indicate that the judicial role in many Arab countries is generally 
perceived of as unique in relation to Western judiciaries. But despite the 
common view that judiciaries in the Arab region have been historically and 
similarly influenced by the French civil law tradition, the judges surveyed here 
do not necessarily share this view. One Egyptian judge commented that there 
was a general difference in judicial role in Arab systems compared with civil 
and common law systems.636 Another Egyptian judge saw his role as a hybrid 
                                               
636 Comment from Judge: 2081484(Arab Judges Survey) 
Agree
64%Neither agree 
nor disagree
11%
Disagree
25%
"The role of a judge in my country is different from the role of 
the judge in Western countries"
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of civil and common law judges. He explained that while the Egyptian legal 
system tends to operate within the framework of a civil law tradition, “there are 
also similarities to a common law system”.637 One Lebanese judge felt that 
“there are multiple similarities, especially with countries applying written laws 
or what we call the romano-germanique legal system”.638 Other judges 
commented that that the differences related to the manner and mode of the 
judicial function in their country vis-à-vis Western judges. For instance, one 
Tunisian judge expressed the view that the workload in Tunisia was more 
burdensome than Western judges, and that affected the judicial role:  
“In view of how the judge works in terms of quantity and quality, 
the Tunisian judge works with large number of cases beyond the 
normal size of the Western judge. Often the weekly case- load 
exceeds a hundred. Due to this, work has become difficult for us 
in Tunisia”.639 
 
Third approach: the importance of precedent and the public 
The Arab Judges Survey also included a series of questions that were 
designed to compare Arab judges’ role perceptions with previous findings on 
judicial role conceptions amongst three groups of Western judges. This 
included Becker’s 1966 study of common law state judges in Hawaii and 
Flango’s 1975 study of civil law judges in Austria and Switzerland.640 To carry 
out this direct comparison, the Arab Judges Survey asked judges to respond 
                                               
637 Comment from Judge: 2078058 (Arab Judges Survey) 
638 Comment from Judge: 2077935 (Arab Judges Survey) 
639 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey), translated from comment in Arabic. 
640 The now decades-old questions were chosen in order to provide for continuity in terms of 
empirical investigation into the role of judges. Since this was a first attempt at studying the role 
perceptions of judges in the Arab Middle East, it was considered suitable to use questions of 
studies that had the same explorative purpose and follow the same pattern of earlier studies. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are substantial limitations particularly when seeking to 
compare the results with international studies. However, the questions have been, and 
continue to be used by judicial behaviourists to measure the several aspects of potential role 
orientations and to understand judicial decision-making. The questions are moreover reflective 
of recent studies into the role of judges, i.e. the questions are devised and designed to 
investigate judges’ expectations about the purposes or objectives they should adopt and how 
they perceive decision-making to operate on the court. See Carman RV, ‘The Development of 
the Judicial Role Orientation’ in Raymond V Carman, Making Good Law or Good Policy? 
(Springer International Publishing 2017); Lee Epstein, Stefanie A. Lindquist ‘The Oxford 
Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behaviour’, Oxford Handbooks of American Politics (Oxford  
University Press 2017) 
 199  
to 14 statements drawn from Becker’s and Flango’s studies.641 The 14 
statements are split into two categories: (1) those that explore judges’ 
“precedent orientation” and how this influences their judicial decision-making 
(6 statements), and (2) those that explore the “public dimension” of judging 
and reflect judges’ views of the appropriate role of judges in society (8 
statements). 
 
Similar to Flango’s approach, the answer options provided to judges in the 
Arab Judges Survey were categorised into “narrow” and “broad”. For the 
narrowly-worded options, judges were asked to say how influential a factor 
was on a four-point Likert-scale (“Very influential”, “Influential”, “Somewhat 
influential”, and “Not at all influential”). For the broadly worded options, judges 
were asked to say whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement on 
a five-point Likert-scale (“Strongly agree”, “Agree”, “Neither agree nor 
disagree”, “Disagree”, “Strongly disagree”).  
 
The survey questions and answer options that explore Arab judges’ 
“precedent orientation” are presented in Table 17 below. Although the 
questions were translated for the Arab Judges Survey, the questions reflect 
the questions used in Flango’s study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
641 Theodore Becker “A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial 
Role Variations” (1966) 60 American Political Science Review 677.; Victor Eugene Flango, 
Lettie McSpadden Wenner and Manfred W Wenner, “The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note” (1975) 19 American Journal of Political Science 277, p.277. See also  
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Table 17. Questions examining precedent orientation (Arab Judges Survey) 
Precedent orientation questions and answer options 
Narrowly worded  
 
Broadly worded  
 
How influential are these to you as a 
judge? 
To what extent do you agree with the 
following? 
“Decisions closest in facts to the present 
case” 
“Judges are merely instruments of the 
law and can will nothing” 
 
“Past decisions of the supreme court” 
 
“It is possible for a judge always to be 
politically neutral and nonpartisan in 
deciding cases” 
 
“Precedent, when clear and directly 
relevant” 
 
“Adherence to precedent must be the 
rule rather than the exception if litigants 
are to have faith in the continuity of law” 
 
The survey questions and answer options that explore Arab judges’ “public 
orientation” are presented in Table 18 below.642  
 
Table 18. Questions examining judges' public orientation (Arab Judges Survey) 
Public orientation questions and answer options 
Narrowly worded  
 
Broadly worded  
 
How influential are these to you as a 
judge? 
To what extent do you agree with the 
following? 
 
“What the public expects” 
“Judges should use their knowledge of 
social and political factors, as well as 
the law, in making their decisions”  
 
“The social consequences of the decision” 
 
“Through cases brought to the courts, 
judges must constantly balance 
conflicting interests in society”  
 
“Requirements of law and order”  
 
 
“It is important that judges keep in 
constant contact with changing social 
mores in order to make their decisions 
relevant to the community”  
“Judges’ view of justice in the case” “It is more important that judicial 
decisions be just than that the letter of 
the law be adhered to”  
 
                                               
642 The 6 statements were also deliberately framed as “narrow” and “broad”. For the narrowly 
worded statements, judges were asked to respond on a four point Likert-scale ranging from 
“Very influential” to “Not at all influential”. For the broadly worded statements, a five point 
Likert-scale was used ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.   
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In total, 48 Arab judges responded to all precedent orientation and public 
orientation questions the survey: 15 from Egypt, 14 from Saudi Arabia, 11 from 
Lebanon, 4 from Tunisia, 2 from Jordan, and 2 each from Syria and Palestine. 
Judicial attitudes to precedent and judicial decision-making   
Table 19 below shows Arab judges’ responses to the narrowly-worded 
statements on the importance of precedent in their judicial decision-making. It 
shows results for all Arab judges combined. 
 
Table 19 Arab judges' assessment of the influence of precedent on their judicial 
decision-making (n=48) 
How influential are the following factors to a judge 
in deciding a case? 
 
Judges saying very 
influential or 
influential 
 No. % 
 
“Precedent, when clear and directly relevant” 
 
40 83.3 
 
“Past decisions of the supreme court” 
 
38 79.1 
 
“Decisions closest in facts to the present case” 
 
36 75.0 
 n=48   
 
All of the narrowly-worded statements on precedent produced general 
agreement among the Arab judges that these were influential in their decision-
making. At least three-quarters of all the 48 Arab judges combined said that 
the three different aspects of precedent were influential. The most explicit 
reference to precedent ("Precedent, when clear and directly relevant”) had the 
highest proportion of all Arab judges combined saying it was influential 
(83.3%).   
 
Looking further at Arab judges’ view of the importance of precedent, Table 20 
shows the number and percentage of Arab judges who agreed with the 
broadly-worded precedent-oriented statements on how judges approach 
judicial decision-making. The results are for those Arab judges who said they 
strongly agreed or agreed with each statement.  
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Table 20. Proportion of Arab judges that agree with precedent oriented statements 
(n=48) 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: Level of agreement 
 No. % 
 
“It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral 
and nonpartisan in deciding cases” 
 
34 70.8 
 
“Adherence to precedent must be the rule rather than 
the exception if litigants are to have faith in the continuity 
of law” 
 
13 27.0 
 
“Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will 
nothing” 
 
4 8.3 
 n=48  
 
In comparison to the narrowly-worded statements on precedent, there were 
much lower levels of support for these broadly-worded statements about 
judicial decision-making. Looking at the responses for all Arab judges 
combined, only one statement was supported by a majority of the judges: 71% 
agreed that “It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral and 
nonpartisan in deciding cases”. There were much lower levels of agreement 
amongst all the Arab judges for the statement “Adherence to precedent must 
be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the continuity 
of law” (27%). The lowest agreement among judges was for the statement 
“Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing”.  
Judicial attitudes to the role of the public & society in decision-making 
Table 21 below shows how the Arab judges who took the survey responded to 
the narrowly-worded statements about what factors are influential in judicial 
decision-making, including public and personal views in cases as well as the 
social consequences of decisions. The results are presented as the proportion 
of Arab judges combined who said each factor was influential in their judicial 
decision-making.  
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Table 21. Arab judges' agreement with narrowly worded statements on social and 
personal factors in decision-making (n=48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nearly all judges regardless of jurisdiction felt that “the requirements of law 
and order” were influential in their decision-making. There were also high 
levels of support for the idea that “the judge’s view of justice in the case” was 
influential (77%). By contrast, few judges considered public expectations as 
influential (12.5%). Just over half of the 48 respondents said that the social 
consequences of a decision were influential. 
 
In comparison to the narrowly-worded statements on public and social factors 
in decision-making, there were more consistent levels of agreement amongst 
Arab judges across jurisdictions on the more broadly-worded statements about 
public and social factors in judicial decision-making. Table 22 below shows the 
proportion of Arab judges combined who said they either strongly agreed or 
agreed with the statements
When a judge decides a case, how influential do you think 
the following factors are for a judge? 
 
Level of influence 
 No. % 
 
“Requirements of law and order” 
 
47 97.9 
 
“Judge’s view of justice in the case” 
 
37 77.0 
 
“The social consequences of decision” 
 
26 54.1 
 
“What the public expects 
 
6 12.5 
 n=48  
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Table 22 Arab judges' agreement with broadly worded statements on public and social 
factors in judicial decision-making (n=48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A majority of judges in all Arab countries that took part in the survey agreed 
with each of the 4 statements, but certain statements had more consistent 
levels of agreement across the jurisdictions than others. Amongst all Arab 
judges combined, the highest level of agreement (83%) was for the statement 
“It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social mores 
in order to make their decisions relevant to the community”. More than two-
thirds of all 48 judges agreed that it is important to be in contact with “changing 
social mores”. The next highest levels of support amongst Arab judges was for 
the statements “it is more important that judicial decisions be just than that the 
letter of the law be adhered to”. Most judges across the jurisdictions (81%) 
agreed with this view. There was greater variability between Arab jurisdictions 
on the two remaining statements: “Through cases brought to the courts, judges 
must constantly balance conflicting interests in society” (67%) and “Judges 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
 
Level of agreement 
 No. % 
 
“It is important that judges keep in constant contact with 
changing social mores in order to make their decisions 
relevant to the community” 
 
40 83.3 
 
“It is more important that judicial decisions be just than 
that the letter of the law be adhered to” 
 
39 81.2 
 
“Judges should use their knowledge of social and 
political factors, as well as the law, in making their 
decisions” 
 
30 62.5 
 
“Through cases brought to the courts, judges must 
constantly balance conflicting interests in society” 
 
32 66.6 
 n=48  
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should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as well as the law, 
in making their decisions” (62.5%).  
Judicial role conceptions: Arab and Western judges compared 
Earlier findings from role perception studies of American and European judges 
show that judicial roles are more complex than the traditional distinction 
between judges in civil law traditions and common law traditions suggests. 
Researchers found that judges in both types of legal systems tend to perceive 
themselves as “executor judges”, a role commonly associated with the 
European civil law tradition.643 For instance, even though Austria and 
Switzerland shared a civil law tradition in contrast to the American common 
law tradition, the differences between these European and American judges 
were less marked than was anticipated.644 In particular, Austrian and Swiss 
judges tended to respond in patterns very similar to American judges:  
 
“[…] nearly all of the surveys of judicial role completed to date, 
except those with very small sample sizes, report that nearly half 
of the judges interviewed are classified as Law Appliers. This 
would seem to indicate that the proportion of judges taking this 
role is not peculiar to the civil law countries of Austria or 
Switzerland [emphasis added].”645 
 
This thesis set out to examine this idea of shared judicial role conceptions 
further. This section compares the results of the Arab Judges Survey on 
precedent orientation and public orientation with findings from the study by 
Becker of Hawaiian judges and Flango’s findings for Austrian and Swiss 
                                               
643 Scheb writes that the “executor” role draws on an ideal Weberian model within the civil law 
framework: “Under code law and the administration of justice within the civil law tradition, 
judges are expected to espouse a well-defined role conception. Like the ideal judge in the 
Weberian model, the civil law judge is expected to function as a bureaucrat - decisions are to 
be based strictly on legal principles without the taint of personal predilection or bias.” John M 
Scheb M John, (1982), Merit Selection, Role Orientations and Legal Rationalization: A Q-
Technique Study of The Florida State District Courts (PhD, University of Florida) p.9 
644 Manfred W Wenner, Lettie M Wenner and V Eugene Flango, “Austrian and Swiss Judges: 
A Comparative Study” (1978) 10 Comparative Politics 499, p. 509 
645 Glick and Vines, for instance, found that a little more than half of the judges they surveyed 
were “executors”. Similar findings were reported by Renstrom, Schubert, and Becker. See 
Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975) “The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science 19(2), p.286 
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judges. The nature of Austrian, Swiss and American judicial roles was 
expected to be different from judicial roles in the Arab region, primarily 
because of the traditional distinction between common law and civil law and 
because Arab legal systems have historically been influenced more by the civil 
law tradition (see Chapter 3). Comparing the findings from the Arab Judges 
Survey on precedent and public dimensions with the studies by Flango and 
Becker, some clear differences do emerge between Arab judges and American 
and European judges but there are equally as many similarities.  
Comparing the relative importance of decision factors  
Generally, most Arab judges tended to regard precedent as important and 
influential, which is similar to the findings of earlier studies with European and 
American judges (Table 23 below). Similar to Austrian (72.4%), Swiss (93.6%) 
and Hawaiian judges (92.0%), most Arab judges (83.3%) said that precedent 
when clear and relevant was an important factor in their judicial decision-
making.  
 
For the two other precedent-related factors, the views of Arab judges 
correspond to the views of non-Arab judges. Arab judges, like Austrian and 
Swiss judges, also said that “Superior court decisions” were important to 
judicial decision-making, although Swiss judges were most likely to consider 
this factor important (97.9%), followed by Austria judges (85.1%) and Arab 
judges (79.1%).646 A majority of Arab, Swiss and Austrian judges also said that 
“Decisions made in analogous cases” were more important and influential to 
their decision-making. But Arab judges were slightly more likely to say this 
(75.0%) than Swiss judges (70.3%) and both sets of judges were more likely 
to say this than Austrian judges (54.3 %). 
 
                                               
646 “Superior court decisions” was not included in the questionnaire in Becker’s study on 
Hawaiian judges.  
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Table 23. Comparison of judges' perceptions of the most important factors 
influencing judicial decisions (Arab region, Switzerland, Austria and Hawaii) 
Decisional guide 
All Arab 
judges 
combined 
Switzerland647 Austria648 Hawaii649 
 
% % % % 
Relevant and clear 
precedent  83.3 93.6 72.4 92.0 
Judges’ perception of 
justice in the case 77.0 79.9 85.2 79.2 
Public needs (requirements 
of law and order)  97.9 12.5 36.1 29.2 
Public expectations and 
demands  12.5 4.3 10.6 0.0 
Social consequences of 
decision  54.1 60.4 68.1 -- 
Superior court decisions  79.1 97.9 85.1 -- 
Decisions in analogous 
cases  75.0 70.3 54.3 -- 
 n=48 n=49 n=48 n=25 
 
Beyond the precedent factors, a majority of all four groups of judges said a 
judge’s perception of justice in a case was an important factor influencing 
judicial decision-making. But clear differences emerged between Arab judges 
and the three other groups of judges about the importance of “Public needs 
(requirements of law and order)” when making decisions. Most Arab judges 
(97.9%) viewed public needs as important but only a minority of Austrian, 
Hawaiian and Swiss judges (36.1%, 29.1% and 12.5% respectively) felt this 
was an important factor in judicial decisions.  
 
Further contrasts are found in relation to these different judges’ attitudes to 
judicial roles. The mean score for Swiss, Austrian and Arab judges in relation 
                                               
647  Flango et al used a 5 point Likert scale ranging from “extremely important” to “irrelevant”. 
The table includes the authors’ findings on “extremely important” (=5), “very important” (=4) 
and “important” (=3). Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975) “The Concept of Judicial 
Role: A Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science 19(2).  
648 Ibid. 
649 Three judges are included in this table that were not included in the article from which this 
data has been extracted because they did not answer a simulated judicial case. (Theodore 
Becker, "A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role 
Variations," American Political Science Review LX [September 1966], 677-80.) 
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to seven statements are presented in Table 24 below.650 Arab judges tended 
to agree “It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing 
social mores in order to make their decisions relevant to the community” (4.12) 
more than Swiss and Austrian judges (3.31 and 3.31 respectively). Arab 
judges were also more likely to agree that “Judges should use their knowledge 
of social and political factors, as well as the law, in making their decisions” 
(3.39) compared to their Austrian and Swiss counterparts (2.97 and 2.97 
respectively). The starkest difference relates to the statement that “judges are 
merely instruments of the law and can will nothing” (statement number 7). Arab 
judges were far less likely to agree with this than their European counterparts. 
The mean score for Arab judges (1.87) was significantly lower than the Swiss 
and Austrian judges (3.66 and 3.62 respectively).  
 
                                               
650 Mean scores were used here in order to allow for direct comparison of results across the 
three separate studies.   
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Table 24. Comparison of judges’ responses to judicial role statements (Arab Judges Survey, Switzerland and Austria) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                           Mean score  
Statement Arab Judges Survey Switzerland Austria 
1 “It is more important that judicial decisions be just than that the letter of 
the law be adhered to”   
4.14 
 4.31 4.5 
2 “It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social 
mores in order to make their decisions relevant to the community”  
4.12 
 3.31 3.31 
3 “It is possible for a judge always to be politically neutral and nonpartisan 
in deciding cases” 4 4.12 4.16 
4 “Through cases brought to the courts, judges must constantly balance 
conflicting interests in society”  
3.85 
 3.34 3.60 
5 “Judges should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as 
well as the law, in making their decisions “  
3.39 
 2.97 2.97 
6 “Adherence to precedent must be the rule rather than the exception if 
litigants are to have faith in the continuity of law”  
3.22 
 4.38 4.00 
7 “Judges are merely instruments of the law and can will nothing” 1.87  3.66 3.62 
  (n=48) (n=48) (n=48) 
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In terms of comparability, the expectation was that Arab judges’ responses 
would be substantially different from common law and civil law judges, 
particularly in relation to precedent orientation.651  
 
Areas where significant differences emerge between Arab and non-Arab 
judges are in factors that relate to the appropriate role of judges in society. The 
Arab judges surveyed here are more cognisant of social considerations in their 
decision-making than Western judges. Arab judges are also more likely than 
their Western counterparts to feel that judges should keep in constant contact 
with changing social mores. They are also more likely to consider that the 
requirements of the social order are significant to their decision-making than 
their Swiss, Austrian and Hawaiian counterparts. Finally, while Arab judges 
tended to disagree with the description of judges as “merely instruments of the 
law”, this was a description that Swiss and Austrian judges tended to agree 
with.  
Arab judges’ orientations to precedent and the public 
In order to further explore these findings, the following section analyses how 
each Arab judge responded to all statements in the public dimension (8 
statements) and the precedent dimension (6 statements).652 Because the 
statements in this area seek to measure a particular orientation, it was 
assumed that the more statements a judge responded positively to the higher 
the judge’s orientation would be to that specific type of role.  
 
For the 6 precedent statements, it was assumed that if an individual judge 
responded positively (“Agree” and/or “Influential”) to 4-6 statements, they 
would have a high precedent orientation. By contrast, if the judge only 
                                               
651 It was hypothesised that precedent orientation, particularly among Saudi judges, would 
score relatively low because stare decisis is not as prevalent in the country (as discussed 
earlier in Chapter 5). However, most Saudi judges surveyed in this study appear to attach 
significant importance to precedent and it was also considered important by most Egyptian 
and Lebanese judges. Statements that specifically defined precedent such as decisions in 
“analogous cases”, “superior court decisions” and “precedent (where clear and directly 
relevant)” generally invoked agreement among the 14 Saudi judges surveyed.  
652 A similar type of analysis was used by Flango et al to measure judges’ orientations towards 
precedent and public by using the 14 statements.    
 211  
responded positively (“Agree” and/or “Influential”) to 0-2 statements, the 
precedent role orientation would be low. Agreement with 3 of the 6 statements 
was considered to only indicate a moderate orientation. Table 25 below 
presents the number of statements that the 48 judges agreed with and/or found 
to be influential in relation to precedent.653  
 
Table 25. Categorisation of Arab judges' precedent orientation 
 
Number of statements that 
were agreed with and/or 
found to be influential 
Number of 
judges 
 
High orientation 
toward 
precedent 
All 6 statements 3 
5 statements 8 
4 statements 19 
Moderate – 
neither higher 
nor lower 
3 statements 5 
 
Low orientation 
towards 
precedent 
2 statements 10 
1 statement 3 
No statements 0 
 n=48 
 
Most (30 of 48) Arab judges appear to have a high orientation towards 
precedent. Three judges agreed with or found all 6 statements to be 
influential. This was followed by 8 judges who responded positively to 5 
statements and 19 judges agreed with and/or responded to at least 4 out of 6 
statements as influential. Five judges agreed with or found 3 statements as 
influential. By contrast, only a minority (13) of Arab judges appear to have a 
low orientation towards precedent. Only 3 judges agreed with or considered 
one statement as influential, and 10 judges agreed with and/or found at least 
2 statements to be influential.  
 
A similar analysis was undertaken in relation to the 8 statements that form the 
public role orientation. It was hypothesised that if judges responded positively 
to 5-8 statements, their public role orientation would be high. By contrast, if 
                                               
653 These results combine “very influential” and “influential” as well as “strongly agree” and 
“agree.    
 212  
judges only agreed/found influential with 0-3 statements, their orientation to 
public would be low. Judges who responded positively to 4 statements were 
assumed to have a moderate orientation towards the public. Table 26 below, 
presents the total number of public statements the 48 judges agreed with 
and/or found to be influential. 
 
Table 26. Categorisation of Arab judges' public role orientation (n=48) 
 
Number of statements that 
were agreed with and/or 
found to be influential 
Number of 
judges 
 
High orientation 
towards public 
All 8 statements 4 
7 statements 11 
6 statements 11 
5 statements 7 
 
Moderate- neither high 
nor low 
 
 
4 statements 6 
Low orientation towards 
public 
3 statements 6 
2 statements 2 
1 statement 1 
No statements 0 
 n=48 
 
Based on the data from the survey, it appears that most Arab judges appear 
to have a high orientation towards the public (33 of 48 judges). Four judges 
agreed with or found all 8 statements to be influential. This was followed by 11 
judges who responded positively to at least 7 statements. By contrast, only a 
minority of Arab judges (15) appear to have a low public role orientation. In this 
group, most judges responded positively to 3 statements. Only one judge 
agreed with or considered one statement to be influential. Finally, 6 judges can 
be considered as having a moderate public role orientation.  
 
Based on this analysis, those judges that participated in the survey can be 
placed somewhere along two continua of precedent role orientation and public 
role orientation (Figures 22 and 23). 
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Figure 22. Precedent orientation scale for Arab judges (n=48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Public orientation scale for Arab judges (n=48) 
 
It appears that among those who participated most Arab judges are found 
somewhere in the middle of the precedent role orientation spectrum. 
Furthermore, three judges have a high orientation towards precedent and 
three judges have a low orientation towards precedent, and most judges are 
found somewhere in the middle of the spectrum which renders them neither 
“high precedent-regarding” nor “low precedent-regarding.654  In relation to 
the 8 public-oriented statements, most judges supported to statements 
suggesting that public aspects of decision-making were important to Arab 
judges; most (33) Arab judges can be placed somewhere towards the higher 
end of public-regarding spectrum and 8 judges appear to clearly have a very 
high orientation towards the public. By contrast, only 1 judge can be said 
to have a very low public orientation. In both the precedent orientation and 
public orientation scale, judges’ overall responses present a nuanced picture, 
more so in relation to the precedent orientation scale. How this translates into 
the four judicial role perceptions of “Executor”, “Delegate”, “Guardian” and 
“Political” is further discussed in Chapter 10.  
                                               
654 Where 15 judges agreed with (or found influential) at least 2-3 statements, and 27 judges 
agreed with 4-5 statements. 
No. of 
statements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
No. of judges 3 10 5 19 8 3 
 LOW  HIGH 
No. of 
statements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of judges 1 2 6 6 7 11 11 8 
 LOW  HIGH 
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Summary 
This chapter explored how Arab judges perceive their role in relation to the law 
and public policy, and the extent to which these Arab judges appear to adopt 
positions of judicial activism or judicial restraint through three elements 
referred to as the “purposive role sector”. The findings presented in this 
chapter relate to how Arab judges characterised their roles from a comparative 
perspective. Based on their Survey responses, many Arab judges tended to 
agree that their roles were less similar to the West, including judicial roles in 
neighbouring jurisdictions.  Second, based on the analysis made, those judges 
that participated in the survey can be placed somewhere along two continua 
of precedent role orientation and public role orientation. While the findings 
reflect some variability in judicial role conceptions amongst judges in each 
Arab jurisdiction that took part in the survey, perhaps most notably the high 
proportion of judges that also identified themseves with the non-generic 
“Guardian role”.  
 
The chapter also compared the findings from the Arab Judges Survey with 
similar earlier studies of judicial role perceptions in common and civil law 
jurisdictions. A clear difference emerge in relation to public consideration. For 
instance, the Arab judges surveyed here were more likely to consider society 
in their decision-making compared to Western judges. The findings made in 
this chapter provides a distinct and novel insight into Arab judicial roles, which 
are further discussed in Chapter 10. The next chapter operates within the 
same framework of role theory and explores how Arab judges see their roles 
in relation to two sets of actors: their judicial colleagues and non-judicial actors 
that are influential in the political system.
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Chapter 9. Arab judges’ relationships with judicial peers and 
non-judicial actors 
The previous chapter sought to explore Arab judicial role perceptions on the 
basis of how they view precedent and more public, personal and societal 
factors in their decision-making. While this analysis provided some new 
insights about Arab judges and their role conceptions, to understand the 
judicial role in the Arab region it is also necessary to examine the normative 
expectations that exist between judges and other key actors. One set of 
expectations involves a judge’s relationship with his/her judicial colleagues. 
Another set relates to relationships with those outside the judiciary, for 
instance legislators and government officials. This can have an important 
effect on judges’ thinking about their own role, particularly where there is a 
high level of judicial deference to law-making bodies.655  
 
This chapter begins by examining the normative expectations Arab judges 
have of each other. It then examines Arab judges’ perceptions of the 
relationship between themselves and non-judges important to the political 
process. The findings are based on the Arab Judges Survey.  Two approaches 
were used in the survey. The first approach was to explore what Arab judges 
feel are important qualities for judges to have and those they think their judicial 
colleagues feel are important. The second approach was to explore Arab 
judges’ views on how much influence non-judges (legal community, public, 
media and government) do or should have in the judicial decision-making 
process. For non-judicial actors, this study confines itself to actors that are 
most important for judges in terms of the political system.  
Existing norms of judicial behaviour  
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are existing norms of judicial behavior for 
Arab judges that are based on formal international, regional and national 
documents. These reflect a myth in which judges are expected to be totally 
                                               
655 Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975) “The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science 19(2), (conclusion).  
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objective arbiters who always act impartially towards everyone. However, as 
Glick says, this “myth does not reflect reality”.656 Norms about the ideal 
conduct of judges often simplify the judicial role to the mechanical application 
of the law.  But as Herndon explains, judicial decision-making will depend upon 
the kinds of interactions taking place between the judiciary and other parts of 
the political system.657 Therefore an examination of the links between judges 
and other elements of the political system is necessary.  
 
One way of doing this is to consider the judiciary within a broader structural-
functional framework. This was done in Chapter 5, where the organisation of 
the judicial system and the interrelationship between courts in four Arab states 
were considered in order to explore judges’ scope for political involvement.  An 
additional way of looking at this is through role theory, exploring judges’ own 
subjective understanding of links within the judicial community and links in the 
wider political system. This chapter presents the findings of the Arab Judges 
Survey, which show how Arab judges perceive their roles in relation to two 
categories of actors under the framework of role theory: judicial colleagues and 
non-judicial actors that are politically important.  
Inter-judicial relationships  
The Arab Judges Survey attempted to investigate what judicial norms were 
important to the judges surveyed. First, the survey explored the relative 
importance Arab judges attached to other judges. Judges were asked to 
indicate how important their immediate judicial colleagues and senior figures 
in the judiciary were to them in their job. A 4-point Likert scale was used 
(“Extremely important”, “Important”, “Somewhat important” and “Not important 
at all”). Figure 24 below presents the findings from the 48 Arab judges that 
answered both of these questions.  
 
 
                                               
656 Glick, H. (1967) Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.233 
657 James Herndon “The Role of the Judiciary in State Political Systems" in Glendon Schubert 
(ed), Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. (Rand McNally and Company 
1964). p. 153-61. 
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Figure 24. Degree of importance attached to colleagues and senior figures in the 
judiciary (n=48) 
 
 
Almost all judges considered their immediate judicial colleagues important (19) 
or somewhat important (16) to them in doing their job. Seven judges 
considered judicial colleagues as very important. More Arab judges felt their 
senior judicial colleagues were important (12) or somewhat important (19) to 
them in their work than judges who felt they were not important (14). Overall, 
Arab judges attached more importance to their immediate judicial colleagues 
than to senior figures in the judiciary.  
Qualities of a good judge 
The survey next examined the rules of consensus which govern Arab judges’ 
behavior towards each other by examining two key dimensions: 
• Arab judges’ views of what constitutes proper behaviour on their part 
toward other judges who occupy the same judicial position; 
• Arab judges’ views of their colleagues’ expectations about the proper 
judicial role.  
 
The survey questions focused on judicial qualities on the assumption that the 
qualities judges considered most important would in turn indicate what norms 
form part of the group. Two survey questions drew on the principles found in 
7
3
19
12
16
19
6
14
Judicial colleagues Senior figures in the judiciary
Very important Important Somewhat important Not important at all
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the Sharjah Convention on judicial ethics, and the survey presented judges 
with the following ten categories of “ideal judicial qualities”:  
• Personal integrity 
• Knowledge of the law 
• Strong moral principles 
• Dealing impartially with parties to cases 
• Intellectual honesty 
• Personal conduct in public 
• Objectivity in decision-making 
• Efficient work habits 
• Decision-writing abilities 
• Awareness of broader social and political issues 
 
First, judges were asked: “To what extent do you feel the following qualities 
are important for a judge to have to do their job well?“. Here judges were asked 
to indicate the level importance for each of the 10 qualities on a four point 
Likert-scale (“Extremely important”, “Important”, “Somewhat important”, “Not 
important at all”).  
 
Judges were then asked in relation to these 10 qualities: ”To what extent do 
you feel the following qualities are valued by the judges you work with?”. A four 
point Likert-scale was used here to indicate value levels (“Valued highly”, 
“Valued”, “Valued a little”, “Not valued at all”). 
Arab judges’ views of the qualities needed to do their job well 
Table 27 presents the results of the survey for the question that asked Arab 
judges which of the 10 stated qualities were important for a judge to have to 
do their job well. Answers of “Extremely important” and “Important” are 
combined in the Table.  
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Table 27 Arab judges' view of important qualities to do their job well (n=52) 
Judicial Qualities Total  
 % 
Personal integrity 100 
Dealing impartially with parties to 
cases 
100 
Strong moral principles 98 
Knowledge of the law 98 
Objectivity in decision-making 92.3 
Decision-writing abilities 90.3 
Intellectual honesty 84.6 
Efficient work habits 82.6 
Personal conduct in public  76.9 
Awareness of broader social and 
political issues 
75 
 n=52 
 
The qualities that were considered by all 52 judges as important were “dealing 
impartially with parties to cases” and “personal integrity”. Nearly all judges also 
indicated that “strong moral principles” and “knowledge of the law” were 
important. Although more than half of the respondents considered “awareness 
of broader social and political issues” and “personal conduct in public” as 
important, overall these qualities were ranked lower by Arab judges as 
qualities important to do their job well. 
 
To varying degrees, a majority of judges said that all 10 qualities were 
important for a judge to have. As all 10 qualities are recognised in the Sharjah 
Convention as important judicial qualities, it is perhaps not surprising that all 
the qualities were considered more or less important to all the Arab judges who 
took part in the survey. As such, the findings merely corroborate the prevailing 
idea of the qualities an “ideal judge” should possess. It was hypothesised that 
since all qualities listed were more or less important for any judge, there would 
be little variation in terms of importance. However, the other key objective in 
asking this question of Arab judges was to determine whether Arab judges also 
thought their judicial colleagues would value these qualities and to the same 
extent. 
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Arab judges’ perceptions of how their colleagues view judicial qualities 
Arab judges’ views on which qualities were valued by their judicial colleagues 
and to what extent are presented in Table 28 below.  
 
Table 28. Judges’ view of qualities valued by their colleagues (n=52) 
Qualities valued by Judicial peers   Total 
 % 
Knowledge of the law 90.3 
Dealing impartially with parties to cases 84.6 
Personal integrity  84.6 
Strong moral principles 76.9 
Objectivity in decision-making 76.9 
Personal conduct in public  75 
Intellectual honesty 76.9 
Decision-writing abilities 63.4 
Awareness of broader social and political issues 59.6 
Efficient work habits 51.9 
 n=52 
 
Although there was more variety among the 52 respondents in relation to this 
question, the qualities most Arab judges thought were valued by their judicial 
colleagues were “knowledge of the law”, “dealing impartially with parties to 
cases”, “personal integrity” and “strong moral principles”. In addition to these 
four qualities, most Arab judges also thought their colleagues valued 
“objectivity in decision-making”.  
 
Viewing the findings for the two questions side-by-side provides for some 
useful comparisons between what qualities judges feel are important for 
themselves and which ones they think their colleagues feel are important (see 
Figure 25 below).
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Figure 25 Comparison of Arab judges' view of qualities important for judges to have and response of qualities valued by judicial colleagues (n=52) 
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One obvious difference in the results viewed in this way is that the Arab judges 
in the survey had lower expectations of their judicial colleagues: they 
consistently ranked each judicial quality higher in value than the value they felt 
their colleagues would place on those same qualities. The greatest difference 
between what judges themselves felt were important qualities and what they 
thought their judicial colleagues valued were: “Efficient work habits” (83% of 
judges valued this v 52% of judges thinking their colleagues valued it), 
“Decision-writing abilities” (90% v 63%), “Strong moral principles” (98% v 
77%), “Intellectual honesty” (85% v 77%) and “Awareness of broader social 
and political issues” (75% v 60%).  
Level of consensus amongst Arab judges on norms of behaviour 
Because judges often work in groups there should be some minimal level of 
“working consensus”.658 And there must be some acceptance of norms that 
regulates individual judges’ treatment to one another. These norms are also 
important because they may serve as a point of reference from which judges 
can evaluate events. Based on these findings, several qualities appear to be 
considered by Arab judges as the most important to do a good job as a judge 
and most likely to be valued by their judicial colleagues.  
 
The following could be seen as among the more highly valued and clearly 
accepted norms of behaviour for Arab judges:  
• Knowledge of the law: 98% of judges said it was important and 90% said 
it was valued by colleagues. 
• Dealing impartially with parties to cases: 100% of judges said it was 
important and 85% said it was valued by colleagues. 
• Personal integrity: 100% of judges said it was important and 85% said it 
was valued by colleagues.  
 
Other qualities appear to be generally accepted norms of behaviour amongst 
Arab judges, but with some variability between how much judges value them 
                                               
658 John C. Wahlke, Heins Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative 
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (John Wiley & Sons 1962), p.145 
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as important to do their job and the extent to which they think their judicial 
colleagues value them:  
• Objectivity in decision-making 
• Decision-writing abilities 
• Intellectual honesty 
• Personal conduct in public 
 
A few qualities are perhaps less widely accepted as both important by judges 
and valued by judicial colleagues in comparison to the other qualities 
examined in the survey:  
• Efficient work habits 
• Awareness of broader social and political issues 
Judicial norms of cooperative working 
As revealed in Chapter 5, many if not most Arab judges sit on multi-member 
panels in deciding cases. The Arab Judges Survey, therefore, also explored 
judges’ views of the qualities judges need to work well with other judges. In 
one question in the survey, judges were asked to rank 8 qualities specific to 
working with other judges in terms of their importance. The question was 
phrased:  Which of the following are important qualities for a judge to have 
when working with other judges (where “1” is the most important quality and 
“8” is the least important quality). The 8 qualities were: 
 
• Hold firm views 
• Show leadership amongst judges 
• Respect the views of others even if you disagree 
• Acknowledge the good work of others 
• Be receptive to change and persuasion 
• Show independence of mind 
• Exercise good manners in dealing with others 
• Keep arguments moderate 
 
 224  
As Glick writes, the qualifications for an ideal judge include “practically an 
unlimited variety of attributes”.659 Following discussions with judges in the 
region during the survey design, the above qualities were considered the most 
relevant. An added justification is that they are based on the principles found 
in the Sharjah Convention.660 Figure 26 below shows how Arab judges ranked 
the importance of these 8 qualities of cooperative judicial working; the figure 
presents the results in terms of how often each of the 8 qualities was ranked 
in the top three of importance by Arab judges.  
 
Figure 26 Arab judges' ranking of most important qualities for working in a group (n=52) 
 
 
Judges’ ranking of qualities provides further insight into the informal norms that 
operate for judges in a collegial setting. For the 52 judges who participated in 
this question, two qualities emerged as clearly most important to judges in 
terms of cooperative working and appear to be clearly accepted norms of 
behaviour were:  
 
• “Respect the views of others” (which had the highest ranking)  
                                               
659 Glick, H. (1967), Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.115 
660 “Sharjah Convention 2007” 
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• “Show independence of mind”  
 
Other qualities that showed more moderate consensus were: 
• “Exercise good manners in dealing with others” 
• “Be receptive to change and persuasion” 
• “Keep arguments moderate” 
• “Acknowledge the good work of others” 
 
The qualities that appeared to have the lowest level of consensus amongst 
the Arab judges and were ranked least often in the top three: 
• “Hold firm views” 
• “Showing leadership amongst judges” 
 
This provides further insight into the informal norms that may operate amongst 
Arab judges, particularly for judges that work in collegial courts in the Arab 
region. The findings also illustrate what type of norms individual judges must 
conform to in order to become part of the group.  
External relationships 
The second element of judicial role conceptions and norms of behavior 
explored in the Arab Judges Survey was judges’ relationships with important 
actors outside the judiciary. This group of “non-judges” includes the legal 
community, court staff, parties in cases, the public, media, government and 
religious authorities. The survey explored the following: 
 
• How much importance Arab judges say they place on non-judges when 
performing their judicial role 
• How influential the public and the government are in judicial decisions 
• Arab judges’ perception of their role in religious affairs 
• How Arab judges think that they are perceived by the public 
• What Arab judges believe the public expects of the judiciary 
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Figure 27 below shows the extent to which the Arab judges say they value 
specific non-judicial groups in the performand of their job as a judge. In total, 
44 judges responded to this question.  
 
Figure 27. Importance Arab judges attach to various groups (n=44) 
 
 
“Religious authorities” were the group that most Arab judges (29) said was not 
important at all to them in doing their job as a judge. Only 6 judges considered 
religious authorities as “important”. The next group that were considered by 
more than half of Arab judges as not important at all, were “Government” (27 
judges) and “Media” (26 judges). Only 2 considered the government as 
“extremely important” in their job as judges. Eight judges considered the 
government of limited importance. For the media, the largest group of judges 
(14) said it was of limited importance. No judge who participated in the survey 
considered the media as “extremely important”.  
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The largest group that was considered by judges as “extremely important” or 
“important” in doing their job as a judge was “Parties that appear in cases 
before me” (31 judges). This group was considered by 15 judges as “extremely 
important”. Judges also tended to consider “Lawyers” (30 judges) and 
“Prosecutors” (28 judges) as “extremely important” or “important”. This was 
followed by “Court staff” and “Judicial colleagues” (25 and 24 judges 
respectively).  
 
There is a clear trend that shows that judges tend to consider non-judicial 
actors within the broader legal community as more important than those 
outside the legal community. The two groups with the most equivocal results 
were “Senior figures in the judiciary” and “the Public”. With regards to senior 
judicial figures, 12 judges considered it to be important and 12 did not consider 
them important at all; only 3 judges considered senior judges as “extremely 
important” and many judges considered senior figures to have a limited 
importance (17). Arab judges were also divided over the importance of the 
public to them in their job: while 16 judges considered the public to be 
extremely important or important, 21 judges considered the public to be of 
limited importance and 7 judges did not consider the public to be important at 
all.  
The executive  
In the survey, judges were asked two questions that explored their relationship 
with the government directly. Because the survey was anonymous and could 
not be traced back to any participant, it was hoped that judges would feel able 
to express their honest views of a difficult topic. As discussed above, when 
asked how much importance they placed on the government in their job as a 
judge, more than half answered that it was not important at all (27 judges.) To 
further explore judges’ perceptions of the role of government in their judicial 
role, the survey went on to ask Arab judges how influential they felt the 
recommendations of government officials were for a judge when deciding a 
case. The results are presented in Figure 28 below.  
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Figure 28. Influence Arab judges attach to government recommendations in their 
decision-making (n=55) 
 
 
Overall, two-thirds of the Arab judges in the survey said that the 
recommendations of officials were of no influence at all when deciding cases.  
Only 7 judges considered recommendations as very influential or influential; 
11 judges indicated that they considered official recommendations as 
“somewhat influential”.   
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the aim was to explore whether or not the 
executive had an influence on judges primarily through the prism of judges’ 
normative expectations. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the executive has been 
an actor that has traditionally been considered to exercise influence on the  
role and work of judges in several Arab states. Literature on judges and courts 
in the Arab Middle East tends to emphasise the role of executive hegemony 
on the work of judges.661 But the findings above appear to illustrate a different 
picture. Although a number of judges appeared to attach some importance or 
                                               
661  See for example Moustafa’s discussion of the Egyptian judiciary in Ginsburg T and 
Moustafa T, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge 
University Press 2008). See also the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), 
“The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of Arab Spring” (2012).  
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influence to the executive, they were in the minority. Most judges in the survey 
indicated that the executive had little impact on their job as judges. The 
exception was one Syrian judge who agreed that he did serve the community 
“but the intrusion of the executive branch and the intelligence services” made 
his work as a judge burdensome and pressured. Drawing on judges’ own 
answers, it appears that either judges do not want to admit that the executive 
has influence on judicial decision-making or they may honestly believe that 
officials do not (whether in fact they do or not). 
Arab judges and religious authorities 
As Figure 27 above illustrates, the group that was considered by Arab judges 
as the least important in doing their job was “Religious authorities”. Two-thirds 
of Arab judges in the survey indicated that religious authorities were not 
important at all. Considering the relevance of religion in the region and the 
existence of religious based courts in a number of Arab countries, additional 
questions were included in the Arab Judges Survey about judicial decision-
making and religion. Judges were asked the degree to which they agreed or 
disagreed that: (1) state judges should be able to interpret religious laws; and 
(2) state judges should be able to develop religious laws. The results are 
presented in Figure 30 below (answers of “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” are 
combined and answers of “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree” are combined).  
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Fifty-five judges answered these two questions and overall, most judges 
agreed that state judges should be able to interpret religious laws. 
Responses were more varied in relation to whether state judges should be 
able to develop religious laws. While the largest group (25 of 55 judges) 
agreed with the statement, a large number (18) were not certain and 12 
disagreed.  
Judges relationship to the public 
How judges think they are perceived by the public is an important element in 
understanding the judicial role. To explore this specific issue further, judges 
were asked to indicate how much they agreed with a series of statements 
about the judiciary and the public (see Table 29). The statements relate to 
Arab judges’ overall perceptions of how the public perceive the judiciary and 
also what public/societal role judges see for themselves. Judges could 
respond to each statement on a 5-point Likert scale (from “Strongly agree” to 
“Strongly disagree”).  
 
 
7
12
12
18
36
25
"State judges should be able to interpret
religious laws"
"State judges should be able to develop
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To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
Disagree Neither disagree nor agree Agree
 Figure 29. Arab judges' view of the role of state judges and religious laws 
(n=55) 
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Table 29. Questions about the Public (Arab Judges Survey) 
Please indicate whether you agree or 
disagree with the following statements: 
To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements? 
"As a judge, I feel I provide an important 
service to society." 
“The judiciary in my country is admired by 
the public” 
"There is a difference between what I think 
the job of a judge is and the way the public 
in my country see it." 
“The judiciary in my country is thought to be 
ineffective compared to other branches of 
government” 
 “The public respect the judiciary in my 
country” 
“The public think that the judiciary needs to 
change” 
 
Figure 31 below shows the extent to which Arab judges agreed that (1) as a 
judge, they provide an important service to society and (2) there was a 
difference in how they as judges perceived the role of a judge and how the 
public perceives it in their respective countries. (In Figure 31 answers of 
“Strongly Agree” and “Agree” are combined and answers of “Strongly 
disagree” and “Disagree” are combined).  
 
Figure 30. Judicial vs public perceptions of the judiciary (n=65) 
 
 
Arab judges in the survey, regardless of country, clearly feel they provide an 
important service to society. With the exception of one,  all judges agreed with 
this statement. But Arab judges’ views were more varied when it came to 
64
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1
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"As a judge, I feel I provide an important
service to society."
"There is a difference between what I think
the job of a judge is and the way the public
in my country see it."
Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree
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assessing whether the public in their country viewed the job of a judge in the 
same way as judges did. Three-quarters of judges in the survey (49 of 65) said 
they felt there was a difference between how they as judges perceived the job 
of a judge and how the public saw it. One senior judge from Tunisia 
commented that while the judge adjudicates a dispute within the framework of 
restrictive procedural laws, the litigant seeks justice and nothing else.662 
Another Tunisian judge commented that the job of a judge is inconsistent with 
the public’s view: “There is always scepticism about the judge's job and people 
dislike the rulings”.663  
 
To examine this issue further, the survey asked Arab judges to respond to four 
more specific statements about how the public in their country views the 
judiciary. Figure 32 below presents the results for all 55 judges combined (with 
“Strongly Agree” and “Agree” combined as “Agree” and “Strongly disagree” 
and “Disagree” combined as “Disagree”).  
 
                                               
662 Comment from Judge 1938201 (Arab Judges Survey) 
663 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey) 
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Figure 31 Arab judicial perceptions of public attitudes to the judiciary (n=55) 
 
 
Judges tended to generally agree with statements that related to positive traits 
of the judiciary, with just over half of the judges in the survey agreeing that the 
judiciary was respected by the public in their country (58% and 53% 
respectively). For the statements that depicted the judiciary in a negative light, 
responses were more varied. There was little consensus amongst the 55 
judges on the issue of whether the judiciary in their country was thought to be 
ineffective compared to other branches of government. Roughly 45.5% of 
respondents (25 judges) disagreed and 36% (20 judges) agreed with the 
statement. The statement that most Arab judges in the survey agreed with was 
that the public in their countries thought the judiciary needed to change (67%). 
One Saudi judge wrote that the judiciary “needs more support”.664 One senior 
Lebanese judge said that: “I think that people are not content with the work of 
the judiciary. The judiciary's work is not ideal. But unfortunately the other 
branches of the government are even worse”.665 And a Tunisian judge 
                                               
664 Comment from Judge 2013392 (Arab Judges Survey) 
665 Comment from Judge 1944358 (Arab Judges Survey) 
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commented that while Tunisia is currently undergoing a democratic transition, 
the importance of the judiciary as an independent authority has not yet been 
emphasised to the public.  
Summary  
Apart from the institutional rules and structures that aim to regulate the actions 
of judges, there are “unofficial norms” that have an impact on judges’ role 
conception. Judges are a part of the society in which they work, and they are 
not devoid of an awareness of how they are perceived by members of that 
society. Based on the survey findings, Arab judges appear to have an 
awareness of relationships with judicial and non-judicial external actors. 
 
In terms of their judicial colleagues, the survey findings show that Arab judges 
(at least those in the survey) felt that “knowledge of the law”, “dealing 
impartially with parties to cases” and “personal integrity” were among the most 
highly valued and clearly accepted norms of behaviour amongst Arab judges. 
In addition, the findings strongly indicate that “respect the views of others” and 
“show independence of mind” were among the accepted norms of behaviour 
among judicial colleagues. Arab judges tend to consider their immediate 
judicial colleagues and non-judicial actors within the broader legal community 
(lawyers, parties to cases, court staff and prosecutors) as more important to 
their work as judges than those outside, particularly the executive branch, 
media and religious authorities. Despite the fact that Arab judges did not see 
religious authorities as important to their work, many did feel that as judges 
they should be able to interpret and develop religious laws.
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Chapter 10. Discussion  
The main purpose of this research has been to begin to fill a knowledge gap 
about the role of judges in the Arab Middle East. This research combined three 
levels of investigation in order to understand the role and political significance 
of judges in the Arab Middle East: the social, the cultural and the personal. To 
do so, an interdisciplinary approach was used drawing on methods from law, 
political science, sociology, social psychology and anthropology.  
Arab judiciaries as institutions 
Judges and judicial institutions in Arab states are a product of long and slow 
growth over time, creating a “maze of rules, procedures, privileges, duties, 
etiquettes, rituals, informal understandings and arrangements”.666 Added 
complexities arise when the judiciaries are placed in a historical perspective. 
Several historical micro and macro trends have come to shape the way Arab 
judges operate today. Chapter 3 sought to situate present judicial roles in the 
Arab region within a broad historical context. The purpose was to offer a more 
nuanced insight into the historical development of judicial culture in the Arab 
region. Placed in this context, judicial practices in the region embody at least 
four legal traditions, with each tradition creating a unique role for the judge. 
The historical review also illustrates the limits of classifying the historical 
periods as a binary interaction between religious and secular notions of law 
and judicial practice. In particular, exploring judicial and legal roles in the 
region as a battle between “modernity” and “traditionalism” is an 
oversimplification. 
 
Against this historical review, the remaining chapters sought to explore present 
judicial roles in the Arab Middle East through the concept of “judicialisation”, 
examining the extent to which Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese and Saudi 
judges may play a political role. This was done by focusing on the present 
institutional arrangements in place that regulate the power of courts, the status 
                                               
666 John C. Wahlke , Heins Eulau , William Buchanan , LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative 
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (John Wiley & Sons 1962). p.50  
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of Arab judges within the institution of the judiciary, and the subjective 
understandings of individual Arab judges that occupy a judicial role.  
Institutional structures of Arab judiciaries 
First, the institutional settings in which judges operate were explored. In each 
Arab country, formal boundaries are placed on the functions of judges and 
courts: “what judges prefer to do and what they think they ought to do are not 
necessarily compatible with what they are encouraged or allowed to do”.667 By 
mapping and analysing the structural set up of the various courts in Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia it was possible to explore whether the 
structural variations found in individual judicial systems were conducive to the 
political significance of courts and judges. The four legal systems share 
similarities, albeit superficial, with European civil law judicial systems, including 
separate and autonomous judicial pyramids. However, their structural set up 
illustrates potentially different manifestations of judicialisation compared to 
each other, and compared to Western countries.  
 
In Egypt, the three superior courts in particular are argued in this thesis to play 
an important political role. This is a feature that does not exist elsewhere in the 
Arab region. Similarly, the powers of judicial review granted to the Egyptian 
Supreme Constitutional Court are significantly wider than courts in continental 
civil systems.  
 
In Jordan, the Court of Cassation is equipped with broad jurisdictional powers 
in accordance with the relevant law discussed in Chapter 5. This also includes 
jurisdiction over the separate judicial branches. The Court is the only judicial 
body empowered to assess whether there are grounds to refer a case to the 
Jordanian Constitutional Court, making it an instrument for judicial politics. 
                                               
667 J Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of 
Judicial Behavior” (1983) 5 Political Behavior 7; James L Gibson, “Judges’ Role Orientations, 
Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model” (1978) 72 American Political Science Review 
911., p.27 
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The initial impression was that the Lebanese judicial structure appear to hinder 
“judicialisation” because of the fragmented character of courts.  But the powers 
granted to the Court of Cassation through the appeals process as well as the 
its powers to create a judicial council equips the Court with significant political 
powers. In addition, the ability of both the parliament and the executive to raise 
constitutional challenges means that constitutional issues are part and parcel 
of political life and dialogue, which is a defining feature of judicialisation. The 
possibility that a law may be referred to the Constitutional Council means that 
more attention is paid to constitutional issues within the political sphere.  
In Saudi Arabia, a unique form of judicialisation can be said to exist despite 
the fact that judges work in courts typified by the classic continental legal 
structure, and despite the absence of a strict separation of powers. Judges are 
accorded a political role by virtue of the significance of Saudi culture and 
religion. The following description by Vogel captures this unique role of Saudi 
judges: 
“[F]or a Saudi qāḍī, a judgment is not conceptualized as merely 
a legal outcome triggered by proof of certain physical (and 
psychological) facts. A qāḍī’s judgment is at once legal and 
religious (in our terminology), so the facts and their 
characterization must sound not only in a physical and legal but 
also in an ethical and religious realm. In this larger realm are 
necessarily dimensions of judicial activity to which our Western 
senses are not attuned; only after a certain exposure do we 
begin to discern those dimensions and that the qāḍī and parties 
are acting within them”.[Emphasis added].668 
The institutional career of the Arab judge  
Looking only at the official rules of a judicial system is not sufficient to 
appreciate all of the complexities of the institution. This thesis argues that it is 
also necessary to consider the internal institutional mechanisms that affect 
Arab judges, specifically the way judges are selected and trained and how their 
career and status were determined. All of these factors help to explain the 
                                               
668 Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System Studies of Saudi Arabia (Harvard University 
1993)., p. 324 
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political significance of judges in the region, and may affect the willingness of 
judges to intervene in the political process.  
 
The thesis sought to explore the institutional controls of the four Arab 
jurisdictions through two models of judicial selection and career: the 
“professional model” and the “bureaucratic model”. The two models are 
commonly used in Western democracies and have been argued to affect the 
political significance of the judiciary in different ways.669 The mechanisms of 
control in relation to judges’ status in the four Arab countries take on different 
forms and involve actors found within and outside the judiciary. The processes 
further reveal that such social controls in Arab judiciaries are not strictly 
confined to either the Western bureaucratic or professional models. Judicial 
selection, training, career and control in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia are perhaps best described as somewhere in the middle of the 
bureaucratic-profession continuum, depending on the type of control explored.  
 
Several factors appear to affect Arab judges’ political significance in relation to 
informal rules and practices that govern who becomes a judge and the future 
prospects of judges. In Egypt, there appears to be a preference for individuals 
who have social and family ties within the judiciary, which is further 
excaberated by the vetting of candidates’ applications by the Ministry of Justice 
and the National Security Agency. In Saudi Arabia, a prerequisite is a good 
comprehension of social and cultural issues by virtue of the religious nature of 
the judicial office. And in Lebanon the need to ensure religious representation 
appear to act as an informal qualification for judicial office. 
 
Indications of judicialisation were also found in relation to career 
advancements. Although all four Arab countries officially adhere to principles 
                                               
669  For a professional judiciary, “influence of the political system is channelled 
primarily through the appointment process” whereas in a bureaucratic judiciary 
the “political influence is filtered through the hierarchical structure and 
procedures for career advancements”. Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The 
Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas 
(Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.64-66. 
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of seniority and merit, in practice promotions illustrate the power of different 
actors internal and external to the judiciary. Hierarchical superiors play an 
important  role for Arab judges’ career advancement, and promotion is closely 
linked with how they are evaluated by senior judges. Varying degrees of 
executive interference also appear to exist, especially for senior judicial posts. 
In Egypt, this is a recent developmet with a new amendment to the law of the 
judiciary formalising external political involvement. In Lebanon, religious 
representation also plays an important part in the advancement of judges, 
particularly for senior positions. In Saudi Arabia, royal support plays a major 
part in judges’ career advancement.  
Arab judges’ prior personal experiences 
Although judiciaries carefully select, train and control judges to meet the 
institutional requirements of judges, the influence exercised by judiciaries is 
limited in at least one important respect. Judicial roles are occupied by 
individuals who may bring prior experiences to the job or hold other positions 
simultaneously. Predispositions developed and acquired through education 
and prior professional experiences are important factors which could be 
powerful influences on how judges act in their roles.670 
 
The findings made from Arab judges’ LinkedIN profiles and the Arab Judges 
Survey showed that Arab judges have a diverse set of background attributes 
based on education, as well as prior and simultaneous professional 
experiences. The findings illustrate several predispositions that may be 
important for the political significance of judges. For instance, out of the 
LinkedIN sample, a high proportion of Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese 
judges obtained post-graduate law degrees from abroad, and in many cases 
these degrees were obtained in jurisdictions significantly different from their 
own (in Europe and the US). Legal values obtained through these educational 
experiences prior to joining the bench (and also during the judicial office) may 
impact the judicial role if the individual judge believes they are important: 
                                               
670 Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges 
Ph.D. Tulane University., p. 147 
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“Judges may decide cases because of predispositions developed 
through their own socialization and they may adhere to certain legal 
philosophies for the same reason. Legal orientations internalized as a 
result of law school training may reinforce previous predispositions”.671 
 
The possibility of social variables affecting Arab judicial role perceptions and 
practices is further illustrated by the findings on prior professional experiences 
of Arab judges. The judges surveyed and profiled in this study illustrate a 
variety of prior professional experiences, such as prosecution, private law 
practice, academia and in some cases governmental positions. And because 
lateral recruitment of legal practitioners into the judiciary exists in Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, this can foster greater connections with 
those outside the judicial branch. Arab judges’ education and professional 
experiences indicate a diverse set of socialisation patterns, which in turn 
heighten the possibility of judges being politically significant in their judicial 
functions. Taken together, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 helped to shed light on 
who Arab judges are, how they may be controlled by their judicial institutions 
and how individual experiences may shape the judicial role. 
The mind of the Arab judge 
Even within formal legal boundaries that set out the judicial role, judges have 
some room to define their own objectives. Within the framework of judicial role 
theory, this thesis explored individual Arab judges’ beliefs about the qualities, 
behaviours and characteristics suitable for the role they have to perfom.672 
Judicial roles can be categorised into three stages. The first stage involves 
formal written rules of judicial conduct.673The second stage involves spoken 
norms about proper judicial behaviour.674 The final stage involves the concept 
of the “mind of the performer”.675 Here the judicial role-holder acts in a 
                                               
671 Ibid. 
672  Central to role theory is the idea of role expectations, which is understood to be the beliefs 
concerning the qualities, behaviours and characteristics suitable to a specific social role. See 
generally Bruce J Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (Academic 
Press 1979) 
673  Ibid. p.117 
674  Ibid.  
675  Empirical research suggests that members whose roles provide for a high level of salience 
are more likely to adopt normative group beliefs than others. 
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particular way: “not because written instructions have been given to him [her], 
nor because of injunctions spoken by others, but rather of his [her] own 
internalised standards”.676 
 
In this study, how judges subjectively understand and conceive of their roles 
was explored in several ways. First, Arab judges’ personalities and 
capacities were examined, including whether individual judges’ personalities 
and capacitites predispose them to be more political. In Chapter 7 it was 
argued that judicial activism may be linked to individual judges’ self-esteem, 
and the empirical research explored how individual judges evaluated their 
contribution to the judicial role. The research showed that nearly all Arab 
judges who participated in the survey felt they provided an important service 
to society, and many of them also felt that being a judge was an important part 
of their self-image. The findings indicate a general pattern of agreement 
amongst Arab judges that the judiciary was an important part of the individual. 
Provided that a judge has other values he/she believes are equally important 
such as “justice”, “fairness” or “equality”, the combination of the two may serve 
as a powerful motivation for the judge to be more activist in his/her decision-
making. The likelihood of this was further reinforced when the objectives of 
Arab judges’ was explored. 
Four judicial role perceptions 
As described in Chapter 2, a frequent approach used in judicial research seeks 
to measure judges’ role orientations on the basis of four distinct judicial role 
perception categories.677 The underlying purpose behind these categories is 
to understand the degree of judicial creativity judges may afford themselves in 
the performance of their roles. The roles are distributed along a continuum that 
ranges from judicial restraint (following precedent, strict construction of 
constitutions and deference to legislative intent) to judicial activism 
                                               
676  The last stage involves a difficult assumption, that is, that individual role-holders are aware 
of their expectations and can state them if asked. See generally Nisbett Nisbett, Richard E.; 
Wilson, Timothy DeCamp, ‘Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes’ (1977) 84 Psychological Review 231 
677  See discussion of the different role orientations in Chapter 2.  
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(insubordination of precedents, statutes, and deference to personal attitudes, 
values, and goals).678 There are four distinct judicial role orientations that 
reflect an individual judge’s approach to adjudication. Figure 33 below 
illustrates the key features of each of the 4 judicial role categories. Although 
the role orientations are sometimes labelled differently by researchers, they 
remain conceptually similar in that they all fall within the continuum of judicial 
activism and restraint.679  
 
 
Figure 32 Four conceptually distinct judicial role orientations 
 
 
Objectives judges perceive as important in the performance of their judicial 
roles include norms that guide their behaviour. By extension, they also include 
individual judges’ internalised impressions of societal norms and expectations 
of what constitutes the role of a judge.680 The findings on judicial role 
orientations in Chapter 8 help to place Arab judges within these four 
                                               
678  J. Woodford Howard Jr., Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S. Courts of Appeals 
(1977) 39 University of Chicago Press, p. 916. 
679  As discussed in Chapter 2, the four judicial role orientations are: “executor”; “delegate”; 
“guardian”; and “political”. 
680  “Generalised other” is George Herbert Mead’s term for the collection of roles and attitudes 
that people use as a reference point for figuring out how to behave in a given situation. See 
generally George Herbert Mead, Charles W Morris and George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and 
Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Univ of Chicago Press 2000). 
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established judicial role orientations. Based on the survey data, Arab judges’ 
responses indicated that at least two role orientations are prevalent in the 
region: the “executor” and the “guardian” judge. 
The executor judge 
The “executor” role orientation reflects a well-defined and widely accepted role 
conception of what a judge “ought to be”. The executor judge is someone who 
does not consider the societal needs or social consequences of judicial 
decision-making. He/she considers precedent as a major factor in decision-
making, and therefore advocates for “judicial self-restraint as a necessary 
control over reading personal predilections into law”.681 In other words, the 
executor judge is a passive executor of the legislative will, a mere mouthpiece 
of the law.682   
 
Some of responses made by Arab judges in the survey indicate that they 
perceive their roles in terms of the executor role, where a judge’s purpose is 
simply “to apply codified law”683 and "administer justice according to law".684 
As one Tunisian judge commented: “the judge is obliged to apply the legal 
texts and not the conflicting interests of the community”.685 Overall, Arab 
judges’ responses tended to favour and rank formalistic and generic roles such 
as “Administrator of justice” and “Applier of the law”, over roles such as “Arbiter 
of morality” and “Architect in the country’s body of law”. This tendency was 
found across the Arab countries represented in the survey, particularly in Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon.  
 
Formal roles such as the “executor role” are not unique to the Arab judges 
surveyed, nor is it unique to civil law jurisdictions. One possible reason why so 
many judges adhered to this role is that it is straightforward and that activities 
                                               
681  Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, “Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges” (1972) 6 Law & Society Review, p. 346. 
682 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.69. 
683 Comment from Judge 1944358 (Arab Judges Survey) 
684 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey) 
685 Comment from Judge 2085655 (Arab Judges Survey) 
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such as “the application of the law” and “administration of justice” constitute 
directly observable behaviour.  As Glick points out: 
“Unlike legal scholars, who do not discuss adjudication because 
it is so obvious to them, judges are constantly confronted with 
their formal task. When asked to describe their job, they reply 
with this formal purpose because it is the one most readily 
apparent.”686 
 
At a minimum, judge’s activity is first and foremost about adjudication which is 
the most straightforward and undisputed role of a judge. Common descriptions 
of judges such as the “interpreter of the law” and “applier of the law” are the 
easiest to identify with, which may explain why such a large proportion of 
judges tend to choose this role. This would also explain why the “executor” role 
is not peculiar to any legal tradition, it is simply the most straightforward 
description a judge can provide for a layman.  
 
According to Guarnieri and Pederzoli, while a “mechanistic” judicial role might 
be desirable and the most straightforward description, it does not necessarily 
reflect a complete picture of the judicial role. Judges, by virtue of applying the 
law, engage in interpretation: “legal norms do not pre-date interpretation but 
assume meaning through the very process of interpretation, a process in which 
the judge obviously plays a strategic role.”687 This research has shown that 
Arab judges, as well as American, Swiss and Austrian judges, tend to identify 
this core-role function as the most straightforward and visible purpose they can 
have.  
Beyond the “mouthpiece of the law” 
In the Arab Judges Survey, generic roles were ranked by Arab judges as the 
most important roles to have. However, other findings from the survey cast 
some doubt on whether the “executor role” really holds true for all Arab judges. 
For instance, judges’ responses to statements about precedent demonstrate 
                                               
686 Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University. p 73  
687 According to the authors, the “delegate” judge is a more realistic version of the “executor” 
judge. Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.70 
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a more nuanced picture. Nearly all Arab judges in the survey said that 
precedent was influential, bur judges’ responses to the number of precedent 
statements tended to vary.  
 
It appears that most Arab judges are found somewhere in the middle of the 
precedent role orientation spectrum. A minority of the Arab judges (3) were 
found to have a very high orientation towards precedent and a minority (3) 
were found to have a very low orientation towards precedent. Drawing on 
the role concept of the “executor judge”, this would mean that only three Arab 
judges in the survey may properly be described as “executor” judges. Most 
judges are found somewhere in the middle of the spectrum which renders them 
neither “high precedent-regarding” nor “low precedent-regarding.688   
 
An additional factor which further cast doubt on the executor role for Arab 
judges relates to judges’ answers to whether they agreed that “judges are 
merely instruments of the law”. Out of 48 Arab judges, only 4 judges agreed 
with the statement. Figure 34 below shows the overall distribution of judges’ 
responses to this statement. 
 
                                               
688 Where 15 judges agreed with (or found influential) at least 2-3 statements, and 27 judges 
agreed with 4-5 statements. 
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Figure 33 Arab judges' responses to "judges are merely instruments of the law and 
can and will nothing" (n=48) 
 
 
 
According to Glick, judges and courts are “claim granting agencies” that 
manage demands of individuals and interest groups amongst other.689 This is 
particularly true in light of the findings from Chapter 8 on judicial role 
perceptions. For those Arab judges that were surveyed for this study, a high 
number indicated that they would incorporate community standards into their 
decision-making. Comparing Arab judges with judges from three Western civil 
and common law countries, the Arab judges tended to be more cognisant of 
social considerations than the Western judges (or at least more willing to admit 
to this).690 This also challenges the myth that Arab judges are “executor” 
judges and are purely mechanical objective appliers of the law.  
 
The survey results also did not provide a strong indication that a “political” 
role orientation exists among Arab judges (at least those surveyed). This may 
be attributed to several factors, including the controversial nature of this 
                                               
689  Glick, H. (1967) Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.3 
690 See Chapter 8 for a fuller comparison of responses between Arab and Western judges. 
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particular role orientation. Glick argues that even if judges conceived their roles 
as political, they would “find it necessary to pay deference to the concept of 
precedent when questioned by laymen”.691 Nevertheless, there are clear 
indications that both judicial “activism” and judicial “restraint” exist among the 
Arab judges surveyed for this study. They tended to regard both the public and 
precedent as important in their judicial roles (albeit with more importance 
attached to the public aspect).  
 
In light of the research findings, another possible role orientation for Arab 
judges is the “guardian judge”. Contrary to the executor judge, whose sole 
purpose is to apply the law, the guardian judge acts as a “moral force” in the 
community.692 The guardian judge’s goals are to balance contending 
principles, evaluate the conditions in society and act as a decision maker to 
promote the welfare of society.693 In achieving these goals, the guardian judge 
seeks to understand and appreciate the changing social forces and 
environments in making his/her decisions.694 According to Flango et al., the 
public dimension relates to the difference between judges who rely on their 
own judgment in making decisions and judges who incorporate community 
standards into their decision-making.695  
 
A substantial number of Arab judges who took the survey indicated that 
community standards were important to their decision-making. For instance, 
Arab judges tended to rank “guardian of the community” among the top three 
important roles for a judge to have in their country.696 The importance of the 
public and the community was also reflected in the specific comments Arab 
                                               
691 Henry Robert Glick, Judicial Role Perceptions and Behavior: A Study of American State 
Judges. (Tulane University 1967), p.285 
692 Glick, H. (1967) Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.60  
693  Thomas D Ungs and Larry R Baas, “Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of 
Ohio Judges” (1972) 6 Law & Society Review. p.347 
694  Ibid. 
695 Flango, V., Wenner, L. and Wenner, M. (1975) “The Concept of Judicial Role: A 
Methodological Note” American Journal of Political Science, 19(2), (Concept), p.282 
696 10 judges ranked this role as number 1 (i.e., the most important role) and 25 judges ranked 
this role either “2” or “3”.  
 248  
judges provided in the survey. For instance, one Lebanese judge said that 
keeping up with social mores was acceptable when the “change is objectively 
for the better future of the society”.697 Similarly, one Tunisian judge explained 
that a judge “should bear in mind the effect of his/her judgment”.698 In a similar 
vein, several judges agreed that decisions should be just rather than adhering 
to the letter of the law. One Lebanese judge, for instance, wrote that law and 
justice “must be balanced as much as possible” in judges’ judgments and 
decisions.699 
 
Furthermore, most Arab judges responded favourably to all 8 public-
orientation statements, many of which suggested that the public aspects of 
judicial decision-making were important. Most Arab judges in the survey (33 of 
48) have a high orientation to the public. Along this public-oriented spectrum, 
a minoirty of Arab judges (4 of 48) appear to have a very high orientation 
towards the public. By contrast, 6 judges can be said to have a moderate 
orientation and only 1 judge to have a very low public orientation. Based 
on the public-orientation dimension, this would arguably place Arab judges 
somewhere between the “guardian role” and the “delegate role”.  
 
While the two roles are conceptually distinct from each other and can in many 
respects be seen as two opposites, the research findings suggest that both 
role conceptions may not be mutually exclusive. It appears that both 
orientations can operate simultaneously in the minds of Arab judges. This is 
supported by the findings from the ranking question, where judges were not 
required to rank all roles, only those they considered most important in their 
respective countries. Most judges chose to rank all roles, and as one judge 
commented “ranking might differ from one case to another”.700 A similar 
comment was made by one senior judge from Tunisia: 
“If the law (which is the main source of legitimacy) carries fair 
and equal human rights and justice, the judiciary will be safe in 
practice. But application of the law assumes that judicial 
                                               
697 Comment from Judge 1920801 (Arab Judges Survey) 
698 Comment from Judge 1938201(Arab Judges Survey) 
699 Comment from Judge 1924649 (Arab Judges Survey) 
700 Comment from Judge 1920801 (Arab Judges Survey) 
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institutions working with human and material resources are 
capable of providing the judge with the best conditions for the 
application of the law, so that the law will not remain a prisoner 
of obstruction of justice”.701   
 
Provided the law is just and fair, the judge’s primary objective will be to apply 
it. But should that not be the case, different judicial roles might be assumed in 
order to achieve what the law is lacking: justice and fairness. In ideal 
circumstances, the default purpose of the judge is to be an “objective applier 
of the law". Nevertheless, seen within the often politically fraught contexts in 
which Arab judges operate, their formal purpose may change and assume a 
more guardian role for the public when necessary. Judges are part and parcel 
of the political and social reality in which they adjudicate. On this basis, it may 
very well be necessary for Arab judges to have several role orientations in 
order to address particular situations. 
Arab judicial norms of internal and external behaviour 
The research also examined individual Arab judges’ expectations of what 
constitutes proper judicial behaviour in relation to other judges (judicial peers) 
and other politically significant people outside judiciary (non-judicial actors). 
These expectations can also affect the political significance of judges. 
Judicial peers  
Arab judges clearly have expectations concerning what constitutes proper 
behaviour on their part towards other judges who occupy the same role. 
Similarly, other judges have expectations regarding what a judge should or 
should not do in dealings with judicial colleagues. As Glick writes, “the sum of 
the interactions of these two sets of normative expectations taking place 
between the judge and his/her judicial colleagues defines the judge’s role”.702   
 
The Arab Judges Survey showed that Arab judges think their judicial 
colleagues expect them to possess strong knowledge of law, be impartial with 
                                               
701 Comment from Judge 1938201 (Arab Judges Survey) 
702 Glick, H. (1967). Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges, 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.18 
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parties to a dispute and hold strong moral principles. Arab judges, on the other 
hand, mostly expect their colleagues to respect the views of others, even when 
they disagree, but also to show an independence of mind. One Lebanese 
judge commented on the relationship between the two qualities as follows:  
“When a judge is part of a panel it is important to discuss and be 
receptive to arguments and persuasion. But in the end, if the 
judge is still convinced with his/her views he should not change 
his attitude towards the decision to take”.703  
 
According to Scheb, political scientists have traditionally preferred to explore 
potential conflicts among judges rather than consensus: “Given that their main 
task has been to explain variation in decision-making”.704 Contrary to common 
law countries, judicial dissent is not publicised in Arab countries; for instance, 
courts routinely use one single judgment. However, the lack of split decisions 
does not mean that there is no variation in view among judges. By exploring 
what norms of consensus are amongst Arab judges, the research provides for 
yet another insight to the role of judges in the region. It primarily shows that 
judges do not act alone and will often need to adhere to certain qualities in 
order to perform the tasks that comes with the judicial office. The findings also 
illustrate what type of norms individual Arab judges feel they must conform to 
in order to become part of the group.  
 
At the outset of this study, it was argued that formal codes of judicial conduct  
promote an unrealistic vision of judicial activity. They usually seek to limit the 
role of the judge to the conceptual role of the “executor” judge as mere 
mouthpieces of the law.705 Based on the research findings, Arab judges appear 
to categorise some principles higher than others (Figure 35). The most highly 
valued and clearly accepted norms among Arab judges were: dealing 
                                               
703 Comment from Judge 1944358 (Arab Judges Survey) 
704 Scheb M John, (1982), Merit Selection, Role Orientations and Legal Rationalization: A Q-
Technique Study of The Florida State District Courts (PhD, University of Florida), p.85 
705 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of 
Courts and Democracy, edited by CA Thomas (Oxford Univ Press 2002) p.69 
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impartially with parties to cases,706 personal integrity,707 and knowledge of the 
law.708  
 
Figure 34 Arab judges' level of consensus on accepted norms of judicial behaviour 
(in order of hierarchy) 
 
 
Dealing impartially with parties to cases forms part of the second principle 
of the Sharjah Convention709. In relation to the impartial treatment of parties, 
judges are instructed to exercise their functions based on their professional 
appreciation of the facts and the appropriate legal reasons, without external 
influence, incitement, pressure, threat or interference from anyone. Judges 
must conduct investigations confidently, respecting the litigant’s right to legal 
counsel. They must also avoid making remarks that may be harmful, whether 
in office or during trials. A judge should recuse him/herself from a case if 
he/she believes that a fairness and impartially may be compromised.710 
According to the Sharjah Convention, practice of equal treatment is manifested 
when judges are aware that their respective societies include diverse 
                                               
706 100% of judges said it was important and 85% said it was valued by colleagues (n=52, 
Arab Judges Survey) 
707 100% of judges said it was important and 85% said it was valued by colleagues, (n=52, 
Arab Judges Survey) 
708 98% of judges said it was important and 90% said it was valued by colleagues, (n=52, Arab 
Judges Survey) 
709 Principle 2: Impartiality and Neutrality “Sharjah Convention 2007”. 
710 Ibid. 
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individuals and groups that have different religions, sects, races, nationalities, 
sex, age, civil status, physical and psychological capacities.711  
 
Personal integrity falls under the third principle of the Sharjah Convention. 
The principle refers to a judge’s ability to hold him/herself to constant moral 
and ethical standards. Judges should ensure that their conduct is above 
reproach in the view of a reasonable observer and that their behaviour and 
conduct must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.712 
Judges with integrity are described  to be role models for their colleagues, and 
they consider themselves as having a duty to encourage integrity amongst 
their peers and confront them when their integrity falters.713  
 
Finally, Knowledge of the law falls under the eighth principle of the Sharjah 
Convention and also reflects the relevant provisions in the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct.714 A judge possessing knowledge of the law is 
described as someone who constantly strives to learn and improve their legal 
knowledge through research.  
 
The importance of these three qualities may also indicate that should judges 
fail to conform to them, they will disrupt the working consensus. Because 
judges often work in groups where members share the same role, there must 
be some minimal level of “working consensus” where formal and informal 
norms indicate what is the expected relationship among judicial colleagues.715 
Although the true internal workings of collegiate courts may be hidden from 
view by an artificial image of “court unity” (reflected in the single judgement), 
the findings of this research indicate that certain norms may serve as points of 
reference for judicial conduct among Arab judges.  
                                               
711 Ibid. 
712 Principle 3: Integrity “Sharjah Convention 2007”. 
713 According to the principle of Integrity “a judge must maintain integrity because it is 
intertwined with the integrity of the judiciary as a whole” Ibid. 
714 Principle 8: Competence and Diligence “Sharjah Convention 2007”; ‘The Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct’ E/CN.4/2003/65 
715 John C. Wahlke, Heins Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative 
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (John Wiley & Sons 1962) p.145 
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Non-judicial actors 
A critical issue in assessing the poltiical significance of the judiciary in any 
jurisdiction is how judges view their relationships with non-judicial actors. 
Judges’ relationships with actors in the legal community are supposed to be 
conducted according to strict legal standards. Generally, rules of judicial 
conduct emphasise judicial objectivity, where judges are expected to “isolate 
themselves from influences which might affect their image of justice incarnate 
or which might skew their determination of a case”.716 Judges are considered 
as delegates of the judiciary and must therefore make sure that the dignity of 
the judiciary is upheld in relation to their personal and professional conduct.  
 
Here again, absolute judicial isolation presents a skewed picture of reality. 
Judges do interact with actors beyond the judicial community, primarily through 
decision-making. While the types of relationship judges have with non-judicial 
actors may vary from country to country, this research explored how Arab 
judges viewed their relationships with a wide range of non-judicial actors. And 
it examined Arab judges’ relationships with the wider public, religious 
authorities and the executive branch in more detail.  
 
The survey findings showed that Arab judges tended to consider non-judicial 
actors from outside the broader legal community as less important than actors 
within the broader legal community. Generally, judges considered parties to 
cases, lawyers and prosecutors as important. Court staff and judicial 
colleagues were also considered by many judges as important. In terms of 
judges’ relationship with the executive, most judges indicated that the 
executive had little impact on their job as judges. Religious authorities were 
also considered by judges of minor importance, particularly for their judicial 
roles. But more varied responses were found when Arab judges were asked 
about the judicial application and development of religious laws. Most Arab 
judges agreed that state judges should be able to interpret religious laws and 
many agreed that judges should develop religious laws.  
                                               
716 Glick, H. (1967) Judicial role perceptions and behavior: A study of American state judges. 
Ph.D. Tulane University, p.233 
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Judges and public perceptions 
Finally, an important relationship for judges that forms part of their core duties 
is their interaction with the public. In principle, judges are required to keep a 
distance from the community. For instance, under the fourth principle of the 
Sharjah Convention, Arab judges are instructed to maintain a balance between 
their judicial duties and their engagement in society.717 However, in practice 
judges are not insulated from society: they remain part and parcel of it primarily 
because of their accessibility. The most visible relationship is through disputes. 
The two studies made by HiiL in Jordan and Lebanon showed that the public 
perceptions of courts were divided, and individuals from both countries tended 
to have different expectations, attitudes, values and beliefs about the 
judiciary.718   
 
The findings from the Arab Judges Survey provided an additional perspective 
on the relationship between the public and judges in the Arab Middle East. 
Arab judges tended to feel that the judiciary was respected and admired by the 
public, but most also thought the public in their countries wanted the judiciary 
to change and saw the judiciary as ineffective. The findings corroborate the 
idea that judges are not isolated from or unaware of public perceptions. While 
Arab judges who took part in the survey were strongly of the view that they 
performed an important role in society, they were consciously aware that the 
public tends to perceive their judicial role differently.   
Does judicialisation exist in the Arab Middle East? 
At the outset of this study, it was hypothesised that judges and courts in the 
Arab Middle East have “political” dimensions attached to them as a result of 
the historical, religious, social and cultural developments of the region. Judicial 
roles in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia carry important political 
dimensions which are manifested in the institutional, functional and 
                                               
717 “Principle 4: Propriety”, Sharjah Convention 2007 
718 See Martijn Kind, Martin Gramatikov, Rodrigo Núñez, Roger El Khoury, Nadja Kernchen, 
“Justice Needs in Lebanon: Legal Problems in Daily Life” and “Justice Needs and Satisfaction 
in Jordan” (The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) 2017) Data and Impact  
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behavioural characteristics explored in this study. Based on the insights 
offered in this thesis, judicialisation is not a new phenomenon arising according 
to the “rights hypothesis”, nor is it a trait unique to contemporary democracies. 
Rather, the socio-cultural conditions in Arab states have always been 
hospitable to judicialisation, despite the lack of a liberal democratic 
government. It should be noted that although judicialisation can be claimed to 
exist in the Arab region, this study does not seek to either promote 
judicialisation or argue against it. The main purpose of this thesis has been to 
explore whether the phenomenon exists in the Arab region and to test the 
theory of judicialisation beyond its traditional boundaries of liberal 
democracies. Whether it is a good or bad judicialisation is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
Future research  
The exploratory nature of this research was ambitious in its approaches but 
modest in its aims: and the limitations of the findings cannot be stressed 
enough. In light of the sampling methods of all three studies and the size of 
samples, the conclusions drawn in this study are therefore are 
methodologically limited. Despite these limitations, the three studies provide 
for important information about judges and courts in jurisdictions where this 
issue has not been systematically and empirically explored. The findings 
therefore offer initial insights into the several topics such as role perceptions, 
background and attitudes of judges. Althought such insights are valuable in of 
themselves, it is hoped that future research will be able to overcome some of 
the methodological limitations of in this study.  
 
Furthermore, empirical research of the justice sector in the Arab region is 
scarce and often riddled with value-based analysis. A primary aim of this study 
was to contribute towards filling the knowledge gap about judicial roles and the 
administration of justice in the Arab region. The findings of the research in this 
thesis highlight several areas where future research on Arab judges and justice 
systems is needed, particularly studies that are empirically oriented and seek 
to understand how Arab legal systems and judges actually operate.  
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Assessing the impact of judicial reform projects  
Legal cultures are increasingly being imported, most notably through the rise 
of externally influenced judicial reform projects across the Arab region. Recent 
decades demonstrate an institutionalist revival of judicial reform projects in 
several Arab legal systems, often based on international legal models, 
terminologies and legal cultures. These have materialised into a myriad of 
initiatives led by international governmental organisations, non-governmental 
NGOs and trans-national organisations.719 These projects are often based on 
a “democracy promotion” approach, with the purpose of enhancing institutional 
capacity and promoting greater transparency and efficiency in Arab judicial 
sectors. For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Prevetion 
(UNODC) lists 32 ongoing projects of “Promoting Integrity and Building 
Justice” in the Arab region.720 It would be useful to investigate how Arab judges 
see these projects by exploring how Arab judges perceive the principles 
underlying the reform agendas, and what their professional and personal 
attitudes are towards them. More specifically, research is needed in relation to 
the actual impact these reform projects have on key actors in Arab judicial 
systems and whether they do bring about a change. 
Public perceptions of judges and justice 
This thesis provides an insight into how Arab judges understand their role and 
how they think the public see their roles. An important next step would be to 
expand this to encompass how citizens themselves in the Arab Middle East 
see the role of judges and courts in their societies. Further research in this field 
could continue to explore the judicial sector in the Arab region, but to shift focus 
from judges to the general public721 and other important actors in each 
                                               
719 See for instance ‘MENA-OECD Governance Programme’ (OECD 2017) 
<https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/mena-oecd-governance-programme-2017.pdf>. 
720 UNODC, ‘Project Summary’ (United Nations Office on Drug and Crime 
Prevention)<https://www.unodc.org/middleeastandnorthafrica/en/resources/projects-
summary.html> accessed 11 September 2018. 
721 As noted earlier, the World Justice Project study was only able to include two Arab states 
in its 2018 survey: Lebanon and Tunisia. Global Insights on Access to Justice Findings from 
the World Justice Project General Population Poll in 45 Countries’ (World Justice Project 
2018) https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_Access-
Justice_April_2018_Online.pdf 
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jurisdiction in order arrive at a greater understanding of how Arab judicial 
institutions and judges are perceived. The findings from the research 
conducted for this thesis, in particular data from the Arab Judges Survey, 
indicate that judges in many Arab states feel there is a difference between how 
they see their judicial function and how the public in their country see it. 
Empirical research with the public in the Arab region could say whether Arab 
judges are or are not correct about this. Building on recent empirical studies 
such as the WJP and HiiL on legal experiences and satifaction of individuals, 
future research endeavours should deepen the inquiry about public 
perceptions of judges and seek to understand the link between the two 
groups.722  
Conclusion: The reality of “Qāḍī justice” 
This thesis has sought to shed some insight into the judicial role in the Arab 
Middle East, which has often been erroneously portrayed as “unbounded as 
to appear arbitrary and even tyrannical”.723 The thesis has sought to address 
these misconceptions through three approaches. The mapping of Arab judicial 
systems highlights the rich and complex nature of judicial power in different 
Arab states. This showed that there is no singular “qāḍī” justice system, but a 
multitude of systems informed by complex structural, functional and 
behavioural elements. Furthermore, the survey of Arab judges also 
demonstrates that judges in the Arab region have as much concern for rule-
based decision-making as their Western counterparts. It is clear that rules and 
procedures are important, even for Qāḍīs.  
 
For the legal anthropologist Rosen, the Qāḍī was one of those striking 
“oriental” figures used in the West to measure judicial discretion:  
                                               
722 See for instance Global Insights on Access to Justice Findings from the World Justice 
Project General Population Poll in 45 Countries’ (World Justice Project 2018) 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_Access-
Justice_April_2018_Online.pdf; ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Jordan’ (The Hague 
Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) 2017) Data and Impact 
<http://www.hiil.org/data/sitemanagement/media/JNS%20Jordan%202017_EN%20(Online)(
1).pdf> 
723 Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society 
(Cambridge University Press 1989)., p.58 
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“As in so many other instances the image of the exotic has thus 
come to serve westerners as a standard against which we 
measure our supposed advance along the enviable road of 
civilization”.724  
 
It is hope that this thesis has helped to shed some light onto why the flawed 
image of the Qāḍī as a whimsical figure in dispensing “Qāḍī-justice” should be 
abandoned, and that questions about the political significance of judges are as 
important and complex in the Arab region as they are in Western states.  
 
 
                                               
724 Ibid. 
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Conference of Heads of Judicial Inspection Bodies in the Arab States, 
Sharjah  <https://carjj.org/sites/default/files/sharjah_document.doc>  
Last accessed 30 August 2016 
 
Cases  
 
Decision No. 74/1994 of the Court of Cassation, issued on 13 March 1995. 
(Jordan) 
 
Terminiello v. City of Chicago. No. 272. (1949) 337 U.S. 1 (69 S.Ct. 894, 93 
L.Ed. 1131 
 
National legislation  
 
- Egypt  
 
Egyptian Constitution of 1971   
 
Egyptian Constitution of 2012  
 
Egyptian Constitution of 2014  
 
Constitutional Declaration  of March 30, 2011  
 
Constitutional Declaration of July 8, 2013  
 
Law No. 131 of 1948, “The Egyptian Civil Code” 
 
Law No. 162 of 1958, “Emergency Law” 
 
Law No. 46 of 1972, “Judicial Authority Law”   
Amendments:  
 
- Law No. 142 of 2006 
- Law No. 17 of 2007 
- Law No. 13 of 2017  
 
Law No. 47 for 1972, “The State Council Law” 
Amendments: 
- Law No.136 of 1984. 
 
Law No. 40 of 1977, “The Political Parties Law” 
Amendments: 
-  Law No.  177/2005 
 
Law. No. 48 of 1979  “Supreme Constitutional Court Law”  
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Law No. 35 of 1984 “Supreme Judicial Council Law” 
Amendments:  
- Law No. 142 of 2006  
 
Law No. 120 of 2008  “Economic Courts Law” 
 
Presidential Decree No. 503 of 2017, “On the composition of the National 
Election Authority” available at: 
https://www.elections.eg/images/pdfs/laws/PresDecreeNEABoard2017-
503_en.pdf 
 
- Jordan  
 
Jordanian Constitution of 1952 
Amendments:  
- Jordanian Constitution of 2012  
- Jordanian Constitution of 2014 
 
Law No. 22 of 1938,  “Law of non-Muslim religious denominations” 
 
Law No. 40 of 1952  “Law of Land and Water Settlement”  
 
Law No. 17 of 1959 “Law of the State Security Court” 
Amendment:  
- Law No. 11 of 1997  
 
Law No. 14 of 1961 “Law of State Property Court”  
 
Law No. 24 of 1964 “Law of the General Intelligence Department” 
 
Law No. 25 of 1964 “Law of Income Tax” (established the Income Tax 
Court of Appeal) 
 
Law No. 38 of 1965 “Law of Public Security”  
 
Law No. 19 of 1972, “Law of the Composition of Sharī’ʿa Courts” 
 
Law No. 19 of 1986 “Law of the Superior Criminal Court” 
 
Law No. 12 of 1992  “Law of the High Court of Justice” 
 
Law No. 17 of 2001 “Law on the Establishment of Regular Courts” 
 
Law No. 23 of 2006 “Law of the Composition of Military Courts” 
 
Law No. 34 of 2008 “Law on the Gendarmerie” 
 
Law No. 15 of 2012 “Law Creating the Constitutional Court” 
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Law No. 27 of 2014  “Law of the Administrative Courts” 
 
The Jordanian Code of judicial ethics (2017)  
 
- Lebanon  
 
Lebanese Constitution 23 May1926  
 
National Reconciliation Accord “Ta’ef Agreement” (1989) 
 
Law No. 186 of 1926, “Urgent Proceedings and Land Court” 
 
Law No. 2 of 1951, “Powers of Christian and Jewish Religious Authorities” 
 
Law No. 7855 of 1961,  “Judicial Organisation Law” 
 
Law No. 150 of 1983, “Law of the judicial system”  
Amendment:  
- Decree-Law No. 22 of 1985 
 
Law for Sunni and Shi’a (1963)  
 
Customs Court Customs Law (1974) 
 
Decree No. 10434 of 1975, “Council of State “  
Amendment: 
- Law No. 227 of 2000 
 
Law No 82 of 1982,  “Law on the Court of Audit” 
 
Law No. 150 of 1983, “establishment of the Higher Judicial Council” 
Amendment:  
- Law of 23 March 1985 
 
Catholic Courts Law No.1 (1991)  
 
Expropriation Commissions Law No. 58 of 1991 
 
Law No. 250 of 1993 “establishment of the Constitutional Council”  
Amendments: 
- Law No. 305, 21:March 1994;  
- Law No. 150, 30 October 1999; 
- Law No. 650  4 February 2005; 
- Law No. 9 June 2006;  
- Law No. 43, 3 November 2008;   
- Law No. 242, 22 October 2012   
 
Law No. 13 of 1998 relating to Procedures before the Higher Council 
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Law No. 1 of 2 003, “Orthodox Law”  
 
Law No. 29 of 2014, Lebanon’s Code of judicial ethics  
 
Decrees No. 7855 of 1961and  No. 10494 of  1962, establishing and 
regulating the Institute for Judicial Studies was established  
 
Decree No. 60 (1936)  
 
Decree No. 3473 (1960) 
 
Decree No. 7855 of 1961 
 
Decree No. 59/2868 
 
Decree No. 79/1663 
 
Decree No. 67/28. 
 
Decree No 77/1 of 2005 
 
- Saudi Arabia  
 
Royal Decree of 24/3/1347 H (corresponding to 20 August 1928 G) 
 
Royal Decree No A/90 of 27/8/1412 H (corresponding to 5 March 1992 
G) “The Basic Law of Governance” 
 
Royal Decree No. M/21 (2000) “The Law of Procedure Before Sharī’ʿah 
Courts”  
 
Royal Decree No M/21 of 17/6/1421 H (corresponding to 15 September 
2000 G) “Law of Sharī’ʿa  Procedure” 
 
Royal Decree No M/39 of 28/7/1422 H (corresponding to 16 October 
2001 G) “Law of Criminal Procedure,” 
 
Royal Decree No M/78 of 19/9/1428 H (corresponding to 1 October 2007 
G), “Law of the Judiciary,” 
 
Royal Decree No M/78 of 19/9/1428 H (corresponding to 1 October 2007 
G). “Law of the Board of Grievances,” 
 
Royal Decree no. M/34, dated 24/5/1433 H (corresponding to 16 April 
2012 G), “New Arbitration Law”  
 
Royal Decree No M/2 of 22/1/1435 H (corresponding to 25 November 
2013) “Law of Criminal Procedure,” 
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Royal Decree No M/1 of 22/1/1435 H (corresponding to 25 November 
2013 G) “Law of Sharī’ʿa Procedure” 
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Appendix 1: Judicial Structures in Bahrain, Syria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates according to official laws  
 
 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC  
 
Directly influenced by the Ottoman Tanzimat. The Majalla served as a civil code in Syria until 1949, when it was replaced by the Syrian Civil Code of 
1949. Largely patterned on  the Egyptian Code. 
 
First degree 
courts 
Courts of Peace 
Courts of First Instance  
Court of Assize 
 
Courts of First Instance are divided into criminal and civil branches and hears claims that cannot 
be heard by the Court of Peace either because of the dispute at hand is urgent or it is concluded 
to be too complex. Hears cases in which sentence exceeds three years.   
Courts of appeal  Thirty Courts of Appeal, three 
criminal courts and four civil 
courts located in Damascus 
and one in every district. 
 
Hears appeals from lower courts. The verdicts can however be nullified by the Cassation court 
Apex courts  The Court of Cassation is 
located in Damascus and is at 
the apex of the ordinary 
Judiciary.  
The Court is divided into four chambers, each chamber composed of a three-judge panel. 
Chamber for Canonical, Military, Civil and Commercial, and Criminal. Hears appeals on points 
of Law and may nullify lower court verdicts. Judgments handed down by the Court of Cassation 
set precedent for lower courts to apply and has the right to overrule lower court judgments. 
 
Administrative Administrative court system is 
stipulated in the constitution. 
Both are separate from the 
courts of general jurisdiction. 
There are two levels of courts that hear administrative cases. The Council of State which 
includes advisory as well as judicial functions and a court of First Instance  
 
Special courts 
  
 
Religious 
The Sharī’ʿa (Muslim), 
Doctrinal (Druze) and Spiritual 
Courts (Christian and Jewish) 
specialised jurisdiction in 
The Religious court system is separated into three-tier hierarchies.  Each court has its own 
appellate court, and the final appeal lies within the Doctrinal and Religious branch at the Court 
of Cassation 
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relation to Personal status and 
family laws 
Constitutional The Supreme Constitutional 
Court (SCC)  
  
 
Mandate to decide on the constitutionality of Laws, review challenges arising from the election 
of the members of the People’s Council and the President of the Republic, and try the President 
of the Republic for treason. 
 
The SCC is composed of 11 members appointed by the President of the Republic. The duration 
of the term for the judges is set for a renewable period of four years. Judges at SCC are not 
entitled to hold office at the People’s Council or the Council of Ministers. 
 
Military & 
Security 
There are a number of other 
courts with specialised 
jurisdictions over certain 
cases.  
 
Military field courts. The Military may establish field courts and try cases referred by the 
minister of Defence and prosecuted by the Military Prosecutor.  
Supreme State Security Court Hears cases related to national security. Its judgments cannot 
be appealed and are not bound by the same procedures of the ordinary courts. 
Economic Security Courts. Established to look into cases involving economic crimes. 
jurisdiction because they do include civil judges. Judgments may be appealed before the Court 
of Cassation. 
 
Appointment 
 The court system is overseen 
by the Supreme Judicial 
Council (SJC) is the main 
organ responsible for the 
organisation of the judiciary 
and the court system. The SJC 
is headed by the Minister of 
Justice and 7 members 
including the Head of State. 
 
 
 
The selection process is based on academic merit and examination. Degree in law is required 
but no explicit requirement of having practiced as a lawyer. Two year training programme for 
successful applicants and if successful, candidates are appointed as judges to the lower courts, 
as deputy public prosecutors or investigating judges.  
 
Seniority and merit is the official criteria for career advancement in the judiciary. Court of 
Cassation judges are appointed by the SJC.  
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KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN  
 
Characterised as a dual court system where courts are  divided into two branches: The Civil Law Courts and the Sharī’ʿa Law Courts. 
The legal system of Bahrain is based on several sources, including customary tribal law and schools of Islamic  Sharī’ʿa law (both Shi’a and Sunni 
schools) and Civil law which has been influenced by British common law. 
 
First degree 
courts 
Court of Minor Causes  
Court of Urgent Matters  
Court of Execution 
Hears cases under of minor value and or misdemeanour cases.  
Also hears cases concerning repossession of property expropriated 
in any way. May assist with specific responsibility to hear urgent 
matters on all claims that need urgent attention except for cases 
falling under the jurisdiction of Sharī’ʿa courts. Court is empowered 
to execute judgments issues by the Courts of all types and degrees. 
 
Courts of appeal  Bahrain has two Courts of Appeal; Greater Civil Court  
and the Higher Appeals Court. 
The Greater Civil Court is empowered to examine appeals from 
lower courts. Any judgment issued by this court in its appellate 
capacity may only be challenged before the Court of Cassation and 
not to the High Court of Appeal. The Greater Civil Court has 
jurisdiction-through an administrative department-in settling 
administrative disputes arising between individuals and between 
the government or public institutions or organisations, except in 
cases where the law stipulates otherwise. Serves as a Court of First 
Instance disputes concerning the Personal Status of Non- Muslims.  
 
The Higher Appeals Court hears appeals from the Court of Minor 
Causes and the Greater Civil Court 
 
Apex courts  The Court of Cassation was established in 1989  The Court serves as the final court of appeal for all civil, criminal, 
civil, commercial and Personal Status of Non-Muslims. Hears 
appeals on points of Law from judgments passed in the High Court 
of Appeal and the Court of Appeal, resolve jurisdictional disputes 
between Sharī’ʿa and civil courts as well as conflicting judgments.  
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Administrative Bahrain does not have and administrative judicial body. 
Instead, the civil division at the greater Civil Court has 
an administrative chamber that hears matters arising 
from administrative disputes. 
 
   
Religious Sharī’ʿa courts are the second, autonomous branch 
within the judicial structure regulated by Law No.13 
(2002).  Courts are divided into three tiers and further 
divided into Shi’a Divisions and Sunni Divisions. Any 
matter relating to the Personal Status of Muslims, 
including matters of Family Law is within the 
competence of the Sharī’ʿa Courts. 
First Instance Court hears all types of maintenance, child support, 
child custody and conservation, inheritance deeds, and other 
deeds. 
 
Sharī’ʿa High Court hears disputes that fall outside the First 
Instance Court. It is in addition empowered to hear appeals. Any 
judgment issued by this Court in its appellate capacity is final and 
cannot be challenged.  
 
Sharī’ʿa High Court of Appeal: A three-judge panel. Examines 
awards issued in the first instance by a Sharī’ʿah High Court against 
which an appeal is made. Final Court of appeal in respect of 
Muslims. (The Court of Cassation does not have the authority to 
entertain any appeal against any judgment issued by this Court). 
Special courts   
 
Constitutional 
 
The Constitutional Court was established the Bahraini 
Constitution of 2002 
 
The Court supervises laws on the basis of the constitution. 
Legislators, members of the government may bring a challenge to 
the court on the basis of constitutionality. The Court consists of a 
president and six members, appointed by royal decree for a 
specified time period 
 
Other  Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution was 
established in 2009 with a judiciary arm and an 
arbitration arm. In the event of a jurisdictional dispute, 
the Court of Cassation decides. 
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Military & 
Security 
Military Courts are divided into four tiers: (Special 
Military Courts; Lower Military Courts; Higher Military 
Courts; Military Appeals Court). 
 
The National Safety Court was established in 2011 
Judges status  The Higher Judicial Council oversees the courts and 
judges. It recommends the nomination of judges, who 
are formally appointed by a royal decree.   
The King chairs the Council, while other members consist of the 
Chairman of the Court of Cassation, the Attorney General, and at 
least five members from the judiciary appointed by royal decree, for 
a membership of three year 
 
Appointment  Law degree from an officially recognised Arab or foreign 
university is a prerequisite or,  an Islamic Shari'ah 
authorization that qualifies candidates to Shari'ah 
judgeship. Legal experience is also needed ranging from 
4 – 10 years depending on the level of court.  
 
Court of Cassation judges appointed by royal decree and serve for 
a specified tenure; Constitutional Court president and members 
appointed by the Higher Judicial Council, a body chaired by the 
monarch and includes judges from the Court of Cassation, Sharī’ʿa 
law courts, and Civil High Courts of Appeal; members serve 9-year 
terms.  
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REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA  
 
Similar to the Egyptian move away from the Ottoman Legal impact, Tunisia had a similar experience but less of an impact. At the time the 
Majalla was promulgated, Tunisia was fully immersed in its own legislative initiatives. With the Treaty of Marsa in 1883, Tunisia became formally 
under the French Protectorate which in legal terms meant that France was permitted to undertake legislative reforms.  The codification of the 
Tunisian Civil Law was instead drawn from a plurality of legal sources and a synthesis of diverse sources of continental civil law with Islamic law 
and Tunisian custom headed by the Italian-Tunisian Jurist David Santillana that helped to inform the judicial structure. Tunisian legal 
development is characterized as a thematic codification as opposed to Sanhuri’s “dual codalism”. It is a synthesis of diverse codes of continental 
civil laws with Islamic law and Tunisian custom. This was replicated in Morocco and Mauritania. Following the Tunisian Revolution, the judiciary 
has undergone several reforms. 
  
First degree courts District Courts 
Courts of First Instance 
District Courts hears cases regarding alimony claims, possessor actions, and urgent 
reports amongst other.  
First instance Courts serve as appellate courts for District courts (final instance with 
regards to alimony and possessor actions on purely principal grounds). Cases 
appealed from the District Courts can be appealed to the Court of Cassation. The 
courts hears all commercial and civil cases regardless of monetary value of claim. 
These courts also rule on rules on the constitution of companies, dissolution, 
liquidation, bankruptcy and rectification.  
 
Courts of appeal  Three Courts of Appeal in Tunisia. 
Each Court have a criminal and 
civil division 
The Courts of Appeal is competent to hear appeals of judgments rendered in first 
instance by the courts of first instance in its district in relation to civil matters. The 
courts hear appeals of a criminal nature flowing from  the court of first instance. Each 
court of appeal comprises of at least one indictment chamber with an investigating 
judge. The courts of appeal are also competent to hear appeals against the decisions 
of professional bodies such as the Bar Association. 
 
Apex courts  The Court of Cassation is Located 
in Tunis and serves as the final 
Court of Appeal with civil and 
criminal divisions. 
In addition to serving as a final instance court for civil  and criminal matters, the Court 
of Cassation has also jurisdiction over the settlement of judges and the dismissal from 
one court to another. It is also empowered to ensure the unity of jurisprudence and 
hears issues that involves conflicting jurisprudence of the lower courts.  
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Administrative Pursuant to the new constitution 
of 2014, Tunisia has an elaborate 
judicial structure dealing with 
administrative disputes, 
administrative courts, and courts 
dealing with the State budget and 
abuse of State power. 
The Administrative Courts have the jurisdiction to rule on disputes involving the 
administration and appeals for excessive powers to annul the acts of the central, 
regional and local administrative authorities, local public authorities and 
administrative public institutions. 
The Court of Auditors have the power to examine the accounts and the 
management of the state of local authorities, public industrial and commercial 
establishments as well as all bodies. 
The Court of Finance has the jurisdiction to review mismanagement of State funds 
by public institutions. 
Special courts   
Religious There are specialised sections in 
the civil courts handle personal 
Status laws and Family laws. 
 
 
 
Constitutional 
Following the Tunisian 
Revolution, the Constitutional 
Council underwent several 
reforms.  
The Tunisian Constitutional Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to rule on questions 
of on the basis of the Constitution. Lower courts may refer a constitutional issue to 
the Constitutional court during the course of its proceedings. The court has a priori 
powers in that it can review the constitutionality of draft legislation within three months 
(subject to an additional three month extension if there is a valid justification). Upon 
the request of the President, the Prime Minister, or thirty members of parliament the 
court can review draft laws, which are referred to the court within seven days of 
parliament’s adoption of the bill.   
Other    
Military & Security The Military has its own judicial 
body and managed by 
the National Defence Ministry. 
 
Under legislation there are three courts in the military branch:  
The Military Court of Appeal 
The Permanent Military Tribunal of 1st Instance of Tunis 
The Permanent Military Court of Kef 
 
Judges status  Judges and prosecutors are part 
of the same corps. Similar 
provisions are applicable to both 
judges and prosecutors in relation 
to selection, appointment, 
Candidates wishing to become judges or prosecutors take the same entry 
examination, and graduate from the same school, the Higher Institute for Magistrates 
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performance, promotion and 
discipline.  
 
Appointment  Judges are appointed by 
presidential decree with the 
assent of the High Judicial 
Council.  
 
The promotion of judges is currently based on the principle of seniority. Appointments 
to senior positions are made by presidential decree after consultation with the Prime 
Minister, based on a list of candidates prepared by the High Judicial Council. Judges 
of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the President of the Republic, the 
Assembly of People’s Representatives, and the High Judicial Council, who each 
appoint four members for a single six-year term.  
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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)  
The law of the UAE is largely codified and operates under a dual legal system based on Sharī’ʿa Law, Custom and legal principles 
influenced by the Egyptian and French civil laws. In the absences of provisions in the UAE codified law, Islamic principles are applied. With 
the exception of the Emirates of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah, the federal system has jurisdiction in the Emirates. There are three main 
branches within the court structure: civil, criminal and Sharī’ʿa, or Islamic, law. Two layers of civil courts exist: the federal system and the 
local systems. The Sharī’ʿa courts are in parallel with  the civil and criminal courts.  There are also “free zone areas” in the federation where 
other legal entities operate autonomously such as the DIFC Courts intended to attract foreign investors and businesses. 
  
Federal Courts Seated in the capital of the 
Union, the UAE has federal 
courts of First Instance 
As specified by the UAE Federal laws, appeals against judgements by the local 
judicial authorities in penal, civil, commercial and other cases may be made 
before the federal courts of First Instance. All or part of a local emirate court's 
jurisdiction to be referred to the federal courts of first instance. The Courts hear 
crimes committed within the boundaries of the permanent capital of the 
Federation personal status actions, civil actions, commercial actions and other 
actions between individuals which arise in the permanent capital of the 
Federation. 
 
Federal courts of appeal  The Federacy have circuits 
of appeal for hearing 
criminal, civil, commercial 
matters amongst other.  
 
The Circuits hear appeals lodged against judgments from the federal courts of 
First Instance and the local judicial authorities. 
Apex courts  The Federal Supreme Court 
is the highest court in the 
federal court structure for all 
Emirates (except for Dubai 
and Ras Al Khaimah)  
The Federal Supreme Court acts as an appellate court with respect to the 
decisions of lower courts, and also supervises lower courts to ensure that they 
are applying and interpreting the law in a consistent manner. Lower courts must 
abide by the legal principles set down by this Court. The Court also adjudicates 
on jurisdictional conflicts between federal judicial authorities and the local judicial 
authorities as well as jurisdictional conflicts arising from two or more Emirates.   
 
In addition, the Court has the jurisdiction to hear disputes between the Emirates, 
or between Emirates and the Federal Government. It also examines the 
constitutionality and legality of federal and local laws and Interrogates Ministers 
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and senior federal officials on the basis of a request by the Federal Supreme 
Council. The Court hear crimes directly affecting the interests of the federation; 
such as crimes relating to internal or external security of the Federation. The 
judgements of the Federal Supreme Court are final and binding.  
 
Administrative No separate Administrative 
judicial branch. Heard by the 
Civil Courts.  
 
   
Religious Sharī’ʿa or Islamic courts 
work alongside the civil and 
criminal courts in the UAE. 
The Sharī’ʿa court is the 
Islamic court in the UAE and 
is primarily responsible for 
civil matters between 
Muslims only. 
Sharī’ʿa courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear family disputes, including 
matters involving divorce, inheritances, child custody, child abuse and 
guardianship of minors. The Sharī’ʿa court may, at the federal level only 
(excluding Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah). The courts also hear appeals of certain 
criminal cases.  
 
 
Special courts 
  
 
  
 Labour Courts handle cases filed by private sector employees or employers 
against one another. Labour cases can be appealed depending on the value that 
is being claimed.  
Commercial courts handle commercial contracts and commitments, banking 
processes, commercial papers, bankruptcy and its reconciliation issues. 
 
Military & Security  Courts for military personnel and tried in a separate court system.  
 
Judges status  At the federal level, Ministry 
of Justice oversees the 
courts and prosecution 
departments across the UAE.  
The Ministry of Justice appoints judges and deals with matters connected with 
the federal courts of the first instance in respect of their organisation, formation, 
departments, local jurisdiction, procedures and conditions of  judicial service. 
 
Judges are appointed by the federal president following approval by the Federal 
Supreme Council, the highest executive and legislative authority consisting of 
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the seven emirate rulers. Judges serve until retirement age or the expiry of their 
appointment terms 
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Appendix 2: English translation of cover letter for Survey questionnaire  
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Justice X 
 
My name is Sara Razai and I am a doctoral student in Law at University College London (UCL)'s 
Judicial institute. I am conducting a research in order to help increase understanding and 
knowledge of the work of judges in the Arab region. I am inviting you to take part in a brief 
survey. The survey explores your experience and views of being a judge. The survey is 
strictly anonymous and the information provided cannot be traced back to any participant.  
 
To access the survey please choose and click on your preferred version below:  
 
https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk/s?s=47482 (English version) 
https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk/s?s=47482&lang=fr_FR (French version) 
https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk/s?s=47482&lang=ar (Arabic version) 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider my request. Your participation will be extremely 
helpful to my research and to help understand the valuable work judges in the Arab region do.  
 
Kind regards,  
Sara 
 
 
 
Sara Razai 
PhD Candidate / Teaching Fellow 
Judicial Institute, Faculty of Laws 
University College London  
sara.razai@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail. This email, including any attachments, is confidential. If you 
are not an intended recipient, please inform the sender immediately and destroy this email. Do not use, copy or disclose 
this email.  
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Appendix 3: Arab Judges Survey (English version)
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(1/13) 
Section 1 - Your Judicial Post 
 
Q1: In which Arab country do you hold a judicial post?If you hold a judicial post in more than one Arab country, please
tick the country which you consider to be where you hold your main judicial post
 
 
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
  
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q2: What is your current employment status as a judge?
 
 
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
  
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q3: In what type(s) of court(s) have you served as a judge? 
 
Algeria Kuwait Oman Syria
Bahrain Lebanon Palestine Tunisia
Egypt Libya Qatar United Arab Emirates
Iraq Mauritania Saudi Arabia Yemen
Jordan Morocco Sudan Other
Active (full-time) Retired Other (Please specify)
Active (part-time)
Trial only Appellate only Other (Please specify)
Trial and Appellate
Page 2 of 18
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
  
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q4: What type of legal matters do you deal with in your current judicial role?(Please tick as many options as apply to
you)
 
 
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
  
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q5: How many years in total have you served as a judge?
 
Civil Administrative Military
Criminal Religious Other (please specify)
Family Constitutional
Less than 1 year 7 - 11 years 17 - 20 years 26 - 30 years
1 - 6 years 12 - 16 years 21 - 25 years More than 30 years
Page 3 of 18
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(2/13)
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
  
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q4: What type of legal matters do you deal with in your current judicial role?(Please tick as many options as apply to
you)
 
 
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
  
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q5: How many years in total have you served as a judge?
 
Civil Administrative Military
Criminal Religious Other (please specify)
Family Constitutional
Less than 1 year 7 - 11 years 17 - 20 years 26 - 30 years
1 - 6 years 12 - 16 years 21 - 25 years More than 30 years
Page 3 of 18
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(3/13)
Section 2- Becoming a Judge 
 
 
Q6: Before being appointed to the judiciary, did you hold any of the following legal posts? (Please tick as many
options that apply to you)
 
 
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
  
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q7: Looking back, to what extent do you feel your previous work experience prepared you for your judicial post? 
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q8: Did you have any judicial training when you were first appointed as a judge? 
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
Public Lawyer (e.g., government lawyer, prosecutor, etc.)
Private Lawyer
Law Professor
I was appointed to the judiciary directly from law school
Other (Please specify)
Not at all Somewhat Fully
Yes No
Page 4 of 18
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(4/13)
Section 3 - Being a Judge 
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
 
 
Q9: "As a judge, I feel I provide an important service to society."
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q10: "There is a difference between what I think the job of a judge is and the way the public in my country see it."
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q11: "Belonging to the judiciary is an important part of my self-image."
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
Strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Disagree
Agree Disagree
Strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Disagree
Agree Disagree
Strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Disagree
Agree Disagree
Page 5 of 18
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(5/13)
 
 
Q12: &ldquo;The role of a judge in my country is different than the role of the judge in other Arab countries in the
region.&rdquo;
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q13: &ldquo;The role of a judge in my country is different than the role of the judge in Western countries.&rdquo;
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q14: Which of the following roles do you think are most important for judges in your country? Rank the following in
terms of which roles are most important for judges in your country (where 1 = MOST IMPORTANT and 6 = LEAST
IMPORTANT )
 
Strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Disagree
Agree Disagree
Strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Disagree
Agree Disagree
Rank
Applier of the law
Guardian of the community
Administrator of justice
Architect of the country's body of
law
Enforcer of legal rules
Arbiter of morality
Page 6 of 18
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
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Section 4 - Qualities of judges
 
 
Q15: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q16: To what extent do you feel the following qualities are important for a judge to have to do their job well? 
 
Strongly Agree Agree
Neither disagree
nor agree Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
The judiciary in my
country is admired by the
public
The judiciary in my
country is thought to be
ineffective compared to
other branches of
government
The public respect the
judiciary in my country
The public think that the
judiciary needs to change
Extremely important Important
Of limited
importance Not important at all
Personal integrity
Knowledge of the law
Strong moral principles
Dealing impartially with parties
to cases
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Q15: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q16: To what extent do you feel the following qualities are important for a judge to have to do their job well? 
 
Strongly Agree Agree
Neither disagree
nor agree Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
The judiciary in my
country is admired by the
public
he judiciary in my
ountry is thought to be
i effective compared to
other branches of
government
The public respect the
judiciary in my country
The public think that the
judiciary needs to change
Extremely important Important
Of limited
importance Not important at all
Personal integrity
Knowledge of the law
Str ng moral principles
Dealing impartially with parties
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Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q17: Which of the following do you think are the most important qualities needed by a judge when working with other
judges?(Rank the following qualities in terms of their importance where 1 = MOST IMPORTANT and 9 = LEAST
IMPORTANT)
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
Int llectual honesty
Personal conduct in public
Objectivity in decision-making
Efficient work habits
Decision-writing abilities
Awareness of broader social
and political issues
Hold firm views
Show leadership amongst judges
Respect the views of others even
if you disagree
Acknowledge the good work of
others
Be receptive to change and
persuasion
Show independence of mind
Exercise good manners in dealing
with others
Keep arguments moderate
Page 9 of 18
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Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q17: Which of the following do you think are the most important qualities needed by a judge when working with other
judges?(Rank the following qualities in terms of their importance where 1 = MOST IMPORTANT and 9 = LEAST
IMPORTANT)
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
Intellectual honesty
Personal conduct in public
Objectivity in decision-making
Efficient work habits
Decision-writing abilities
Awareness of broader social
and political issues
Hold firm views
Show leadership amongst judges
Respect the views of others even
if you disagree
Acknowledge the good work of
others
Be receptive to change and
persuasion
Show independence of mind
Exercise good manners in dealing
with others
Keep arguments moderate
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Q18: To what extent do you feel the following qualities are valued by the judges you work with?
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
Valued highly Valued Valued a little Not valued at all
ersonal integrity
Knowledge of the law
Strong moral principles
Dealing impartially with parties
to cases
Intellectual honesty
Personal conduct in public
Objectivity in decision-making
Efficient work habits
Decision-writing abilities
Awareness of broader social
and political issues
Page 10 of 18
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Section 5 - Judicial Decision-Making
 
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
 
 
Q19: "Through cases brought to the courts, judges must constantly balance conflicting interests in society"
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q20: "It is important that judges keep in constant contact with changing social mores in order to make their decisions
relevant to the community"
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q21: "It is more important that judicial decisions be just than that the letter of the law be adhered to"
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
Strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Disagree
Agree Disagree
Strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Disagree
Agree Disagree
Strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Disagree
Agree Disagree
Page 11 of 18
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Q22: "Judges should use their knowledge of social and political factors, as well as the law, in making their decisions. "
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q23: When a judge decides a case, how influential do you think the following factors are for a judge? 
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q24: To what extent to you agree with the following statements?
 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
Very influential Influential
Somewhat
influential Not influential at all
Requirements of law and order
Judges’ knowledge of social
and political factors
What the public expects
Judges' view of justice in the
case
Fair application of law
Social consequences of the
decision
What officials recommend
Following previous decisions
Page 12 of 18
Strongly Agree Agree
Neither Disagree
nor Agree Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
State judges should be
able to interpret religious
laws
State judges should be
able to develop religious
laws
Page 13 of 18
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Section 6 - Judges and the Law  
 
 
Q25: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following definitions of the rule of the law?
 
Agree Disagree
The rule of law means that a
government abides by existing
laws
The rule of law means that a
government respects judges’
rulings
The rule of law means
ensuring law and order to
protect the lives and property
of citizens
The rule of law means
equality between citizens
The rule of law means
efficient and predictable
justice
The rule of law is based on
the protection of human rights
The rule of law is based on
divine justice
The rule of law does not have
a fixed and precise meaning
The meaning of the rule of law
can differ between different
legal traditions
Other (Please specify in box
below)
Page 14 of 18
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
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Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q26: How influential are the following factors to a judge in deciding a case? 
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q27: In your job as a judge, how much importance do you place on the following groups? 
 
Very influential Influential
Somewhat
influential Not influential at all
Decisions closest in facts to
the present case
Past decisions of the higher
courts
Previous decisions, when clear
and directly relevant
Extremely important Important
Of limited
importance Not important at all
The public
Lawyers
Prosecutors
Parties in cases that appear
before me
Court staff
Judicial colleagues
Senior figures in the judiciary
Media
Religious Authorities
Page 15 of 18 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q28: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
Government
Strongly Agree Agree
Neither disagree
nor agree Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Judges are merely
instruments of the law and
can will nothing
It is possible for a judge
always to be politically
neutral and nonpartisan in
deciding cases
Adherence to past
decisions must be the rule
rather than the exception
if litigants are to have faith
in the continuity of law
Page 16 of 18
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Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
 
 
Q28: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
 
 
Please feel free to provide any further comments in the box below 
Government
Strongly Agree Agree
Neither disagree
nor agree Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Judges are merely
instruments of the law and
can will nothing
It is possible for a judge
always to be politically
neutral and nonpartisan in
deciding cases
Adherence to past
decisions must be the rule
rather than the exception
if litigants are to have faith
in the continuity of law
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Section 7 - About you 
 
 
Q29: Are you:
 
 
 
Q30: Please indicate your age group:
 
 
 
Q31: What is your country of nationality?
 
 
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
 
 
 
Q32: What is your religious affiliation?
 
 
If you have chosen "other", please specify: 
 
 
 
Q33: Finally, is there anything you would like to say about your role as a judge that has not been covered in the
survey? 
 
Female Male
Under 25 31 - 35 41 - 45 51 - 55 61 - 65 66 -70 Over 70
26 - 30 36 - 40 46 -50 56 - 60
Algeria Libya Sudan
Bahrain Mauritania Syria
Egypt Morocco Tunisia
Iraq Oman United Arab Emirates
Jordan Palestine Yemen
Kuwait Qatar Other (Please specify)
Lebanon Saudi Arabia
None I prefer not to say Please specify
Page 17 of 18
Thank you very much for taking the time to share your views.  Your contribution has been
very valuable and is very much appreciated.
Should you wish to see the results of this survey please send an e-mail to
Sara.razai@ucl.ac.uk and I will share the findings with you when the survey has ended and
the results have been analysed
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Appendix 4: Country-based from the Arab Judges Survey  
(Chapter 8) 
 
Figure 35 Arab judges’ view of most important judicial roles, by jurisdiction (top 3 preferences combined) (n=60) 
 
4
3
10
12
18
3
4
10
16
18
2
4
8
11
7
1
1
7
12
16
2
2
6
2
1
1
5
3
Other  (n=4)
Tunisia  (n=5)
Lebanon (n=14)
Egypt  (n=17)
Saudi  Arabia (n=20)
Administrator of justice Applier of the law Enforcer of legal rules
Guardian of the community Architect of the country's body of law Arbiter of morality
 310  
Figure 36 Arab judges’ view of whether their role is different than the role of the judge in other Arab countries, by jurisdiction 
(n=63) 
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Figure 37 Arab judges’ view of whether their role is different than the role of the judge in Western countries, by jurisdiction (n=63) 
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Table 30 Arab judges’ assessment of the influence of precedent on their judicial decision-making, by jurisdiction (n=48) 
How influential are the 
following factors to a 
judge in deciding a 
case? 
 
Judges saying very influential or influential 
Egypt Saudi Arabia Lebanon Other725 All Arab Judges combined 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
“Precedent, when clear 
and directly relevant” 
 
13 86.6 13 92.8 9 81.8 5 62.5 40 83.3 
“Past decisions of the 
supreme court” 
 
14 93.3 11 78.5 8 72.7 5 62.5 38 79.1 
“Decisions closest in 
facts to the present 
case” 
 
12 80.0 12 85.7 6 54.5 6 75 36 75.0 
 n=15  n=14  n=11  n=8  n=48   
                                               
725 Tunisia (n=4), Palestine (n=2), Syria (n=1) and Jordan (n=1) 
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Table 31 Proportion of Arab judges that agree with precedent oriented statements, by jurisdiction (n=48) 
Please indicate whether you agree or 
disagree with the following statements: 
Egypt Saudi Arabia Lebanon Other
726 
All Arab Judges 
combined 
Level of agreement 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
 
“It is possible for a judge always to be 
politically neutral and nonpartisan in deciding 
cases” 
10 66.6 9 64.2 8 72.7 7 87.5 34 70.8 
 
“Adherence to precedent must be the rule 
rather than the exception if litigants are to 
have faith in the continuity of law” 
4 26.6 5 35.7 1  9.0 3 37.5 13 27.0 
 
“Judges are merely instruments of the law 
and can will nothing” 
2 13.3 0 0.0 1 9.0 1 12.5 4 8.3 
 
 n=15  n=14  n=11  n=8  n=48  
 
                                               
726 Tunisia (n=4), Palestine (n=2), Syria (n=1) and Jordan (n=1) 
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Table 32 Arab judges’ agreement with narrowly worded statements on social and personal factors in decision-making, by 
jurisdiction (n=48) 
When a judge decides a case, how 
influential do you think the following 
factors are for a judge? 
Egypt Saudi Arabia Lebanon Other727 
All Arab Judges 
combined 
Level of influence 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
 
“Requirements of law and order” 14 93.3 14 100 11 100 8 100 47 97.9 
 
“Judge’s view of justice in the case” 12 80.0 12 85.7 7 63.6 6 75 37 77.0 
 
“The social consequences of decision” 7 46.6 8 57.1 7 63.6 4 50 26 54.1 
 
“What the public expects 3 20 0 0.0 2 18.1 1 12.5 6 12.5 
 
 
n=15  n=14  n=11  n=8  n=48  
 
                                               
727 Tunisia (n=4), Palestine (n=2), Syria (n=1) and Jordan (n=1) 
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Table 33 Arab judges’ agreement with broadly worded statements on public and social factors in judicial decision-making, by 
jurisdiction (n=48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
728 Tunisia (n=4), Palestine (n=2), Syria (n=1) and Jordan (n=1) 
Please indicate whether you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements: 
 
Egypt Saudi Arabia Lebanon Other
728 All Arab Judges combined 
Level of agreement 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
“It is important that judges keep in 
constant contact with changing social 
mores in order to make their decisions 
relevant to the community” 
12 80.0 14 100 9 81.8 5 62.5 40 83.3 
“It is more important that judicial 
decisions be just than that the letter of 
the law be adhered to” 
13 86.6 13 92.8 9 81.8 4 50.0 39 81.2 
“Judges should use their knowledge of 
social and political factors, as well as the 
law, in making their decisions” 
8 53.3 11 78.5 6 54.5 5 62.5 30 62.5 
“Through cases brought to the courts, 
judges must constantly balance 
conflicting interests in society” 
13 86.6 8 57.1 7 63.6 4 50.0 32 66.6 
 n=15  n=14  n=11  n=8  n=48  
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Chapter 9 
 
Figure 38 Degree of importance attached to judicial colleagues, by jurisdiction (n=48) 
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Figure 39 Degree of importance attached to senior figures in the judiciary (n=48) 
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Table 34 Arab judges’ view of important qualities needed to do their job well, by jurisdiction (n=52) 
Judicial Qualities Egypt  Saudi 
Arabia  
Lebanon Other  Total  
     % 
Personal integrity 16 17 13 6 100 
Dealing impartially with parties to cases 16 17 13 6 100 
Strong moral principles 16 17 12 6 98 
Knowledge of the law 16 17 13 5 98 
Objectivity in decision-making 16 14 12 6 92.3 
Decision-writing abilities 16 14 12 5 90.3 
Intellectual honesty 16 10 12 6 84.6 
Efficient work habits 14 14 10 5 82.6 
Personal conduct in public  16 11 9 4 76.9 
Awareness of broader social and political issue 14 10 11 4 75 
 n=16 n=17 n=13 n=6 n=52 
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Table 35 Arab judges’ view of qualities valued by their colleagues (n=52) 
Qualities valued by Judicial peers   Egypt Saudi 
Arabia 
Lebanon Other Total 
     % 
Knowledge of the law 13 16 12 6 90.3 
Dealing impartially with parties to cases 14 16 8 6 84.6 
Personal integrity  13 17 11 3 84.6 
Strong moral principles 11 15 11 3 76.9 
Objectivity in decision-making 11 15 9 5 76.9 
Personal conduct in public  12 12 11 4 75 
Intellectual honesty 12 15 9 4 76.9 
Decision-writing abilities 9 12 8 4 63.4 
Awareness of broader social and political issue 8 11 8 4 59.6 
Efficient work habits 8 10 6 3 51.9 
 n=16 n=17 n=13 n=6 n=52 
 
 
 
 
 
